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NOTE
This thesis broadly reviews the developments which have 
occurred in relation to the implementation of equal pay 
principles within the Australian wage fixing process up until 
March 1991. Although updated references have been included in 
relation to certain events occurring since this date, an 
analysis of the Industrial Relations Commission's decision in 
the National Wage Case, April 1991 is not included in this 
study.
It is worth noting that several issues relevant to wage 
discrimination were raised in this recent National Wage Case 
decision chiefly through submissions presented by the 
Australian Federation of Business and Professional Women.
These submissions called for a work skills value inquiry to 
review all aspects of skill evaluation, including those with a 
bearing on the relative evaluation of male and female work.
The Commission declined to convene such an inquiry, expressing 
the view that current wage fixing principles already provided 
ample scope for the review of any specific instances where 
work typically performed by women was claimed to be 
undervalued. The Commission confirmed that the 1972 equal pay principles of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission would continue to apply to special instances, and 
invited parties appearing before the Commissioner in 
individual cases to raise any issue they consider inconsistent 
with the provisions of Section 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 fCtM.
Significantly the Commission acknowledged that enterprise 
bargaining - especially bargaining for overaward payments - 
placed those sectors of the labour force where women 
predominate at a relative disadvantage.
The above developments suggest that the application of equal 
pay principles will remain an issue relevant to industrial 
wage setting policy and practice into the 1990's.
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CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE OF 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE DETERMINATION OF WAGE RATES
OVERVIEW
The relationship between industrial law and discrimination law 
with regard to the determination of wage rates involves an 
area of considerable social, economic and legal complexity. 
This thesis is directed to examining the legal aspects of this 
relationship. It seeks to explore the impact that legal 
developments in the area of discrimination law may have upon 
the determination of wage rates for women within Australia's 
centralised wage fixing system. The primary focus of the 
study involves an analysis of Australia's federal industrial 
and discrimination laws in so far as they apply to the 
implementation of equal pay principles. This involves an 
analysis of the problems encountered with respect to indirect 
discrimination in the wage determination process, and a close 
examination of the difficulties in applying the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value to assist in remedying these 
problems. The ways in which the provisions of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) may affect the functions of 
Australia's federal wage fixing authorities in determining 
industrial award wage orders, and national wage fixing 
principles is also considered.
1
For several reasons, an emphasis has been placed throughout 
this study on developments occurring in the area of federal 
industrial law. To begin with, the federal Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission has, for a considerable period, been 
regarded as Australia's predominant single wage fixing 
authority.-^ Its decisions in major cases have traditionally 
influenced the determinations of State industrial wage 
tribunals. Its wage setting practices have in addition been 
regularly adopted within the various State industrial 
jurisdictions. This is no less so in the area of equal pay 
where the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission has played 
an important role in removing discriminatory wage fixing 
practices through a gradual round of national wage decisions. 
These decisions have included, the introduction of the "total 
wage" concept in 1967,^ the Equal Pay decisions of 1969^ and
1 E J Sykes and H J Glasbeck; Labour Law in Australia,
Butterworths Sydney, 1972,.p. 565; S Deery and D Plowman, 
Australian Industrial Relations, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Sydney, 1985, p 129; in relation to the area of 
equal pay, see C O'Donnell and N Golder, "A Comparative 
Analysis of Equal Pay in the United States, Britain and 
Australia", Australian Feminist Studies, Summer 1986, p 
73; Department of Employment Education and Training, "Pay 
Equity: A Survey of 7 OECD Countries", Information Paper
No 5, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p 49
2 National Wage Case (1967) 118 CAR 655
3 Equal Pay Cases (1969) 127 CAR 1142
2
1972,** and the abolition of the adult male minimum wage in 
1974.4 5 6
The industrial arbitration scheme established under federal 
law is, in a number of respects, comparable to that of the 
State industrial system in that similar wage settlement 
methods, and tribunal procedures apply. Although differences 
in approach have at times emerged between the two systems in 
the area of equal pay, "with the federal tribunal acting for 
some time as the cart rather than the horse",^ since 1972 the 
development of equal pay principles has been more prominent 
within the federal industrial jurisdiction.7 While signs have 
emerged over more recent years to suggest that certain State 
Government initiatives may once again be providing a lead to 
the practical implementation of equal pay principles within
4 National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172
5 National Wage Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
6 J Nieuwenhuysen and J Hicks, "Equal Pay for Women in 
Australia and New Zealand" in Pettman B (Ed), Ecrual Pay 
for Women; Progress and Problems in Seven Countries. MCB 
Books, Bradford 1975, p 75
7 C Short, "Equal Pay - What Happened?" (1986) 28 Journal 
of Industrial Relations 315, p 329
3
the industrial relations field,8 9the broad national focus of 
the federal Industrial Relations Commission suggests that the 
ongoing development of equal pay measures will continue to be 
a significant issue relevant to the area of federal industrial 
law. ^
This study seeks to provide a conceptual framework for 
examining the issues arising as a result of the application of 
equal pay measures within the context of industrial 
conciliation and arbitration. Most importantly, a specialised 
study of the federal industrial law jurisdiction provides the 
basis for analysing the functions of the federal Industrial 
Relations Commission in relation to the determination of 
women's wages in accordance with the principles contained 
within the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
8 Office of the Director of Equal Opportunity in Public 
Employment, "The Structural Efficiency Principle and 
Implications for Equal Employment Opportunity",
Guidelines For Departments and Authorities, DEOPE,
Sydney, December 1989; NSW Department of Industrial 
Relations and Employment, Women's Directorate, 
Restructuring For Excellence and Equity, Sydney, 1990; 
Women's Employment Branch, Department of Labour, Women 
and Award Restructuring, Melbourne, 1990; Commission for 
Equal Opportunity, Government Policies and Practices, 
Section 82(b) Report No 4: Job Evaluation and 
Broadbanding in the Western Australian Public Service, 
EOC, Perth, 1987; South Australian Women's Advisers Unit, 
Department of Labour, Award Restructuring and Women 
Workers, Discussion Paper, Adelaide, May 1989
9 See, for example, Child Care Industry (ACT) Award 1985 
and Child Care Industry (NT) Award 1986, Decision of the 
Industrial Relations Commission, September 19909, Dec 
1001/90 S Print J 4316 (Child Care Workers Case)
4
The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) is the key legislation
which implements Australia's obligations under international 
law resulting from the ratification of the two important 
international treaties relevant to the application of equal 
pay principles. These treaty agreements, ratified in 1974 and 
1983, respectively, are the International Labour 
Organisation's Convention 100 Concerning Equal Remuneration 
For Men and Women Workers For Work of Equal Value (ILO 100), 
and the United Nation's Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (the UN Convention).
Both these Conventions expressly contain provisions requiring 
the implementation of the principles of equal pay for equal 
work, and equal pay for work of equal value. Significantly, 
it is the UN Convention which has provided, in part, the 
constitutional basis for the enactment of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) within Australian domestic law.
A study of Australia's federal discrimination legislation, 
would appear, therefore, to provide the most comprehensive 
means of evaluating the legislative measures adopted with 
reference to Australia's treaty obligations in the area of 
equal pay.
As mentioned above, Australia's obligations under 
international law include a requirement to develop and apply 
the basic principle of equal pay for work of equal value.
This central principle will now be examined.
5
EQUAL PAY FOR WORK OF EQUAL VALUE
The concept of equal pay for work of equal value has formed 
the subject of international debate over several years in the 
course of determining appropriate measures for the elimination 
of sex discrimination in relation to wage payments. Equal pay 
for work of equal value requires the determination of wage 
rates on the basis of the value of the work performed so as to 
ensure that wage rates are legitimately set without regard to 
the sex of an employee. It allows for comparisons to be made 
between identifiably male occupations, and identifiably female 
occupations, having regard to such factors as effort, skill, 
responsibility and working conditions. Such comparisons serve 
to identify the extent to which wage differences may possibly 
occur as a result of sex discrimination in the wage setting 
process.^
The underlying theory of this approach suggests that women's 
work has traditionally been undervalued precisely because it 
is work usually performed by women. The same social attitudes 
and institutional biases which have historically led to the 
prevalence of separate, and distinctly lower wage scales for 
women are arguably replicated in current wage setting 
practices. The implementation of equal pay for work of equal
10 For a general description of the principle of equal pay 
for work of equal value see, C Burton, The Promise and 
the Price. Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1990, Chapter 11; 
International Labour Conference, Report III (Part 4B) 
General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Equal 
Remuneration, ILO, Geneva 1986
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value has been viewed as providing a means by which the gender 
bias inherent in such practices may be analysed.^ This 
analysis has occurred most recently through the development, 
and use of job evaluation procedures by which alleged 
discrimination in the fixing of wage rates can be 
systematically reviewed.
On a broader policy level, the implementation of equal pay for 
work of equal value may be viewed as a means of addressing the 
persisting wage gap which exists between men and women workers 
by providing a focus for reducing that part of the wage gap 
attributable to gender. For reasons which will shortly be 
outlined, it is unlikely, however, that even the complete 
implementation of equal pay for work of equal value will 
entirely remove the gender wage gap. The promotion of the 
principle has been recognised, nonetheless, as an important 
measure to ensure at least some narrowing of the ratio between 
male and female earnings.1^
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value needs to be 
distinguished at the outset from the more widely understood 
concept of "equal pay for equal work". This latter expression 
covers the situation where work is carried out under
11 C Burton, op.cit., Chapter 11
12 id; C Burton, R Hag & G Thompson, Womens Worth, Pay
Equity and Job Evaluation in Australia, AGPS, Canberra 
1987, pp 1-9? C Burton, "Gender Bias in Job Evaluation", 
Monograph No 3, Affirmative Action Agency, Ambassador 
Press, Sydney, 1988; M Thornton, "(Un)equal Pay For Work 
of Equal Value", (1981) 23 Journal of IndustrialRelations 466, p 478
7
conditions where both male and female employees are performing 
the same, or substantially similar tasks. The term "equal pay 
for work of equal value" expands upon the concept of "equal 
pay for equal work" by requiring the payment of equal wages 
for different jobs which are equal in value. Complex issues 
here arise regarding the ways in which work value should be 
assessed, and by whom. In response to these issues, different 
approaches have developed within Australia, and overseas.13 A 
significant point which is worth noting here is that in 
Australia the value of work has consistently been held to 
refer to worth in terms of award wage, or salary fixation, as 
distinct from worth to the employer.14
In summary, equal pay for work of equal value extends to cover 
the review of wage rates in cases where male and female 
employees are not carrying out exactly the same, or even 
similar work tasks. The implementation of the principle may 
involve the evaluation of relative pay scales between 
different job classifications, for example, between such jobs
13 In relation to the assessment of work value in the 
implementation of the equal pay for work of equal value 
principle in the United Kingdom, see M Rubenstein, Equal 
Pay for Work of Equal Value, Macmillan, London, 1984;
C McCrudden, "Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value: the 
Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983", (1983), The 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 12 197; E Szyszczak, "Pay 
Inequalities and Equal Value Claims", (1988) Modern Law 
Review Vol. 48 139; in relation to the U.S. experience 
see generally P Weiler, "The Wages of Sex: The Uses and 
Limits of Comparable Worth", (1986) Harvard Law Review, 
Vol. 99, 1728
14 Equal Pay Cases (1969) 127 CAR at 1159; National Wage and 
Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172 at 180; Private 
Hospitals" and Doctors' Nurses (A.C.T.) Award (1986) 300 
CAR 190
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as a clothing cutter and a machinist, a nurse and a fitter and 
turner, or even presumably a childcare worker and an
1 cengineering tradesperson. J The proper application of the 
equal pay for work of equal value principle naturally involves 
*the comparative evaluation of work and skill in a non- 
discriminatory, or gender-neutral manner.
Although equal pay for work of equal value may encompass 
situations where jobs are like in nature and equal in value 
as, for example, in the case of a social worker and a 
psychologist, the principle does not necessarily require a 
comparison between like jobs. The emphasis remains on the 
identification of similarities in job value as distinct from 
similarities in job content alone.
The broad outline of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value which has been described roughly accords with what 
is commonly referred to in the United States as "comparable 
worth". Due to the similarities relevant to issues of wage 
discrimination, the two expressions are assumed in much of the 
literature to be interchangeable.-^ It is to be stressed, 
however, that clear differences exist in relation to the 
respective legal models within which the two principles have
15 See Child Care Workers Case, September 1990, S Print 
J4316. A detailed discussion of this decision is 
contained in Chapter Seven
16 See C Burton, op.cit., p 132
17 See M R Killingsworth, "Comparable Worth in Australia", 
The Economics of Comparable Worth. W E Upjohn Institute, 
Michigan, 1990 p 239
9
developed in Australia and the United States. The concept of 
comparable worth as evolved in overseas jurisdictions has, 
moreover, been ostensibly rejected by Australia's federal wage 
fixing authorities as being inappropriate to the uniquely
1  QAustralian industrial wage fixing system. ° It is important 
to note that it is within this centralised wage fixing system 
that the principle of equal pay for work of equal value has 
traditionally been applied in Australia.
It is also important to recognise that the adoption of the 
equal pay for work of equal value principle, as a standard to 
be applied by federal industrial wage tribunals, predates the 
introduction of federal discrimination legislation by some 
twelve years. The developments which have taken place through 
the industrial arbitration system with respect to the 
implementation of equal pay principles forms the subject of 
Chapter Two of this thesis.
Before proceeding to this study, however, a brief discussion 
will be presented regarding the general nature of 
discrimination in the wage determination process, and the 
difficulties in identifying this phenomenon from the mix of 
factors which lead to the inequalities between men and women's 
earnings. The complex range of factors giving rise to an 
inference of wage discrimination in the wage setting process 
will be considered, and it will be argued that a small, but
18 Private Hospitals' and Doctors' Nurses (A.C.T.) Award 
(1986) 300 CAR at p 191
10
significant residual of wage discrimination exists. The need 
to identify, and remedy the undervaluation of women's work 
within the Australian wage fixing system is canvassed in the 
course of this presentation. An overview of the legislative 
and non legislative responses to the application of equal pay 
principles is next described. An outline finally follows of 
the contents of the various Chapters included within this 
thesis.
THE PROBLEM OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION
Wage discrimination is a specific kind of employment 
discrimination relating to unequal treatment in the payment 
and setting of wage rates. It may occur directly with the 
payment of unequal wages to men and women performing the same, 
or materially similar work, or indirectly through the 
undervaluation of women's wages. It can arise as 
discrimination in the terms and conditions offered, or 
afforded in the course of employment, and may in some cases 
also be characterised as discrimination in the denial of equal 
opportunities for promotion. ^  Irrespective of the form it 
takes, the identification and treatment of wage discrimination 
fundamentally involves the review of wage setting practices 
and procedures.
In Australia direct sex discrimination in the payment of wages 
has been substantially remedied through the implementation of
19 See, for example, Koh v Mitsubishi (1985) EOC 92-134
11
the principle of equal pay for equal work within the
industrial arbitration system. Although evidence of direct
sex discrimination in the wage setting process has over recent
o nyears been detected, u explicit sex discrimination in the 
payment of wage rates is no longer viewed as an overriding 
feature of the Australian wage setting process. The large 
scale removal of direct wage discrimination in circumstances 
where men and women are performing identical work tasks has 
essentially resulted from the general processing of equal pay 
claims in the course of industrial award wage fixation, and 
from the extension in 1974 of the minimum award wage to female 
employees. x In contrast, the problem of indirect wage 
discrimination has yet to be comprehensively dealt with within 
the Australian wage fixing system. This is largely 
attributable to the difficulties in fully recognising, and 
treating the problem of indirect discrimination in the wage 
determination process. Unlike direct wage discrimination, 
where unfavourable treatment is apparent on the face of the 
employment contract, indirect wage discrimination is rarely 
obvious, or easy to demonstrate. Proof of indirect wage 
discrimination commonly involves the gathering of detailed 
evidence, and in all cases requires a thorough assessment of 
the economic and social factors which may otherwise account
20 See, for example, Equal Opportunity Commission, "Review 
of Industrial Awards and Agreements of Western 
Australia", Occasional Report. No 1, EOC, Perth 1987, p 
12
21 National Wage Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
22 See Burton, Hag and Thompson, op.cit.; McCrudden; op.cit.
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The legal,for differences in male and female earnings. 3^ 
social and economic issues to be determined as part of this 
assessment are frequently complex and contentious. The costs 
in obtaining the information and expert evidence necessary to 
support claims of indirect wage discrimination in such 
circumstances will characteristically involve considerable 
expense. There is, not surprisingly, very little conclusive 
data available at the organisational level to indicate the 
presence of indirect discrimination in the wage fixing process 
at large. It is partly because of this lack of clear evidence 
that the extent of discrimination in the wage determination 
process is extremely difficult to accurately assess. As a 
result the incidence of wage discrimination at a macro level 
has essentially come to be inferred, rather than directly 
established.^ There are, however, a number of factors giving 
rise to a strong inference of the existence of indirect sex 
discrimination in the payment of women's wage rates. The 
first of these relates to the major gap in male and female 
earnings.
THE MALE/FEMALE WAGE GAP
In Australia, the wage gap between men and women workers has 
not altered significantly over the past fifteen years, and in
23 Weiler, op.cit., 1986, p 1779-1795; Rubenstein, op.cit., 
1984 p 13-34; B Chiplin and P J Sloane, Tackling 
discrimination in the workplace, Cambridge University 
Press, London 1983 pp 122-132
24 id
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all components of earnings women continue to earn less than 
men.^ In 1989, average weekly total earnings for all female 
employees were 65% of those for all male employees. Earnings 
of full time female workers were 78% of male full time 
earnings, or 83% when average ordinary time earnings, 
excluding overtime are taken into account. If further 
adjustments are made to isolate award rates of pay, a gap in 
the range of 8%-10.9% remains between male and female average 
weekly earnings. In analysing these differences between 
male and female earnings it is important to acknowledge that 
the gender wage gap cannot wholly be explained by the 
phenomenon of wage discrimination. Clearly a variety of 
factors need to be taken into account in calculating the 
extent to which wage discrimination may contribute to the 
gender wage gap. These factors include, differences between 
men and women with respect to the length of hours worked, 
education and training, labour force experience, continuity of 
work history, demand and supply of labour, the effect of 
occupational and job segregation by sex, and even other forms 
of employment discrimination. The length of hours worked, or 
the lack of training received may, for example, result from 
discrimination in the denial of equal opportunity in 
employment, as distinct from discrimination in the actual
25 ABS Catalogue No 6302.0, Canberra, 1989
26 id
27 National Pay Equity Coalition, Submission to the 1988 
National Wage Case. June 1984, p 4; P Hall, "The Price of 
Wage Justice, The Costs of Delay”, Paper prepared at the 
Australian Federation of Business and Professional 
Women's Conference. Sydney, 15 July 1989, p 2
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determination of wage rates. The ability to perform overtime 
is very likely, in turn, to be linked to the higher demands 
placed on women to undertake family responsibilities and 
domestic home duties within the unpaid labour market.
In spite of the obvious difficulties in systematically 
quantifying the many variables which comprise the gender wage 
gap, much research has been directed to analysing the possible 
dimensions of wage discrimination by estimating the size of 
the residual earnings gap between male and female earnings 
after all such known variables have been accounted for.28 In 
much of this research, the use of economic regression analysis 
has been relied upon in an attempt to isolate the parameters 
of the residual wage gap from which the existence of wage 
discrimination may then be inferred. Although the size of the 
residual wage gap varies with the application of different 
methods with respect to different samples of male and female 
employees, estimates consistently reveal that a distinct part 
of the wage gap remains unexplained, even where standard
28 See Weiler, op.cit.; Rubenstein, op.cit.; Killingsworth, 
op. cit. ; B J Chapman and C Mulvey, "An Analysis of the 
Origins of Sex Differences in Australian Wages", (1986) 
The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, 504; R G 
Gregory, A Daly, & V Ho (1986), "A Tale of Two Countries: 
Equal Pay For Women in Australia and Britain", Discussion 
Paper No. 147, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Canberra; R G Gregory and V Ho, (1985) "Equal Pay and 
Comparable Worth: What Can the U.S. Learn From The Australian Experience?", Discussion Paper No 123. Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Canberra; R Drago, "The 
Extent of Wage Discrimination in Australia", Australian 
Bulletin of Labour, Volume 15, No 4, September 1989; N 
Agrawal, "Sources of Inequity Between Male and Female 
Wages in Australia", Australian Economic Review, No 84 
Summer 1986 26
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differences in worker characteristics, and other wage 
determination variables have been discounted.^  It may of 
course be possible that mismeasurement, or other undetected 
factors may be responsible for the existence of any residual 
wage gap estimated in this way. To date, however, the 
persisting and unexplained presence of this residual wage gap 
continues to raise the inference of indirect discrimination in 
the payment of wages. As Gregory and Ho note:
"The relative lack of success in explaining the pay gap 
therefore may indicate that pay discrimination is very 
large."30
This inference becomes stronger on a close analysis of the 
wage inequalities associated with the high degree of 
occupational segregation by gender within the labour market. 
This refers to the fact that most women work in a narrow 
concentration of jobs, occupations and industries. In 1989, 
55.2% of Australian women workers were employed in clerical
*3 1and sales related occupations, while 81.1% of women were
29 See for example B J Chapman and C Mulvey, op.cit., p 504; 
R G Gregory & V Ho, op.cit., p 314; Argrawal, op.cit. , p 
35; Weiler, op.cit., 1985
30 Gregory & Ho, op.cit., p 10
31 Australia Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 62030, 
Canberra, 1989
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"3  Oconcentrated in five main industries. Jobs within 
industries and occupations are also stratified by sex with 
women predominantly to be found in lower grade positions.
These high levels of occupational segregation strongly 
correlate with differences in earnings, with women most 
heavily concentrated in the lowpaying jobs, industries and 
occupations. Women earn less than men in all major 
occupational groups, and in the case of plant and machinery 
operators the gap between male and female earnings is as high 
as 27.4% in the case of average weekly ordinary time earnings, 
and 35% in the case of average weekly total earnings.^3 The 
statistical data in relation to sex segregation in the 
workforce plainly suggests that part of the earnings gap 
results from the high concentration of women workers in 
lowpaying jobs, industries and occupations. The slow rate of 
desegregation of occupational segregation by sex is generally 
viewed as providing part of the explanation for the persisting 
differentials between male and female earnings, although it is 
interesting to note that very little research has been 
conducted to assess the actual impact of occupational
32 id. For a closer analysis of the high levels of 
occupational segregation on the basis of sex within the 
Australian labour market, see S M Rimmer, "Occupational 
Segregation, Earnings Differentials and Status Among 
Australian Workers", Article to be published in the 
forthcoming September 1991 edition of Economic Record
33 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 6306.6, 
Canberra, 1988; For a more complete description of male 
and female earnings by occupation and industry, see 
Labour Resource Centre, Pay Equity for Women in 
Australia, National Women's Consultative Council, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1990
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segregation on the relative earnings of male and female 
workers.^
While it appears that occupational segregation has a distinct 
influence on the nature and extent of the gender wage gap, the 
reasons why women are heavily concentrated in low paying areas 
of employment are accordingly difficult to distinguish 
precisely . To begin with, it may be that women are 
performing less productive work than men as a result of less 
experience, training or fewer job skills. Some female 
employees may simply choose to engage in less well paid work 
as a tradeoff for fewer job demands, or flexibility in working 
hours. Other female workers, though equally capable may be 
relegated to less productive work as a result of employment 
discrimination. Alternatively, women may be performing work 
which is less paid because it is work predominantly performed 
by women. It is this last possible explanation of the 
disparity between male and female earnings which focuses on 
the issue of indirect discrimination in the wage setting 
process resulting from the undervaluation of women's work.
The existence of this form of indirect wage discrimination is 
broadly supported by much evidence which indicates that large
34 See S M Rimmer, "Occupational Segregation, Earning
Differentials, and Status Among Australian Workers", 
Unpublished paper, op.cit., p 11. Rimmer's conclusions 
suggest that occupational segregation per se may have 
less of an impact on the sex differentials in earnings 
than is generally assumed, and that a greater focus needs 
to be placed on examining the ways in which gender wage 
differences may be attributed to discriminatory wage 
practices
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proportions of female workers have a negative effect on the 
level of wage rates across occupations, and that where the sex 
composition of an occupation shifts to becoming predominantly 
female, wage rates do not maintain their relativity. 5^ The 
issue of the undervaluation of women's work will now be 
briefly examined.
THE UNDERVALUATION OF WOMEN'S WORK
Until as recently as 1974, explicit sex discrimination in the 
determination of wage rates historically formed an underlying 
feature of the Australian wage fixing system.^ From the 
earliest decisions of the Arbitration Court in the exercise of 
its powers under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 
(Cth), women's work was very clearly distinguished from that 
of men's, in accordance with the family wage concept by which 
wage rates were determined on the basis of the differential 
needs assumed to exist between men and women workers.^
Women's wage rates were traditionally regarded as demanding a
35 D T Treiman & H I Hartman, Women, Work and Wages: equal 
pay for jobs of equal value. National Academy Press, 
Washington, 1981 p 34-35; Rubenstein, op.cit., p 19; 
Weiler, op.cit., p 1790
36 See, Short, op.cit.; E Ryan & A Conlon, Gentle Invaders:
Australian Women at Work 1788-1974, Nelson, Melbourne, 
1975; R Hunter, "Women Workers and Federal Industrial 
Law: From Harvester to Comparable Worth", (1988) Volume
1 Number 1, Australian Journal of Labour Law, pp 147-164; 
M Thornton, "(Un)Equal Pay For Work of Equal Value", 
(1981), The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 23, 466
37 In relation to the introduction and purpose of the family 
needs concept, see the Harvester Decision; Ex Parte 
Harvester v McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1
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lesser entitlement than male wage rates, in a wage fixing 
system in which the participation of women employees was
■3 Qexpressly discouraged. ° Ironically, the first initiatives 
towards pay equity for women resulting from the earliest 
"equal pay" determinations of the industrial wage fixing 
system were primarily designed to exclude the competition of 
female workers from the ranks of male employment. The 
operation of such overt male bias in the determination of wage 
rates has been well documented by researchers over a period of
■a qdecades. * Their findings indicate that until 1950, minimum 
rates for women in individual awards remained at around 54% of 
the male basic wage.^ As late as 1974, a separate male 
minimum rate of pay existed within the federal industrial 
arbitration system. In the National Wacre Case decision^^ of 
that year, this minimum rate was extended to women wage 
earners in the form of an "adult wage", and the family 
component finally discarded from the minimum wage concept.
The likelihood that the attitudes, and labour market forces 
which led to such wage setting practices would dramatically 
change over a period of less than 17 years would seem to be 
remote. Anecdotal evidence of the undervaluation of women's 
work, the continuing identification of discriminatory award
38 See, for example the approach 
"problem" of female labour in 
Case (1912) 6 CAR 61
by Higgins J to the 
the Rural Workers Union
39 Supra, note 36
40 Short, op.cit., d 316
41 (1974) 157 CAR 293
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wage provisions,^  and the bringing of equal pay claims some 
18 years after the 1972 Equal Pay Decision,^3 would certainly 
suggest as much. The expectation that past discriminatory 
practices have indirectly carried over into the contemporary 
wage determination system is also consistent with a large body 
of sociological findings which demonstrate the pervasiveness 
of discriminatory attitudes and cultural norms in the 
differential evaluation of male and female characteristics and 
work.^ Much of this evidence points to the phenomenon of 
indirect discrimination through the undervaluation of women's 
work. Women workers are generally evaluated less highly in 
terms of job performance than men with whom they share the 
same characteristics, and the more a job is perceived to be 
"women's work" associated with "feminine" attributes, the less 
it is likely to be paid. The 'feminine' nature ascribed to
42 Anti-Discrimination Board N.S.W., "Discrimination in Legislation", Report of the Anti-Discrimination Board in Accordance with Section 121 of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977, Part I, Volumes 1 & 2, 1978; L Philips, "Casual 
and Part Time Work, A Survey of the Provisions Contained 
in New South Wales Awards, Women's Co-Ordination Unit,
NSW Premier's Department 1982; J O'Dea, C Byrt and I 
Beaumanis, Review of Discriminations Provisions in South 
Australian Awards and Agreements, South Australia, 
Department of Labour, 1987; D Loxton, "Discrimination in 
By-Laws", A Review of the By-Laws of Municipalities in 
Western Australia, Report No.l Equal Opportunity 
Commission, Perth, 1988; Department of Employment and 
Training, Women's Bureau & Office of the Status of Women, 
Survey of Sex Differentiating Provisions in Federal 
Awards, Canberra, 1987; Q Bryce, Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner, "An Address to Worksafe Australia, National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Paper 
presented to the Lead Forum, August 1990.
43 See, for example, the Child Care Workers Case, Industrial 
Relations Commission, September 1990, S Print J4316
44 See C Burton 1991, op.cit. , p 88 ff; Weiler, op.cit., p 
1790; Treiman and Hartman, op.cit., p 34 ff
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this work may mean that it is not as highly valued in the 
employment context, and there is much literature which 
suggests that the skills conventionally brought by women to 
their jobs are perceived as requiring less ability and effort 
relative to the skills more commonly associated with male 
dominated occupations.^ Jobs commonly held by women in such 
areas as secretarial and factory process work, for example, 
frequently require a capacity to perform interrupted, or 
simultaneous tasks with high levels of speed and manual 
dexterity. Such fine motor movement skills and co-ordination 
skills may, however, receive little, or no recognition, while 
certain skills associated with predominantly male occupations, 
such as lifting of weights, are implicitly rewarded. The 
different labour value placed on the handling of finances and 
machinery, relative to the remedial care of people, or the 
education of children, has similarly been cited to illustrate 
the ways in which lesser value is regularly assigned to work 
predominantly carried out by women.^ A common example 
relates to the situation where attending to automobiles, a 
largely male occupation, is more highly remunerated than 
caring for children, even in circumstances where levels of
45 For a summary of this literature see, C Burton 1991, 
op.cit., p 88 ff
46 ibid, pp 98-99. See too Department of Employment, 
Education and Training, The Women's Bureau, Working Party 
on the Role of Women in the Economy; Equal Pay 
Discussion Paper, Canberra, 1988, p 24
22
Thistraining and education are more than comparable. ^  
particular comparison of job classifications also practically 
illustrates the tendency to inadequately identify and 
compensate the negative working conditions of jobs 
predominantly performed by women. While dirt, grease, noise, 
vibration and the lifting of machinery may be taken into 
account in the evaluation of a mechanic's working conditions, 
less attention may be directed to the disadvantageous working 
conditions regularly encountered by child care workers with 
respect to exposure to noise, lifting of weights, soiled 
clothing, the development and behavioural problems of small 
children, and so on. Similar kinds of considerations arguably 
also apply to the work carried out by nurses, nurses aides, 
laundry workers, and workers engaged in other service sector 
occupations.
Another factor relevant to the undervaluation of the work 
conventionally performed by women concerns the way in which 
work value is determined by the assessment of certified 
qualifications and training. Interpersonal communication 
skills, organisational skills and other more specific skills 
such as sewing, cleaning, cooking, laundering, typing, 
keyboard and switch board expertise are commonly brought to 
the job by female employees having been acquired elsewhere. 
Although these skills may be a prerequisite to employment,
47 E Sorensen, "The Wage Effects of Occupational Sex
Composition: A Review and New Findings", Policy and
Research Report, The Urban Institute, Washington D.C., 
1988
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they often receive either no formal creditation or inadequate 
recognition. Male dominated occupations are more likely on 
the other hand to be associated with preliminary training 
programs, such as apprenticeship, which are more likely to 
receive automatic accreditation, and as a result higher wage 
rates.
A comprehensive analysis of the ways in which work 
conventionally performed by women may be undervalued is well 
beyond the scope of present discussion. The above examples 
attempt to provide, however, some understanding of the ways in 
which indirect discrimination may operate through the 
systematic undervaluation of women's skills and related wage 
levels.
The present inability to explain fully the gender wage gap, 
when viewed together with the propensity for the subtle 
undervaluation of women's worth, suggests that more effective 
mechanisms for the review of alleged discrimination in the 
payment of wages may be warranted. Even if it is assumed that 
only a very small proportion of the residual wage gap is 
attributable to such indirect forms of wage discrimination, 
the economic loss to women workers arising from such 
discrimination would arguably be substantial. The need to
48 See Department of Employment, Education and Training,
Women's Bureau, New Brooms: Restructuring and Training 
Issues For Women in the Service Sector, AGPS, Canberra, 
1989; B Pocock, Demanding Skill. Women and technical 
education in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Australia, Sydney 
1990, pp xiii-xvi
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provide adequate measures for the treatment of wage 
discrimination becomes especially apparent when the potential 
dimensions of this economic loss are considered. If, for 
example, the wages of women's workers were on average 
undervalued by as much as 1%, Australian women might 
potentially be underwriting the Australian economy to an 
amount in excess of $669 million annually.  ^ The sizeable 
wage injustice which these figures potentially imply starkly 
emphasises the need for effective procedures to enable the 
review of wage setting practices where indirect wage 
discrimination is alleged to occur. It is also important to 
appreciate here that discrimination constitutes a highly 
inefficient work practice, the removal of which should 
ultimately result in productivity gains to employers and 
industry in general.
The express recognition of the need to review discriminatory 
wage practices is already contained within the terms of 
Australia's federal sex discrimination laws, as well as 
several international treaty agreements ratified by the 
Australian Government of direct relevance to the
49 This general figure is being calculated on the basis of 
current wage figures which suggest that there are over 
3.12 million Australian women workers earning an average 
of approximately $21,450 per annum, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Catalocrue, 650610, 1988; For a more 
conservative estimate of the costs involved in remedying 
discrimination in wage fixing process, see P Hall, 
op.cit., p 3-4
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An overview of theimplementation of equal pay principles.^  
legislative and non legislative methods which have been 
adopted to enable the review of discriminatory wage setting 
practices through the bringing of wage discrimination claims 
will now be presented.
LEGISLATIVE AND NON-LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO PAY EQUITY 
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
In response to the need to ensure equal treatment in the 
determination of wage rates, legislation has been introduced 
in a number of overseas jurisdictions by which a statutory 
right to review alleged discrimination in the payment of wage 
rates is provided, and in some cases extended to include the 
right to equal pay for work of equal value. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, claims for equal pay for work of equal 
value may be brought pursuant to the Equal Pay Act 1970, under 
the terms of the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983.^ 
Proceedings brought under these statutory provisions have
50 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women; Equal Remuneration 
Convention (ILO 100); Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation Convention (ILO 111)
51 See A Lester QC and D Wainwright, Equal Pay For Work of 
Equal Value, TMS Management Consultants, London, 1984; B 
Hepple, Equal Pay and the Industrial Tribunals, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1984; Equal Opportunities Commission, 
Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value, A Guide to the Amended 
Equal Pay Act, London, 1984; S L Wilbom, "Equal Pay for 
Work of Equal Value: Comparable Worth in the United 
Kingdom", (1986), The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 34, 415. By way of a closer comparison to 
Australia it is worth noting the recent introduction of 
pay equity legislation enacted in New Zealand under the 
Employment Equity Act 1989 (NZ)
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culminated in the review of landmark equal pay cases before 
the House of Lords, where several decisions have highlighted 
the possible use of the equal value procedures established by 
the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations as a means of providing 
remedies for women workers seeking pay equity with male 
comparators.J
Pay equity claims have in other countries been pursued through 
testing the interpretation of existing discrimination laws 
under which the legal right to equality of treatment is 
broadly guaranteed. In the United States, for example, 
proceedings brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
1964 enables parties to seek pay equity claims outside the
C O"equal work" context, 0 although only in a limited range of 
circumstances.^ The use of discrimination legislation in 
this way has led to considerable legal analysis and judicial
52 Pickstone v Freemans pic [1988] 2 All E.R. 803; Hayward v 
Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd [1988] 2 All E.R. 257; 
Leverton v Clvwd County Council [1989] 1 All E.R. 78; See too, B Napier, "Equal value - another barrier falls", New 
Law Journal, July 1988, p 500; Equal Opportunities 
Commission, Equal Opportunities Review, Number 24 March 
1989. In relation to the gradual development of UK case 
law in the equal pay area see, Equal Opportunities 
Commission, A Casebook of decisions on Sex Discrimination 
and Equal Pay 1976-1981, London, 1981
53 See County of Washington, Oregon v Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 
(1981); American Nurses Association v llinois, 783 F.2d 
716 (7th Cir 1986); IVE v Westinghouse 631 F.2d 1094 (3rd 
Cir 1986); AFSCME v State of Washington 770 F .2d 1401 
(9th Cir. 1985)
54 See Weiler, op.cit.; B Powers, "AFSCME v Washington: 
Another Barrier to Pay Equity for Women", Harvard Women's 
Law Journal, Vol. 9 1989
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authority on the topic of indirect discrimination in the 
valuation of women's wages.
In Australia, by way of contrast, there has been very little 
legal development with respect to the identification and 
treatment of discrimination in the determination of wage 
rates. The reasons for this lack of development, though 
varied, relate essentially to the unique legal and 
institutional approach adopted in Australia in relation to the 
regulation of wage rates through the system of industrial 
arbitration. It is through the federal and State system of 
industrial arbitration that the wage rates for the vast 
majority of Australian workers are determined. The pursuit of 
equal pay claims, like most wage related disputes, has come to 
be regarded in Australia as a matter appropriately dealt with 
through the processes of collective bargaining, industrial 
arbitration and centralised wage fixing provided within the 
broad framework of industrial law.
The benefits which have been derived by female employees 
through the operation of the Australian industrial wage system 
have been identified by several commentators who stress the 
advantages which have flowed to women workers through the 
process of centralised wage f i x i n g . T h e s e  benefits are 
consistently reflected in statistical wage indices which 
indicate that the differential in male and female earnings is
55 C O'Donnell & N Golder, op.cit.: Gregory & Ho, op.cit.; 
Killingsworth, op.cit.
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noticeably less when award rates of pay are considered in 
isolation from the overall wage rates relating to male and 
female average weekly earnings.^ The relative effectiveness 
of the industrial arbitration system in implementing pay 
equity for women might also be implied from the fact that 
differences in the ratio between male and female earnings are 
considerably lower in Australia than in many other 
industrialised countries, including the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom and Japan, where distinctly different 
systems for the regulation of wage rates exist.
It is no doubt partially due to the success of the Australian 
wage fixing system in securing relatively high levels of wage 
equality between men and women workers, that broader legal 
remedies outside the industrial arbitration system have rarely 
been sought as a solution to the problems of wage 
discrimination. The difficulties experienced in overseas 
jurisdictions in the use of legislative procedures under which 
individual legal rights to equal remuneration are provided 
has, in Australia, arguably also brought into question the 
appropriateness of legally pursuing equal pay claims within 
and outside the industrial relations field. More 
fundamentally, however, the way in which legal mechanisms can 
be used to review wage setting practices in Australia is 
largely unclear and remains untested. A detailed analysis of
56 Labour Resource Centre, op.cit., pp 36-37
57 Department of Employment, Education and Training, Women's 
Bureau, "Pay Equity, A Survey of 7 OECD Countries", 
Information Paper No 5, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, pp 59-68
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this issue will be provided in Chapters Nine and Ten of this 
thesis. An outline of the various Chapters presented in the 
course of examining the relationship between industrial and 
discrimination law with respect to the determination of 
women's wage rates in Australia now follows.
THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter One of this thesis has attempted to provide a broad 
introduction to the issue of discrimination in the 
determination of women's wage rates in Australia.
Chapter Two of this thesis develops this general theme by 
presenting an outline of the legislative framework relevant to 
the regulation of industrial award wage rates in Australia. 
Existing State and federal laws relating to the implementation 
of equal pay principles are examined, and a basic description 
is provided of the Australian industrial award wage fixing 
process. Chapter Two goes on to set out the key historical 
developments relating to the regulation of women's wages in 
Australia with reference to the ways in which work 
predominantly performed by female workers has been 
traditionally valued within the industrial arbitration system.
Chapter Three describes the changes occurring in relation to 
the social, cultural and economic role of women in Australian 
society during the early 1950's and 1970's. Chapter Three 
relates these changes to the Australian experience with regard
30
to the implementation of equal pay principles within the wage 
determination process. The focus of this Chapter involves a 
study of the major equal pay decisions arising within the 
federal industrial law jurisdiction from 1969 to 1974. The 
gradual development towards the implementation of equal pay 
principles is traced within the Australian conciliation and 
arbitration system. The positive effects of the equal pay 
decisions determined within the general framework of 
industrial law is here outlined with reference to the 
significant reduction occurring in relation to the wage 
differentials between male and female workers.
From 1976-1990 the wage gap between Australian men and women 
appears to have largely stabilised. Chapter Four of this 
thesis identifies this basic pattern, and attempts to describe 
the broad economic and industrial relations environment 
relevant to these developments. The gradual deregulation of 
the Australian wage fixing process from 1976 to 1983 is 
critically examined with regard to the implications for pay 
equity between male and female workers. The major changes 
occurring within the Australian industrial wage fixing system 
as a result of the 1983 National Wage Case, and the 
incorporation of the tri-partite Accord agreement are 
subsequently considered.
The effects of the wage fixing procedures developed by the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in response 
to the 1983 Accord agreement are closely reviewed in Chapter
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Four with regard to the application of equal pay principles. 
More particularly, a detailed description is provided of the 
principles adopted in the determination of work value claims, 
and anomalies and inequities claims within the Australian wage 
fixing system. The importance of these principles to the 
implementation of equal pay in Australia is illustrated 
through an analysis of the Nurses Test Case proceedings 
commenced in 1 9 8 5 . Chapter Four concludes with a study of 
the events leading on from the decision of the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the Nurses Case.^ 9 
A brief critique is here included of the limitations posed by 
the Nurses Case decision with respect to future equal pay 
claims arising within the Australian industrial wage fixing 
system.
A broad review of the restrictions placed on the application 
of equal pay principles within the Australian industrial 
arbitration process from 1974 up to the outcome of the 1985 
Nurses Case forms the subject of Chapter Five. This Chapter 
begins with a discussion of the limited application of the 
1972 Equal Pay Case8  ^to the industrial award rates fixed for 
predominantly female occupations. The difficulties of 
pursuing equal pay claims within the constraints imposed by 
traditional work value principles is next outlined, followed
58 Private Hospitals' and Doctors' Nurses (ACT) Award (1986) 
300 CAR 190
59 id
60 (1972) 147 CAR 172
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by a short discussion of the topic of gender bias in the 
industrial award making process. The problems attached to 
ensuring the proper implementation of the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value in the negotiation of consent 
award agreements are considered. The need to provide 
accessible procedures to review the effective application of 
equal pay principles is also canvassed as a means of removing 
gender discrimination in the industrial wage fixing process. 
Chapter Five concludes by describing the ways in which past 
wage relativities continue to influence the maintenance of 
fixed wage differentials between various occupational groups. 
The difficulties in transcending the subtle entrenchment of 
such wage relativities in the course of removing gender 
discrimination in the determination of wage rates are finally 
considered.
Chapter Six investigates the attempts made to incorporate the 
progressive implementation of equal pay measures within the 
industrial relations framework developed over the late 1980's. 
This Chapter examines the new directions taken within the 
Australian wage fixing system from 1986 to 1988 with 
particular reference to the initiatives relating to the 
process of award restructuring, and the application of the 
structural efficiency principle. The development of the 
supplementary payments principle is also considered with 
regard to its impact on the wage levels of Australian women 
workers. In the course of this review close attention is 
given to the decision of the Conciliation and Arbitration
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Commission in the 1988 and 1989 National Wage Case
decisions.^ The impact of these decisions on the level of 
women's wage rates, and the removal of indirect wage 
discrimination is finally considered.
Chapter Seven serves to describe through practical case 
studies the ways in which the various wage fixing principles 
described in Chapters Five and Six have come to influence the 
determination of equal pay claims lodged within the industrial 
arbitration system since the 1985 Nurses Case. Chapter Seven 
begins by demonstrating the limitations inherent in applying 
the anomalies and inequities principle to resolve equal pay 
claims brought to remove indirect sex discrimination in the 
wage determination process. Several industrial award wage 
claims lodged within the federal industrial law jurisdiction 
concerned with equal pay issues are analysed. These include 
the Therapist's Case,^ the Social Worker's Case,^3 and the 
Dental Therapist's Case.**'* The emerging shift in the approach 
adopted to the resolution of equal pay issues with the advent
61 National Wage Case 1988 (1988) 25 IR 170; National Wage 
Case 1989 (1989) 30 IR 81
62 Re Professional Officers Association, Australian Public 
Service, Application re Therapists, (1985) 29 IR 343
63 Re Professional Officers Association, Australian Public 
Service Social Workers Award 1985, Report of Commissioner 
Griffin, Canberra 10 December 1987, Decision Anomalies 
Conference 10 February 1989, Statement in A302, President 
Maddern, 14 April 1988
64 Re Professional Officers Association, General Conditions 
of Employment, A.C.T. Health Authority Award 1986, C. No 
07070 of 1986, Report of Commissioner Lewin, Adelaide, 13 
July 1989
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of award restructuring is then examined. The changes brought 
about to the application of equal pay principles by the 
introduction of award restructuring are discussed with special 
reference to the decision of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission in the Child Care Workers Case finally 
determined in September 19 90.^
The case studies presented in Chapter Seven reveal the strong 
influence of the national wage fixing principles determined 
within the Australian federal industrial law jurisdiction on 
the methods applied, and the outcomes obtained in relation to 
the negotiation of equal pay award wage increases. As the 
Nurses Case and more recently the Child Care Workers Case have 
shown, variations to national wage fixing principles have an 
overriding and determinative effect on the procedures and 
policies governing the resolution of equal pay award wage 
increases.
Chapter Eight is directed to reviewing the ways in which 
national wage fixing principles may come to influence the 
application of equal pay principles in the 1990's. The policy 
initiatives introduced in relation to pay equity for 
Australian women workers are outlined, and the challenges for 
workplace reform are described. The barriers to a more 
comprehensive system to enable the proper implementation of 
equal pay principles are considered, and the need to place a
65 Child Care Workers Case. Decision of the Industrial
Relations Commission, September 1990, S Print J 74316
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more explicit emphasis on the removal of indirect 
discrimination in the wage determination process is discussed. 
Chapter Nine proceeds to consider the ways in which a greater 
recognition of discriminatory wage practices might develop 
through the promotion and acceptance of the principles 
contained under Australia's federal discrimination laws. An 
overview is provided in this Chapter of the operation of 
discrimination legislation in the area of wage regulation with 
general reference to the restrictions placed on the review of 
alleged sex discrimination in the industrial relations field.
Chapter Ten provides a more specific and detailed analysis of 
the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and 
the legal prohibitions provided under this Act in relation to 
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. The Act's 
limited potential to assist in the identification and 
treatment of wage discrimination is described. Particular 
attention is given to the difficulties attached to 
establishing claims of indirect discrimination in the wage 
setting process in the area of over award and non award wage 
payments. Chapter Ten concludes by examining the broad 
effects of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) on the 
operation of Australia's federal wage fixing authorities. The 
possible legal sanctions available in circumstances where 
industrial wage determinations may be inconsistent with the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) are briefly discussed. The 
policy influence of the principles embodied in Australia's 
federal discrimination laws are finally considered.
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Chapter Eleven seeks to explore further the ways in which 
legal precepts and policies may constructively influence the 
implementation of equal pay principles within the Australian 
wage fixing system. It commences with an examination of the 
principles developed under international law of direct 
relevance to equal pay. This study is followed by a critical 
evaluation of further measures and steps to be introduced 
within the Australian industrial wage process to ensure an 
adequate level of compliance with international treaty 
obligations with respect to equal remuneration between men and 
women workers.
The final Chapter of this thesis, Chapter Twelve, sets out a 
series of broad conclusions derived from the preceding 
examination and analysis presented.
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CHAPTER TWO
INDUSTRIAL LAW AND THE REGULATION OF WOMEN'S WAGE RATES
INTRODUCTION
In Australia the setting and determination of wage rates 
occurs predominantly through the operation of a unique 
system of industrial conciliation and arbitration. This 
system provides the means by which wage conditions for 
nearly 88% of all female employees in Australia are 
determined.1 2 Of these female employees over 63% are 
covered by State industrial awards, and nearly 22% by
9federal industrial awards.
In examining the ways in which industrial law has led to 
the introduction of equal pay principles within Australia, 
a comprehensive understanding is initially required of the 
operation of the industrial relations system with respect 
to the determination of award rates of pay. Similarly an 
appreciation is needed of the different wage methods, and 
procedures historically applied in the conciliation and 
arbitration of industrial disputes. This Chapter 
consequently begins with an outline of the legislative 
framework relevant to the regulation of award wage rates 
as provided by the Australian system of industrial
1 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6315.0, 
Canberra, AGPS 1985
2 ibid
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conciliation and arbitration. The limited statutory- 
provisions under State and federal law requiring the 
implementation of equal pay principles within Australia's 
industrial wage fixing system is set out, and a brief 
description of the award wage fixing process is provided. 
The historical developments that have taken place within 
the federal wage fixing system relating to the regulation 
of women's wages are next described, and the ways in which 
women's work has come to be valued within this system are 
considered.
WAGE REGULATION AND EQUAL PAY PROVISIONS - THE FEDERAL 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The capacity of the Federal Parliament to legislate on the 
subject of industrial wage regulation arises mainly from 
the provisions of Section 51(xxxv) of the Australian 
Constitution. This head of power enables the making of 
laws with respect to:
"conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the 
limits of any one State."
The first major legislation passed in the exercise of the 
power conferred by Section 51(xxxv) was the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) . The main object of this 
Act was to prevent strikes and industrial unrest by
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providing mechanisms for the resolution of industrial 
disputes. The Act originally provided for the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration whose functions were strictly limited to 
the settlement of genuine industrial disputes between 
contesting parties extending beyond one State. Judicial 
and non-judicial functions were vested in the Court, and 
specific powers were given to prescribe minimum award wage 
rates. Penalty provisions were included under the Act for 
the enforcement of awards and other wage determination 
orders.
In 1956 proceedings were brought to challenge the 
constitutional power of the Commonwealth Parliament to 
vest arbitral and judicial functions in the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration. The decision of the 
Australian High Court in the Boilermakers Case  ^held that 
it was unconstitutional for a federal judicial body to 
exercise both judicial and non-judicial power. The 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1956 (Cth) was 
consequently passed with a view to separating the judicial 
and arbitral functions of the conciliation and arbitration 
process. Under this legislation, a separate Commonwealth 
Industrial Court was established to exercise the judicial 
powers relevant to enforcement proceedings in the area of 
industrial wage regulation. The functions relating to the
3 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermaker's Society of
Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254
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arbitration of industrial awards, and wage fixing orders 
were simultaneously vested in the Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission.
The Commission remained in existence as Australia's 
leading wage fixing authority until March 1989 when its 
functions in relation to the conciliation and arbitration 
of industrial disputes were transferred to the Industrial 
Relations Commission with the proclamation of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth).
Australia's federal industrial legislation has at no time 
contained express statutory provisions specifically 
requiring the implementation of equal pay principles 
within the wage determination process. Historically the 
absence of such provisions may be attributed in part to 
the constitutional limitations of the conciliation and 
arbitration power under Section 51(xxxv) of the Australian 
Constitution. This situation has, however, arguably 
altered with the ratification by the Australian Government 
of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women.
In this regard, section 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1988 (Cth) now provides that;
*
"In the performance of its functions, the Commission
shall take account of the principles embodied in the
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Racial Discrimination Act 1975, and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 relating to discrimination in 
employment."
The constitutional validity of Section 93 presumably 
relies on the combined operation of the conciliation and 
arbitration power under Section 51(xxxv), and the external 
affairs power under Section 51(xxix) of the Australian 
Constitution. The latter head of constitutional power has 
only recently in Australia's legal history been 
interpreted to allow the Federal Parliament power to give 
legislative effect to areas covered by international 
Conventions and treaties to which Australia is a party.^
The terms of Section 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1988 (Cth) are especially relevant to Australia's 
international obligations arising under the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (the UN Convention). This 
Convention was ratified by the Australian Government in 
1983, and implemented in part within Australia domestic 
law with the enactment of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
( Cth ) . ^
4 See Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; 
Koowarta v Bielke-Peterson (1982) 153 CLR 168
5 See Section 3, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). A 
more detailed discussion of this Act, and the extent 
to which its terms operate to implement Australia's 
international treaty obligations in the area of 
equal pay is provided in Chapters Nine, Ten and 
Eleven
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Section 86 of the Industrial Relations (Consequential
Provisions) Act 1988 (Cth) ensures that the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) is a prescribed Act for the 
purposes of Section 121 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1988 (Cth). The provisions of Section 86 lend weight to 
the argument that no new orders or awards should be made 
by the federal Industrial Relations Commission which are 
inconsistent with the terms of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act. The combined effect of Section 93 and 
Section 121 is however uncertain regarding the extent of 
the Commission's statutory duty to strictly ensure the 
application of equal pay principles in the exercise of its 
powers to determine award wage rates. This issue forms 
the subject of more detailed consideration in Chapter Ten. 
For present purposes, it is simply worth noting that the 
existing statutory provisions contained within Australia's 
federal industrial laws are unclear regarding the 
existence of a precise statutory duty requiring the 
implementation of equal pay principles within the national 
industrial wage fixing process.
WAGE REGULATION AND EQUAL PAY PROVISIONS - THE STATE 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Unlike federal legislative power, State legislative power 
may deal directly with the regulation of industrial 
disputes. This is due to the fact that State Parliaments
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are not subject to the constitutional restrictions which 
affect the Federal Parliament in the making of federal 
laws. State industrial legislation may accordingly cover 
areas falling outside federal legislative power. Despite 
the wider legislative capacity of State Governments to 
pass laws dealing with industrial matters, a similar 
approach to that adopted under federal law has been 
applied by the various States to the arbitration of 
industrial disputes.^ Similar legislative schemes for the 
determination of industrial wage claims are provided under 
the terms of the New South Wales Industrial Arbitration 
Act 1940, the Victoria Industrial Relations Act 1979, the 
South Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1972, the Western Australian Industrial Relations Act 
1979, the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1961, and the Tasmanian Industrial 
Relations Act 1984.
In contrast to federal law, certain express provisions are 
provided under State industrial legislation in relation to 
equal pay for female workers. These provisions vary from 
State to State, and require the payment of equal wage 
rates for men and women in a very limited range of 
circumstances.
6 Report Of The Committee of Review, Industrial
Relations Law and Systems, Canberra AGPS, 1985, 
Volume 1, Appendix VI
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New South Wales
In New South Wales, Section 88D of the Industrial 
Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW) provides that equal pay is 
available where female employees are performing work of 
the same or like nature, and of equal value to male 
employees. This Section was incorporated within the NSW 
Industrial Arbitration Act in 1958 by the Industrial 
Arbitration (Female Rates) Amendment Act. Significantly, 
Section 88D does not extend to work essentially, or 
usually performed by women. Nor does it allow for the 
application of equal pay for work of equal value in 
circumstances where men and women are not performing 
identical work tasks. Section 88D simply provides, in 
summary, for the application of equal pay for equal work 
where work is not usually performed by women, and where 
men are performing the same or substantially similar 
tasks. No separate legislative provision is made for the 
application of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value.
Victoria
Victoria is one of only two States which legislatively 
requires the separate application of the equal pay for 
work of equal value principle, in addition to the 
principle of equal pay for equal work. The Victorian 
provisions introduced under the Public Service (Amendment) 
Act 1981 (Vic) are restricted, however, to public sector 
employees. Under this legislation equal pay increases
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are, moreover, contingent on the existence of suitable
•7economic conditions. Outside the area of public sector 
employment there are no existing legislative provisions 
requiring the application of equal pay principles within 
the industrial wage determination process.
Queensland
In common with the Victorian legislation, the statutory 
provisions under the Queensland Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1961 ostensibly provide for the 
separate, but limited application of the equal pay for 
work of equal value principle. The Queensland provisions 
extend more broadly to private sector employment, and 
require by virtue of Section 12 (l)(a) that:
"the same wage shall be paid to persons of either sex 
performing the same work or providing the same rate of 
profit to their employer."
For the purpose of satisfying the provisions of Section 12 
of the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1961, it has been held that:
"The evidence required will not be evidence as to the 
quality and quantity of the work of individual 
employees but as to the general quality and quantity
7 See Section 15A, Public Service (Amendment) Act 1984
(Vic)
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of the work in each calling of the average competent 
employee, male or female, and as to its comparative 
value to the average good employer."^
This unique approach to comparative work value appears, 
however, to have only been applied in relation to male and 
female classifications involving the same or substantially
Qsimilar job content. It is also to be noted that Section 
13 of this legislation continues to provide for the 
payment of a different male and female basic wage in 
keeping with the traditional family wage concept. As 
Sykes and Glasbeck point out, the requirement that the 
female basic wage rate must be calculated with regard to 
the family wage concept has made it clearly difficult for 
Queensland industrial tribunals to take Section 
12(l)(a)(i) at face value.^ Given the erosion of the 
family wage concept since the National Wage Case decision 
of 1974, ^  the existing statutory provisions under 
Queensland law would appear to be largely obsolete.
8 (1917) 2 QIG 211, per McNaughton J at 214
9 See, Department of Labour and National Service,
Ecual Pay: Some Aspects of Australian and Overseas 
Practice, Melbourne, 1969, p 62
10 E l  Sykes and H H Glasbeck, Labour Law in Australia,. 
Butterworths, Sydney, 1972, p 623
11 (1974) 157 CAR 293
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South Australia
In South Australia, amendments to the State Industrial 
Code in November 1967 provided that the South Australian 
Industrial Commission was empowered to grant equal pay- 
wage increases upon application by female employees 
performing work of the same, or a like nature, and of 
equal value. As in the case of New South Wales, awards 
and industrial agreements applying to persons engaged in 
work, essentially or usually performed by females, were 
specifically excluded from the Code, even in circumstances 
where male employees were also employed.
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972 (SA) . 
which replaced the South Australian Industrial Code 1967. 
contains no provision requiring the application of equal 
pay principles. The bringing of equal pay claims may 
nonetheless be possible under the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1972 (SA) relying on the application 
of principles established by earlier equal pay decisions. 
Claims for equal pay may also arguably be brought under 
the terms of the South Australian Equal Opportunity Act 
1984. The limited extent to which State discrimination 
legislation may operate to remedy wage discrimination on 
the ground of sex is further considered in Chapter Eleven.
12 Section 79, Industrial Code 1967 (SA)
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Western Australia
The Western Australian experience in relation to equal pay 
legislation is similar to that of South Australia. In 
1968, amendments were introduced to the Western Australian 
Industrial Arbitration Act to allow for the application of 
equal pay for equal work. J In 1971 the exemption 
regarding work usually or essentially performed by women 
was removed.^ Later, legislative amendments in 1973 
provided for the implementation of the equal pay for work 
of equal value principle.1  ^ No equal pay provisions were, 
however, considered necessary for inclusion within the 
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).^
As in the case of South Australia, access to equal pay 
principles may be available in the course of negotiating 
an industrial wage claim under existing State industrial 
legislation. A complaint of discrimination in the 
determination of wage rates may alternatively be brought 
under the Western Australian Equal Opportunity Act 1984.
Tasmania
In the State of Tasmania, no legislative provisions exist 
expressly requiring the application of equal pay
13 See Sections 143 and 144, Industrial Arbitration Act 
1912 (WA)
14 See Section 2, Industrial Arbitration Act 1971 (WA)
15 C Short, "Equal Pay - What Happened?" (1988) 28 
Journal of Industrial Relations, p 327
16 See Adult Minimum Wage Case, WAIG 60, p 1894
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principles. Although legislative measures formerly 
existed in relation to the application of the principle of 
equal pay for equal work within public sector 
employment,^  these provisions have since been repealed by 
the Tasmanian State Service Act of 1984. While containing 
no reference to equal pay, Section 4 of this legislation 
provides nonetheless that all State employees shall 
receive fair and equitable treatment. This provision may 
arguably entitle parties to lodge equal pay claims in 
relation to wage conditions applicable to the Tasmanian 
public sector.
OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO 
EQUAL PAY
Very few legislative restraints are to be found within the 
broad field of industrial law prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sex in the payment, or determination of 
award wage rates. The legislative measures which do exist 
relate almost exclusively to the implementation of the 
principle of equal pay for equal work, and largely exempt 
the review of alleged discrimination arising in 
predominantly female occupations. No statutory mechanisms 
exist which comprehensively require the separate 
application of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value. It is worth recalling that the legislative 
initiatives adopted under State law in relation to equal
17 Public Service (Equal Pay) Act 1966 (Tas)
50
pay essentially date from the late 1960's and early 
1970's. Current at this time were major issues concerned 
with direct and blatant forms of sex discriminations in 
the payment of wage rates to male and female workers.
Since the 1970's, and the gradual removal of explicit wage 
discrimination in the workplace, the impact of the 
existing legislative measures in the area of equal pay has 
largely subsided. As will be demonstrated in the course 
of this thesis, a clearly formulated legislative response 
to the underlying, and ongoing, problems of indirect wage 
discrimination in the determination of wage rates is yet 
to evolve.
The limited statutory provisions relevant to the 
application of equal pay principles within the industrial 
law jurisdiction, would tend to suggest that the 
achievement of greater pay equity for Australian women has 
not occurred, nor is likely to occur as a direct result of 
the legislated standards presently in place. This is 
particularly so in respect of the federal industrial 
jurisdiction where there are no legislative provisions 
which positively require the Industrial Relations 
Commission to ensure the unqualified application of equal 
pay principles in the course of determining award rates of 
pay, or other wage fixing orders.
Although the impetus of State legislative reform in the 
1960's and 1970's greatly assisted equal pay developments
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within the Australian wage fixing system, these 
developments have essentially been facilitated through the 
broader decision making powers of industrial tribunals in 
the general course of industrial wage fixation. The 
implementation of equal pay principles through the process 
of industrial arbitration will now be examined, commencing 
with a general outline of the nature of Australian wage 
determination procedures.
AUSTRALIAN WAGE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES AND INDUSTRIAL AWARD 
DETERMINATION
In Australia, industrial tribunals generally specify 
minimum wage rates and conditions in the form of 
industrial awards. Award provisions regulate the minimum 
amount of wages to be paid in respect of defined job 
classifications, as well as such matters as maximum hours 
of work, the payment of overtime rates, and shift work 
allowances.
While the making of a federal industrial award does not 
involve the exercise of judicial power by an industrial 
tribunal, an award represents "a document affecting 
rights",^® and legally binds the parties to it. Awards 
are, however, only binding on persons actively or
18 R v Hamilton Knight; Ex Parte Commonwealth Steamship 
Owners Association (1952) 86 CLR per Fullagar J. at 
319
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constructively involved in the determination of an 
industrial dispute or matter before an industrial 
tribunal. It is not possible, for example, for an 
industrial tribunal to establish a "common rule" in 
relation to wage conditions binding on persons not parties 
to an industrial dispute. w Where an award is breached, 
penalties may be imposed by industrial courts, and 
employers may be ordered to pay the amount of award wages 
due under the award. Industrial award orders do not, 
however, confer rights on persons who are not parties to 
the industrial dispute upon which an industrial award has 
been based.21
Although the industrial wage determination process is 
commonly referred to as a "compulsory" wage arbitration 
system, consent agreements between the parties to an 
industrial dispute are regularly reached in the course of 
informal collective bargaining. Registered industrial 
agreements signed by both parties, following certification 
by industrial wage tribunals are deemed to be awards under
19 C P  Mills & G H Sorrell, Federal Industrial Law, 
Butterworths Sydney, 1975, p 79
20 Australian Boot Trade Employers Federation v Whvbrow 
& Co 1910) 11 CLR 311; R v Kelly; Ex Parte the State 
of Victoriar (1950) 81 CLR 64
21 Blackley v Devondale Cream (Vic) Ptv Ltd (1986) 117 
CLR 253? For a more complete summary of the legal 
effect of industrial wage determinations see 
generally W B Creighton, W J Ford and R J Mitchell, 
Labour Law; Materials and Commentary, Law Book 
Company, Sydney, Chts 12-19? Report of the Committee 
of Review, Industrial Relations Law and Systems,
op.cit., pp 52-61
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State and federal industrial legislation. Industrial 
decisions and certified agreements made in relation to 
award rates of pay apply to all workers covered by an 
industrial award.
It should be noted that other collective bargaining 
agreements are regularly made outside the wage fixing 
process in the form of over award payments. These 
payments, made outside the terms of industrial award 
provisions, are more regularly paid to male employees with 
women employees receiving only 47% of the over award 
payments paid to male employers. The availability of 
remedies in respect of wage discrimination arising through 
the differential payment to men and women of overaward 
wage rates would appear to fall outside the terms of 
Australia's industrial legislation. This issue is more 
closely examined in Chapter Ten where the potential legal 
remedies under discrimination legislation are canvassed in 
relation to the problem of wage discrimination.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS INVOLVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EQUAL 
PAY PRINCIPLES
Compliance with Australian wage fixing procedures remains 
an important pre-requisite for the pursuit of any award 
wage claim, including a claim for the application of equal
22 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 
6306.0, Canberra AGPS, 1988
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pay principles. Under federal law, notification of an 
industrial dispute can only be made by an employer, an 
organisation registered under the Industrial Relations 
Commission Act 1988 (Cth) , the Minister for Industrial 
Relations, or an Industrial Registrar of the Industrial 
Relations Commission.^  The lodging of a dispute with the 
Industrial Relations Commission invariably involves the 
bringing of an industrial claim by a registered trade 
union organisation. Access to the industrial arbitration 
process is therefore largely dependent on the willingness 
of trade unions to pursue specific industrial disputes, 
including award wage claims relevant to the application of 
equal pay principles.
While it is conceivable that leave could be granted to 
persons other than registered trade unions to appear in 
proceedings before the Commission,^ the award negotiation 
process cannot generally be instituted by interested 
individuals or representative groups other than those 
registered under the Act.^ It is significant to note 
that only 44% of all female employees belong to registered
23 Section 99, Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
24 See Section 57 Industrial Relation Act 1988 (Cth)
25 See however Williams v Commonwealth Banking 
Corporation (1960) 98 CAR 650; R v Portus & Qantas 
Airways; Ex Parte McNeil (1961) 105 CLR 537. An 
association of employees with a common cause may in 
certain circumstances provide a sufficient basis to 
enable the determination of an industrial dispute.
It is highly unlikely that any such dispute would, 
however, merit settlement by an award wage 
determination
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trade union organisations, in comparison to 62% of male 
employees. The fact that access to the wage negotiation 
process is determined by a requirement with which a 
greater proportion of men than women tend to comply, 
through higher levels of trade union membership, raises at 
the outset issues concerning men and women's equal 
participation within the industrial wage fixing process.^
Access to the industrial relations process is further 
subject to the requirement that an award must be made in 
settlement of an industrial dispute. The existence of 
such a dispute is a precondition to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of federal industrial wage tribunals.^® It 
is not possible, for example, to pursue an equal pay claim 
unless it can be characterised as an industrial dispute 
between an employer and an employee. The meaning of this 
expression has been very broadly interpreted by the 
Australian High Court to include any dispute between 
employers and employees with respect to work terms and 
conditions even where the dispute does not strictly
26 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 
6323.0, AGPS, Canberra, June 1989
27 See here the definition of indirect discrimination 
contained within Section 5(2) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), which aims to protect 
persons from institutionalised practices resulting 
in a disparate impact on the basis of sex
28 Re Federated Storemans and Packers Union: Ex Parte 
Woodumpers (Vic) Ltd (1989) 84 ALR 80
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concern an industrial, productive or organised business. 9^ 
Such a wide definition would generally encompass equal pay 
claims within a large category of occupations, although 
problems of access to the industrial wage fixing system 
can in certain cases arise.
A recent example relating to the issue of restricted 
access to industrial arbitration procedures involved an 
industrial dispute arising in relation to the award 
coverage of family day care workers in Victoria and 
Tasmania. The claim was originally brought before the 
former Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in 1988 by 
the Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employee's 
Union.^ The predominantly female group of family day 
care employees represented by the Municipal Employers' 
Union provided child care on the basis of an hourly rate 
of $1.20 per child per hour.^1 Prior to determining 
whether the jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Act 
1988 (Cth) could apply in this case, a threshold issue 
arose as to whether family day care providers could be
29 The Queen v Coldham & Ors; Ex Parte the Australian 
Welfare Union 1983 CLR 297; Slonim v Fellows (1984) 
15 CLR 503
30 C No 33362 of 1988
31 When considering the principle of equal pay for work 
of equal value it is interesting to compare this 
rate with the 1988 hourly wage rate assessed for a 
first year apprentice motor mechanic under the 
Federal Vehicle Industry - Repair Services and 
Retail Award 1983 of $3.68 per hour. This rate 
increases for a fourth year apprentice to $7.70 per 
hour
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said to be employees, as opposed to contract workers, and 
therefore eligible for union membership. A decision of a 
single Commissioner of the Industrial Relations Commission 
held that these workers should be classified as 
employees. This decision was, however, taken on Appeal 
by the employer group joined to the proceedings.
In April 1991 the case was finally determined by the 
Industrial Relations Commission which held that family day 
care workers are independent contractors rather than 
employees. The decision means that no award coverage 
exists for approximately 15,000 workers performing child 
care services under the family day care scheme.^
TRADITIONAL WAGE SETTING PRACTICES - WOMEN'S WORK VALUE AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF MALE WAGE RATES
In examining the ways in which women's wages are 
determined within the Australia wage fixing system, a 
preliminary understanding is required of the methods 
traditionally employed by industrial tribunals in setting 
female wage rates. This in turn requires an appreciation 
of the historical division within federal and State 
industrial awards which separated award payments into two
32 Federal Municipal and Shire Commonwealth Employee's 
Union of Australia & Local Government Authorities in 
Victoria and Tasmania December 724/89 Print No H 
9730
33 See M Davis, Financial Review, 9 April 1991, p 4
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distinct categories. These two categories were known as 
the "basic wage", and "margins" for skill.
The basic wage represented a foundational element in award 
payments, and was first formalised in the Harvester 
Decision of 1907.34 This decision established the family 
wage concept within the federal industrial arbitration 
system, and determined a "fair and reasonable" wage as 
that which allowed an unskilled worker to support himself, 
his wife and three children. Margins were then added to 
this basic wage to reflect an evaluation of different 
levels of skill.
From its earliest beginnings the industrial arbitration 
system assumed a distinct division between men and women's 
wage rates based on the concept of differential needs 
between an average female worker without dependents, and 
an average male worker with family responsibilities . 
Women's wage rates were as a result consistently fixed to
34 Ex Parte Harvester v McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1
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represent a percentage of male rates, irrespective of the 
content, and value of work performed. 5^
While the family wage concept established in 1907 had a 
major effect on determining the level of women's wage 
rates, it was not until 1912 that the issue of women's pay 
was explicitly discussed within the federal industrial 
arbitration system. In that year a decision was made to 
grant equal pay to certain classes of female workers 
engaged in fruitpicking for the express purpose of 
discouraging the replacement of male workers by female 
workers in the fruit picking industry.^ Where this 
perceived difficulty did not exist in relation to work 
"essentially adapted for women", a reduced minimum basic 
wage was assessed for women workers as a proportion of the 
male rate. These basic principles were consistently 
applied in later decisions of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court under which the value of women's work
35 The early institutionalisation of discrimination in 
wage setting practices in Australia has been well 
researched and documented: See, for example, E Ryan 
and A Conlon, Gentle Invaders: Australian Women at 
Work 1788-1974, Nelson, Melbourne 1975; L Bennett, 
"Legal Intervention and.the Female Workforce: The 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Court 1907 
- 1921" (1984) 12 International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law 23, M Thornton, "(Un)equal Pay for 
Work of Equal Value", (1981), Journal of Industrial 
Relations Vol 23, 466? C Short, op.cit., p 315ff; R 
Hunter, "Women Workers and Federal Industrial Law: 
From Harvester to Comparable Worth", (1988) Vol. 1 
Number 2 Australian Journal of Labour Law, 147
36 Rural Worker's Union Case (1912) 6 CAR 61
37 ibid, at p 80
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was characteristically set at a lesser rate to that of 
male employees.3 ®
The segregation of work categories on the basis of sex, 
and the valuation of work with reference to this gender 
segregation is succinctly reflected in the observations of 
Powers J in the 1917 Theatrical Employees case:^
"It is only where the work in question is women's work 
- suitable work for women - that the Court awards what 
it considers to be the value of the work as woman's 
work; or if the value is less than a living wage for a 
woman then it allows a living wage for a woman for a 
week's work. This Court allows to men a living wage 
based on the assumption that the average man has to 
keep a wife and family of three children whatever the 
value of the work he does may be.
"The Court allows a living wage to a woman as a single 
woman. The single man often gets more than his work 
is worth, but if single men are paid less than married 
men the cheaper labour would be employed and they
38 Re Federal Clerk's Award 1916 10 CAR 32; Theatrical 
Employees Case 1917 11 CAR 85; Clothing Trades Case 
(1919) 13 CAR 647; Re Clothing Awards (1923) 18 CAR 
1040; Re Food Preserving Award (1924) 20 CAR 60; Re 
Fruitpicker's Award (1929) 28 CAR 609; Re Metal 
Trades Industry Award (1941) 47 CAR 783
39 (1917) 11 CAR at 146
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could not make the necessary provision for 
marriage.
In 1919, an equal basic wage and margin was for the first 
time awarded to men and women in the clothing industry for 
certain limited classifications, such as cutters and 
machinists, where men and women were performing the same 
tasks.^ For job classifications where the gradual 
replacement of men by women was not in issue, the female 
basic wage was fixed at 54% of the male basic wage. This 
fixed ratio was to largely influence the setting of the 
female basic wage for well over the next three decades.
Over the period of 1912-1967, Short identifies three basic 
models for the payment of female w a g e s . T h e  first 
involved jobs where women could have displaced men had 
they been given lower wages, and where equal basic wages 
and margins applied. The second involved occupations 
where no risk to male displacement was apparent due to the 
nature of the job being "peculiarly suited" to female 
workers. Here women received 54%-75% of the male basic 
wage and margin. In the third category, equal margins 
were paid, but unequal basic wage rates were set. It was
40 id
41 Federation Clothing Trades v JA Archer (1919) 13 CAR 
617
42 C Short, op.cit., p 317
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within the second and third category of wage payment that 
the majority of female workers fell.
THE WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT BOARD AND POST WAR CHANGE
For a brief time during the Second World War, women's 
wages were determined by a separate wage authority known 
as the Women's Employment Board. The Board was 
established for the purpose of encouraging women into 
essential war time service employment in the absence of 
male workers. The measurement of work value by the Board 
was determined with reference to the worth of the 
employment services provided to the employer, and as such 
represented an unprecedented approach within the federal 
wage fixing system to the determination of women's wage 
rates. These were set between 60%-100% of the relevant 
male rate.^ The effect of the wage increases sanctioned 
by the Women's Employment Board had a marked impact on the 
expectations and demands of women workers within the post­
war industrial wage fixing system. These heightened 
expectations and demands were ultimately to take form in 
significant industrial pressure for remuneration to be set
43 M Killingsworth, The Economics of Comparable Worth, 
W.E. Upjoin Institute, Michigan, 1990, p 230; A 
Holgate & K Milgrom, She Works Hard For The Money, 
Women's Legal Resources Group, Melbourne, 1985, p 15
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at a more equitable rate in accordance with the value of 
work performed.^
This changing industrial climate had, in particular, an 
important influence on the outcome of the Basic Wage 
Inquiry of 1949-50^ through which the basic wage for 
women under federal awards was increased from 54% to 75% 
of the male basic wage. Although this decision 
represented a clear improvement to women's basic wage 
standards, it nonetheless preserved earlier wage fixing 
methods under which the value of women's work was 
determined through the implicit application of the strict 
gender criteria adopted in the 1919 Clothing Trades 
decision.^
The Basic Wage Inquiry decision of 1949-50 did, however, 
represent a slight shift in emphasis from the traditional 
family needs concept, a development which was later 
reinforced in the Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry of 1952- 
53.^7 In the latter case, employers had sought a 
reduction of the 75% rate paid to women to a lesser rate 
of 60% of the male standard. The employers' claims were 
rejected by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission on
44 Hunter, op.cit., p 154, Ryan & Conlon, op.cit. , pp 
124-140
45 Basic Wage Inquiry 1949-1950 (1950) 68 CAR 698
46 Federated Clothing Trades v JA Archer (1919) 13 CAR 
647
47 (1953) 77 CAR 477
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the basis that no material had been placed before it to 
support a ruling that the rate of 75% was too high. From 
1953 to 1967, adjustments to the female basic wage, 
continued therefore to be made by systematically adding 
75% of any male increase awarded to the basic female award 
wage rate.
The system for fixing margins for skill continued 
throughout the 1950's to reflect community attitudes 
relating to the inferior value of women's work. As Hunter 
points out, the work performed by women was often 
classified differently in keeping with such perceptions 
when it came to the assessment of marginal wage rates.
The Federal Metal Industry Award 1959 contained, for 
example, 42 male classifications in which different 
margins for skill were received. This compared to 6 
classifications for female employees. A similar pattern 
was apparent across blue collar and white collar awards.^ 
This phenomena might arguably be attributed to the fact 
that women were assigned to a far narrower range of 
unskilled tasks in the workplace. As a result the extent 
of wage discrimination, as distinct from other forms of 
employment discrimination, is difficult to evaluate. This 
is particularly so in circumstances where no clear methods 
were employed to identify and compare skill levels in the
48 R Hunter, op.cit., p 152
49 id
65
course of wage negotiation. Yet as Hunter points out, the 
situation remained that:
"Skills associated with men's work, including both the 
use of physical strength and the ability to perform a 
range of tasks came to be valued more highly than 
skills associated with women's work such as speed, 
dexterity, and the performance of repetitive tasks.
Even when the same or similar job classifications arose, 
different margins were routinely awarded for male and 
female employees. Wage rates were regularly set without 
regard to any system of work value investigation. Wage 
outcomes accordingly involved little assessment of 
relevant skills brought to the job, or actual work 
performed. Wage agreements reached between employer and 
employee groups naturally reflected, moreover, the 
interests of the major participants in the wage 
negotiation process. These participants comprised on the 
whole, male employers and male trade unionists involving 
negligible representation with regard to the disadvantaged 
interests of women workers.
The system of setting margins for skill was underpinned by 
the principle of "comparative wage justice" under which it 
was assumed that the relative position of a particular 
wage within the wage structure should remain unchanged
50 id
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unless job requirements increased or altered.^1 Margins 
were fixed separately from the basic wage, traditionally 
through the Metal Trades Award, and relativities were 
regularly restored by ’wage rounds” which maintained a 
basic wage hierarchy between existing job classifications. 
Work value claims were not permitted outside of award wage 
claims where a change in the work being performed could be
c odemonstrated.J
The above principles have played an integral role in 
determining work value claims throughout the post war 
years, up to and including the 1990's. The overriding 
requirement of establishing net additions to job 
requirements prior to the granting of work value 
increases, and the need to ensure, so far as possible, the 
maintenance of stable wage relativities remain essential 
and underlying features of the Australian wage fixing 
system. The restrictive effect of these features on the 
processing of industrial award claims concerned with 
securing wage increases through the application of equal 
pay principles is discussed at greater length in Chapters 
Four and Five.
51 C O'Donnell and H Golder, "A Comparative Analysis of 
Equal Pay in the United States, Britain, and 
Australia, (1986) 3 Australian Feminist Studies 59 
at p 74
52 id; See too National Wage Case 1981 (1981) 254 CAR 
347 at 386
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THE 'TOTAL WAGE' AND EARLY DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS EQUAL PAY
In 1966, the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission announced its intention to replace the basic 
wage and margins concept with the "total wage” concept 
which enabled identical wage increases to be awarded to
C  Omale and female employees. J A year later, the "total 
wage" concept was formally adopted by the Commission in 
the 1967 National Wage Case. The introduction of the 
total wage represented a small step towards improved 
treatment in the setting of wage standards for women, but, 
significantly, did not provide for equal pay between male 
and female employees. The continuing gender division 
between the wage rates afforded to male and female workers 
in the application of the total wage concept is summarised 
in the 1967 National Wage Case as follows:
"Although we refer to the total wage, there will for 
the present be a different total wage for males and 
females and a number of total wages for many 
classifications. These result from existing basic 
wage differentials and from the quite complex history 
of basic wages particularly those for females, 
starting many years from a concept of differing needs 
and responsibilities of men and women. Both basic
53 Basic Wage Margins and Total Wage Cases (1966) 115 
CAR 93
54 (1967) 118 CAR 655
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wages have over the years been adjusted in a variety 
of ways. We are conscious of these apparent 
anomalies, but consider it is not practical to attempt 
to deal with either at this time. The Community is 
faced with economic, industrial and social challenges 
arising from the history of female wage fixation. We 
have on this occasion deliberately awarded the same 
increase to adult females and males. The recent 
Clothing Trades Decision affirmed the concept of equal 
margins for adult males and females doing equal work. 
The extension of that concept to the total wage would 
involve economic and industrial sequels and calls for 
a thorough investigation and debate in which the 
policy of gradual implementation could be
c cconsidered.”
In addition to announcing the introduction of the "total 
wage" concept, the Basic Wage Margins and Total Wage Cases 
of 1966 also saw the introduction of the first adult 
minimum wage.*^ This new minimum wage did not, however, 
extend to women, or junior employees. Implicitly retained 
was the concept that wage standards were somehow referable 
to the sex of an employee based on assumptions relating to 
family responsibilities. The establishment of a male only 
minimum award served to maintain a marked sexual division 
in the payment of wage rates amongst low paid workers.
55 ibid, at 660
56 (1966) 115 CAR 93 at 194 ff
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Explicit gender discrimination in the payment of minimum 
wage rates was to remain in force until the introduction 
of a gender neutral "adult wage" in 1974.^
Five years prior to this development, however, Australia's 
first major equal pay case was brought before the federal 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission claiming the 
application of equal pay for equal work in the payment of
c oaward rates. ° The ruling in this case was followed by a 
second equal pay decision in 1972 in which qualified 
access to the separate principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value was granted. * The National Wage Case of 
1 9 7 4 6 0  involved a third equal pay decision which saw the 
final abandoning of the family wage concept through the 
replacement of the minimum male rate with an "adult" 
minimum wage applicable to both male and female workers. 
These three cases represent the first positive attempts to 
secure equal treatment for Australian women workers in the 
setting of wage rates, and will now be separately 
discussed.
57 See, National Wage Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
58 Equal Pay Cases (1969) 127 CAR 1142
59 National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172
60 National Wage Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
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CHAPTER THREE
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS - THE 1960'S AND 1970'S
The early 1960's through to the mid 1970's marked a period 
of rapid change in the social, cultural and economic role 
of Australian women. Between 1961 and 1973, women's 
participation in the paid workforce increased from 28.96% 
to an estimated 41.3%, with the labour participation rate 
for married women increasing by nearly 22%.^ The growing 
involvement of women in the labour market throughout the 
major western industrialised economies reflected new 
social attitudes relating to the status of women. Part of 
this changing awareness involved the recognition of the 
legal right to equal treatment irrespective of sex, 
including the right to be protected from unfair 
discrimination in all its forms. Internationally, a 
common interest in the implementation of equal pay 
principles emerged in response to the need to remove 
discriminatory employment practices, and to provide for 
greater equity in relation to women's working conditions. 
This Chapter is directed to describing the ways in which 
the application of these principles were to evolve in the 
context of the Australian industrial wage fixing system. 
More particularly an analysis is presented of the major 
equal pay decisions of the former Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission from 1969 to 1974.
1 J Nieuwenhuysen and J Hicks, "Equal Pay for Women in 
Australia and New Zealand" in B Pettman (Ed) Equal 
Pay for Women; Progress and Problems in Seven 
Countries, MCB Books, Bradford 1975, p 5
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Instrumental to the developments towards improved wage 
conditions for women workers during the 1960's was the 
adoption in 1951 by the International Labour Conference of 
the International Labour Organisation's Convention 
Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers 
for Work of Equal Value (ILO 100), and the accompanying
nILO Recommendation (No 90). Although ILO 100 was not 
ratified by the Australian Government until 1974, its 
principles and objectives were an important impetus to the 
introduction of the equal pay measures incorporated within 
Australia's State industrial legislation from the late 
1950's through to the early 1970's.^ With the progressive 
enactment of equal pay provisions under State laws, equal 
pay claims were gradually processed over this period 
before State industrial tribunals.
In the majority of States, wage improvements for women 
were perhaps most notable in the teaching industry. In 
New South Wales, for example, equal margins for male and 
female teachers were introduced from January 1959. The 
basic wage component was progressively raised in this 
State by a series of 8% wage increases which allowed for
2 M Gaudron and M Bosworth, "Equal Pay?", in J 
MacKinolty and H Radi (eds), In Pursuit of Justice, 
Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979, p 163
3 See Industrial Arbitration (Female Rates Amendment) 
Act 1958 (NSW), S 88D; Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1961 (Queensland); Industrial 
Arbitration Amendment Act 1968 (WA); Industrial Code 
1967 (SA); Public Service (Equal Pay) Act 1966 (Tas)
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equal male and female wage rates by 1963. In Victoria, it 
was determined that equal margins would be extended in 
1967, and basic wage differences phased out by 1971. A 
similar time frame was applied for particular teaching 
classifications in Queensland and Tasmania. In South 
Australia, equality in male and female teaching salaries 
was to be implemented by five annual instalments from 1966 
up till 1971. Finally, in Western Australia it was 
determined that equal pay for female teachers would be 
introduced over five years by 1973.^
The equal pay awards gained by female employees within the 
teaching profession were not, however, representative of 
changes industry wide. In other occupations and 
industries equal pay claims met with mixed success.^ 
Throughout Australia, the equal pay award wage increases 
which were obtained led nevertheless to a growing 
awareness of equal pay issues within the general 
community, and provided an important foundation for 
further changes to the methods applied in the 
determination of women's wage rates. Over time these 
changes were to flow through to the federal industrial 
wage system, and by 1969 Australia's first equal pay case
4 Department of Labour and National Service, Equal Pay: 
Some Aspects of Australian and Overseas Practice, 
Melbourne, 1969, p 74 ff
5 ibid, at pp 52-62? See too M Thornton, "(Un)equal Pay 
for Work of Equal Value”, (1981) Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Volume 23, 466 at p 471
73
proceedings had commenced within the federal industrial 
law jurisdiction.
THE 1969 EQUAL PAY CASE
The implementation of equal pay principles within various 
award wage rates established by State industrial tribunals 
provided towards the end of the 1960's a direct basis for 
comparison for female employees within the federal wage 
fixing system. By this time, noticeable discrepancies 
in wage rates had begun to emerge between similar job 
categories covered under federal and State awards. Such 
discrepancies were arguably attributable, in part, to the 
fact that no legislative provisions existed within the 
federal industrial jurisdiction requiring the application 
of equal pay principles in the determination of women's 
wage rates.
In June 1968, an application was lodged with the federal 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission by the Metal 
Employee's Union for the purpose of testing the 
application of equal pay principles in the making of 
federal industrial wage awards. The claim was later 
joined by ten additional applications brought by several 
Commonwealth public sector employee associations.
Following an unsuccessful jurisdictional challenge by
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employer groups to defeat the claims brought, the 
combined wage claims were fully presented before the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission by 
Australia's present Prime Minister, R J Hawke, then acting 
as an industrial advocate for the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (the ACTU).6 7 8 Several women's representative 
groups intervened in the case in support of the 
introduction of equal pay measures including the 
Australian Federation of Business and Professional Women's 
Clubs, the Union of Australian Women, the Australian 
Federation of Women Voters, and the Australian National 
Council of Women.
The ACTU's claim sought to increase award wage rates for 
female employees uniformly by an amount representing the 
difference in the former male and female basic wage. The 
applications did not, however, seek to comprehensively 
claim wage increases resulting from any differences
oarising from the "marginal" content of the total wage.
The ACTU's submissions referred to changes in trade union 
policy which, it was suggested, had resulted in an
6 See, The Commonwealth and Arbitration Commission & 
Ors: Ex Parte The Analiss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546
7 See, Equal Pay Cases, (1969) 127 CAR 1142
8 ibid, at 1147, 1158
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acceptance of the concept of equal pay for equal work.^
It was argued that by acceding to the wage claims lodged, 
an important step towards equal pay would be achieved, and 
that any anomalies which remained after the claims were 
granted could later be dealt with by individual 
Commissioners.
The Commonwealth claimed that it did not oppose the 
principle of equal pay provided that it was not applied 
where work was usually performed by women, and provided 
that the same type and volume of work was performed by 
both male and female employees.1  ^ The case was strongly 
contested, on the other hand, by the private employer 
organisations represented in the proceedings. These 
groups maintained that the claim would result in a major 
piece of "social engineering", and was in effect "a sort 
of face-saver, a sop, to be thrown to w o m e n " T h e  
advocate for the employer's group went on to deplore the 
selfishness of "the suffragettes who thronged this Court 
yesterday" from seeking to divert wages away from the male 
breadwinner in a workplace in which women should more 
appropriately be safe-guarding the well-being of their
9 id
10 ibid, 1149-1150. Query of course the extent to which 
the qualifications sought to the application of equal 
pay principles by the Commonwealth might correctly be 
interpreted as support for the proper implementation 
of equal pay
11 ibid, 1151
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families by remaining outside the paid labour market. *
The extent to which these arguments may have in any way 
influenced the Commission's decision in the 1969 Equal Pay 
Case proceedings is not entirely clear. Although the 
Commission finally determined that it was not prepared to 
grant the claim as pressed, it did however allow for the 
application of the principle of equal pay for equal work 
in a limited range of circumstances.
In coming to its decision, the Commission had regard to 
four basic issues. These included the history of women's 
wage fixation, the attitudes of the State Governments 
represented in the proceedings, the operation of 
developing international Conventions such as ILO 100, and 
the economic effects of any decision to allow the award 
wage increases sought. J Having considered these matters, 
the Unions' claims for equal pay were granted, but not in 
full. Most importantly, all claims for review were 
conditional upon compliance with nine separate principles. 
In summary, these principles required that male and female 
employees had to be working under the same award 
determination, and performing work of the same, or like 
nature, and of equal value. In applying equal pay
1 ?
12 See Transcript of the 1969 Equal Pay Case 
Proceedings, 25 February 1969; p 55; See too P 
Morrigan, "From Moses to Moore: The Legitimate 
Control of Women's Wages by the Australian State”, 
Paper presented to the 55th ANZASS Congress. 
Melbourne, 1985, p 23 ff
13 (1969) 127 CAR 1142 at 1152-1155
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principles within the award determination process, 
consideration was, in addition, not to be restricted to 
the situation in any one establishment. Rather, it had to 
extend to the broader employment situation under the award 
being considered. In reaching any decision on the issue 
of equal value, it was necessary that the range and volume 
of the work, and the overall work conditions were the same 
for male and female employees. Finally, equal value was 
held to mean equal value from the point of view of wage, 
or salary assessment, as opposed to equal value to the 
employer.^
Though an important decision in its time, the 1969 equal 
pay determination was deficient in several respects. The 
principles established were limited to "basic wage" 
differentials, and did not cover differences arising from 
the "marginal" content of the total wage. Significantly 
too, access to equal pay was not available where the work 
was essentially, or usually carried out by women. This 
aspect of the decision was in keeping with the need to 
bring, and maintain federal industrial wage awards in line 
with State industrial wage awards determined in accordance 
with equal pay provisions under State industrial 
legislation. It was a restriction which again operated to 
substantially entrench the principles first laid down in
14 ibid at 1159
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the 1912 Clothing Trades Case1  ^under which equal pay 
measures were not to be applied where work was 
predominantly performed by women. For reasons left 
unexplained, the principles were held not to apply to 
junior employees.
The wage fixing principles dealing with the processing of 
equal pay claims provided that wage increases were to be 
introduced in several stages from October 1969 to January 
1972.16 This was to enable a gradual implementation of 
female basic rates to reflect 100% of the male basic wage 
over three years. Certain wage increases occurred over 
this period, including the granting in 1970 of a 
significant award wage increase to large numbers of women 
process workers under the Metal Trades Award.^ By 1972, 
however, it had become apparent that the 1969 equal pay 
principles had had little effect on wage rates for the 
vast majority of women workers, who as a result of being 
employed in female dominated occupations had no access to 
the 1969 principles. It was estimated at this time that 
only 18% of females had received any wage increase as a
15 (1919) 13 CAR 647
16 1969 127 CAR 1142 at 1159
17 Metal Trades Industry Association v Electrical Trades 
Unionr (1970) 131 CAR 663; E Ryan and A Conlon,
op.cit., p 159
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result of the 1969 decision.^ In 1972 a second round of 
equal pay claims were consequently brought before the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission which will now be 
examined.
THE 1972 EQUAL PAY DECISION
In 1972, seven separate union claims were joined in a 
hearing before the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
for the purpose of further testing the application of 
equal pay principles within the federal wage fixing 
system.  ^ Several women's groups were granted leave to 
intervene in the proceedings, including the National 
Council of Women, the Union of Australian Women, and the 
Women's Liberation Movement. The claims sought a 
consideration of whether the male minimum wage should be 
applied to female employees, and whether any new equal pay 
principles should be formulated in the light of events 
occurring since 1969. These events included a marked 
change in attitude of most State Governments to equal pay 
issues and the introduction of legislative provisions for 
equal pay in Western Australia and South Australia. Of 
relevance too was the attitude of the newly elected 
federal Labor Government which had succeeded in reopening 
the 1972 proceedings following its election in December of
18 National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172 
at 177
19 ibid
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that year. Additional submissions were at this time 
placed before the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in support of a broader concept of equal pay by 
an industrial advocate who was to become Australia's first 
female High Court judge, the Honourable Justice Gaudron, 
then acting on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia.
As in the 1969 proceedings, the Commission was prepared to 
accept the importance of the legislative changes occurring 
at State Government level in relation to equal pay 
developments. Reference was again made to the provisions 
of ILO 100, and particular recognition was afforded to the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value. Recent 
overseas legislative reforms in the countries of New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom were additionally noted by 
the Commission. Interestingly in relation to the British 
Equal Pay Act 197 0, the Commission made the following 
comments :
"We have in this country built up over the years a 
system of work evaluation not inconsistent with job 
evaluation as envisaged in the United Kingdom Act. 
Accordingly, the reference to job evaluation in the
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United Kingdom can fairly be translated to the work
n nvalue reviews of the Australian scene.'
The Commission decided in the light of the various changes 
and international developments occurring since the 1969 
Equal Pay Case to positively state a new principle 
regarding the implementation of equal pay:
"In our view the concept of 'equal pay for equal work' 
is too narrow in today's world and we think the time 
has come to enlarge the concept to 'equal pay for work 
of equal value'. This means that award rates for all
work should be determined without regard to the sex of
0 1an employee."
Under the terms of the Commission's 1972 decision, the 
relationship between wage rates for men and women was to 
be governed by a fresh set of principles to be phased in 
by three instalments over two and a half years. Equal pay 
for work of equal value was first broadly defined as the 
fixing of award rates by a consideration of work performed 
irrespective of the sex of an employee. This general 
principle was to be applied either by agreement between 
industrial parties or, where no agreement could be 
reached, through the process of industrial arbitration. A 
scheme was proposed where work comparisons were to be made
20 ibid, at 178
21 id
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wherever possible between male and female classifications 
within the same award. Where this was not possible, 
female rates could be determined by work value comparisons 
within and between other female award classifications. As 
a final alternative comparisons with male and female 
classifications in different awards were to be permitted. 
The circumstances which would give rise to direct 
comparisons between male and female classifications 
remained, however, unspecified.
The Commission acknowledged that awards had generally been 
set without a comparative evaluation of the work performed 
by males and females. The Commission further conceded 
that unfamiliar issues may be encountered in conducting 
the kind of work value comparisons envisaged by the 
proposed guidelines. The implementation of the new equal 
pay for work of equal value principle to be applied would 
continue to be guided, however, by "the exercise of the 
broad judgment which has characterised work value 
inquirieswithin the federal wage fixing system. Any 
differences in the work performed would be determined by 
an arbitrator in keeping with "normal work value 
practices."^  The Commission here endorsed its earlier 
approach to the determination of work value with reference 
to worth in terms of salary fixation, as distinct from 
worth to the employer. The Commission also confirmed that
22 ibid, at 179
23 ibid, at 180
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pre-existing wage relativities could be a relevant factor 
to the determination of any equal pay increases.
On the question of the payment of an equal minimum wage, 
the Commission flatly declined the unions' application.
The Commission refused to extend the minimum wage to 
female employees on the basis that the male only minimum 
wage included an "essential characteristic"24 in that it 
took into account family considerations. Because such 
considerations did not in the Commissioner's view apply to 
women workers, no female minimum wage was prescribed. The 
new equal pay principle did not therefore apply to the 
male minimum wage which remained to be determined from 
factors unconnected with work actually performed.
The view adopted by the Commission in the 1972 Equal Pay 
Case that the retention of the male minimum wage 
represented "no real bar" to its consideration of equal 
pay2  ^revealed in part, the Commission's lack of 
appreciation of the effects of gender discrimination in 
the wage fixing process. No difficulty was perceived in 
attempting to provide a framework for the payment of wages 
irrespective of sex, while simultaneously upholding a 
minimum wage concept based on assumptions linking family 
responsibilities to the gender of an employee. The 
persistent characterisation of women's needs as being less
24 ibid, at 176
25 id
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than that of men on the basis of perceived family 
responsibilities, does not appear to have been based on 
any clearly objective criteria nor was it referable to any 
evidence presented to the Commission regarding the 
different financial responsibilities of female and male 
employees with parental obligations. The implied 
acceptance of women's inferior economic needs would appear 
to have rested substantially on little more than the 
stereotyped concept of the traditional "male breadwinner". 
The inability to identify and treat such subtle forms of 
discriminatory treatment within the industrial arbitration 
process through the use of more objective criteria 
connected to the value of work actually performed may yet 
be a matter to be fully addressed by Australia's federal 
wage fixing authorities. °
Ironically in the context of an equal pay case, the 
Commission's refusal in 1972 to extend the minimum wage to 
female employees represented one of the last forms of 
direct discrimination in the treatment of women within the 
federal industrial arbitration process. In 1974 this form 
of explicit discrimination.was finally removed in relation 
to minimum adult wage rates through the extension of the 
minimum wage to women workers. The 1974 National Wage
26 See, C Burton, The Promise and the Price. Allen &
Unwin, Sydney, 1991, Chapter 11; V Pratt, Affirmative 
Action Agency, Submission to the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs 1989, p 20.
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9 7Case decision in which the family wage concept was 
finally abandoned will now be outlined.
THE 1974 NATIONAL WAGE CASE
In the 1974 National Wage Case proceedings, the ACTU again
sought to claim a minimum wage applicable to both adult
males and females before the Australian Conciliation and
9 flArbitration Commission. ° In support of the ACTU's 
claims, submissions were presented by the Women's 
Electoral Lobby, the Union of Australian Women, and the 
National Council of Women.
In the course of determining the issues presented by the 
parties the Commission began by undertaking a review of 
the developments leading to the introduction of the male 
minimum wage in 1969. For the first time the Commission 
acknowledged that insufficient information was available 
to enable it to discriminate between the widely varying 
family responsibilities of workers within the labour 
market. Having decided that the subject of family needs 
should more correctly be dealt with by direct government 
measures, it was agreed that the family component should 
be discarded from the minimum wage concept.
27 National Wage Case 1974 157 CAR 293
28 id
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In weighing up the case for applying the minimum wage to 
adult female workers, the Commission accepted that strong 
evidence of widespread social support for the proposal 
existed. It was also conceded that the extension of the 
minimum wage to female workers was in all the 
circumstances economically viable. Most persuasive, it 
seems, were the economic arguments presented in support of 
the case, and the fact that large scale wage increases 
would be unlikely to occur:
"The lowest rates applicable to adult females in most 
awards are now close to the present minimum wage.
These developments make our proposal for the extension 
of the minimum wage to females economically feasible. 
We have, therefore decided to award the same minimum 
wage to adult males and females.
The cost estimates of allowing the extension of the 
minimum wage to women workers were estimated to range from 
$50 million to $200 million per annum, and a phasing in 
period involving three stages was laid down to end in June 
1975. These costs were in the Commission's assessment 
warranted to ensure the proper operation of the 1972 
decision which required that award rates for all work 
should be considered without regard to sex. Had these 
financial costs been greater, or the economic factors
29 (1974) 157 CAR 293 at 299
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different, it is arguably doubtful whether the outcome of 
the 1974 National Wage Case would have been the same.
EQUAL PAY EFFECTS FROM 1969 TO 1975
From 1969 to 1975 substantial increases in women's 
earnings occurred as a direct result of the equal pay 
principles developed and applied within the Australian 
industrial wage fixing system. In 1969, average weekly 
ordinary time earnings for full time non-managerial adult 
female employees were only 65.9% of those for male 
employees. By 1972, this ratio had risen to around 72%, 
and by 1975 had reached approximately 83%.^ While the 
overall wage gap between men and women remained 
significantly wider in relation to the total earnings of 
women workers (including part time employees), the above 
indices reveal a significant reduction of the level of 
wage discrimination in respect of award wage rates payable 
in the case of full time female employees.
By 1976, the large increases in relation to women's 
relative wage rates began, however, to subside as the 
percentage of the Australian male/female wage gap began
30 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 6304.0, Canberra, 1983
31 It is worth noting here that the above wage indices 
are of particular relevance when examining the 
incidence of discrimination in the wage fixing 
process insofar as wage differences arising from the 
number of hours worked are largely minimised
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once again to stabilise. The application of the newly 
developed equal pay principles designed to facilitate the 
removal of direct wage discrimination had, it seems, 
reached its limits.
•5 OThe National Wage Case of 1974,  ^marked in summary the 
end of a distinct era with regard to the development of 
national wage fixing principles designed to remove 
explicit sex discrimination from the wage determination 
process. A new phase in the equal pay debate was to 
emerge in the late 1970's involving a shift in focus away 
from issues of direct sex discrimination towards the more 
subtle and intractable problem of indirect discrimination 
in the wage determination process. The response of the 
federal industrial relations system to the changing nature 
and direction of equal pay issues following on from the 
1974 National Wage Case forms the subject of the following 
three Chapters of this thesis.
32 National Wage Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE STABILISATION OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP
The period from 1976 to 1990 has been characterised by a 
relative stability in the earnings gap between Australian 
men and women workers. In the case of total average weekly 
earnings of male and female workers, including part-time 
and overtime earnings, women's wage rates have consistently 
remained fixed at around 65% of those of men.-*- Where 
full-time adult non-managerial earnings are isolated over 
roughly the same period, the percentage wage difference 
between male and female employees has roughly remained 
fixed at around 17%. ^  while certain other salary indices 
have shown a slight reduction in male/female wage 
differences, no substantial movement in gender wage 
relativities on average has occurred.
The 1972 Equal Pay Case decision anticipated that all wage 
claims for the implementation of equal pay for work of
1 Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue No 6302.0, 
Canberra, August 1989
2 Labour Research Centre, Pay Equity For Women in 
Australia, National Women's Consultative Council, 
AGPS, Canberra, 1990, p 26
3 See for example, the 0.01% change in the ratio of 
award rates of pay from 1985 to 1988: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 6506.0
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equal value would be progressed by 1975.^ Despite this 
ruling, equal pay claims have continued to arise within the 
federal industrial wage fixing process through the late 
1970's, the 1980's, and indeed up to and including the 
1990's.^ The ongoing determination of equal pay claims 
before industrial wage fixing authorities has led to a 
series of isolated wage increases for particular groups of 
women workers. Important though these claims have proved, 
in terms of upholding the application of equal pay 
principles, their effect on reducing the persisting wage 
differences between men and women's earnings has been 
minimal. The relative position of women's wage rates has 
been essentially preserved over the past fifteen years, 
with only slight adjustments detectable in the comparative 
rates of male and female earnings with respect to most wage 
indices.
In appreciating how this situation has developed, some 
understanding is necessary of the broader economic and 
industrial relations context from 1975-1990. This Chapter 
examines this context with reference to the development of 
equal pay principles from 1975, up to and including the 
period governed by the Accord agreement endorsed by the
4 (1972) 147 CAR 172 at 180
5 See F. Rafferty, "Equal Pay - Past Experience, Future 
Directions: A Practitioner's Perspective, December 
1989, The Journal of Industrial Relations, 526. See 
too, Child Care Industry (ACT) Award 1985 and Child 
Care Industry (NT) Award 1986 Dec 1001/90 S Print 
J4316
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In the course of this1983 National Wage Case.^ 
examination, the establishment of national wage fixing 
procedures are considered in so far as they relate to the 
application of equal pay principles and broader issues 
concerning pay equity for women.
This Chapter begins with an outline of the events following 
the 1975 National Wage Case decision.7 The major changes 
brought to the Australian wage fixing system as a result of
Qthe Accord agreement0 will then be discussed having regard 
to the implementation, of equal pay principles. This 
discussion includes a review of the 1983 National Wage Case 
decision,^ and the 1985 Nurses Case.1^
1975 TO 1983 - TOWARDS WAGE DEREGULATION AND A WIDENING OF 
THE GENDER WAGE GAP
Following the 1975 National Wage Case,11 wage indexation 
principles were introduced within the Australian federal 
wage fixing system in response to acute economic pressures 
relating to high unemployment and inflation. These
6 National Wage Case 1983 (1983) 291 CAR 3
7 National Wage Case 1975 (1975) 167 CAR 18
8 See National Wage Case 1983 (1983) 291 CAR 3
9 id
10 Private Hospitals' and Doctors’ Nurses (ACT) Award 
(1986) 300 CAR 190
11 (1975) 167 CAR 18
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principles initially provided for regular quarterly 
adjustments to award wage rates in line with movements to 
the Consumer Price Index. The new wage indexation 
guidelines were viewed by the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission as remaining consistent with the application of 
the 1972 equal pay principles, and several equal pay claims
were processed within the 1975 national wage fixing
12principles established.
By 1976, full indexation had moved to partial indexation, 
and in 1981 the wage indexation system established under 
the 1975 National Wage Case was finally abandoned. This 
move away from centralised wage regulation, prompted by an 
apparent resources boom, resulted in a period of direct 
industry bargaining. As of 1982, little regulatory control 
consequently existed over the national level of wages and 
salaries. While this situation led to wage increases in 
such areas as the metal trades and transport industries, 
the repercussions for ordinary wage earners with less 
collective bargaining strength was less favourable:
"The effect of industry bargaining over this period 
was that those trade unions with bargaining power in 
the market place obtained wage increases while those 
unions which either lacked power or were in the public
12 C O'Donnell & N Golder, "A Comparative Analysis of 
Equal Pay in the United States, Britain and 
Australia", Australian Feminist Studies, Summer 1986, 
p 79
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sector where government resisted increases were 
largely unable to secure such substantial increase.
Women workers who fell predominantly within the latter 
categories of union membership did not fare well from the 
effects of deregulated industry bargaining. This is 
reflected in the 1982 figures in relation to wage earnings 
which showed a decline in the male/female wage ratio in 
respect of both average hourly earnings and average 
ordinary time earnings.^ For the first time in the six 
year period leading on from 1976, the wage gap between male 
and female employees began to show noticeable signs of 
regressing.
By 1982, further economic downturn had led to the 
introduction of a general wage freeze setting the ground 
for a sustained period of wage restraint. In September 
1983, indexation was again introduced through a new set of 
wage fixing arrangements laid down in the 1983 National 
Wage Case.1  ^ These arrangements were essentially modelled 
on a Statement of Accord agreed to by the ACTU, and the 
Australian Labor Party prior to the election of the federal 
Labor Government in March 1983. The incorporation of the 
terms of the Statement of Accord within the national wage
13 RC McCallum, MJ Pittard & G Smith, Australian Labour 
Law, Butterworths, Sydney, 1990, p 440
14 Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue No 6304.0, 
Canberra, 1983
15 (1983) 291 CAR 3
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fixing guidelines determined by the federal Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission represented a major shift within 
the Australian industrial relations system. It was a 
development which was to set definitively the context for 
Australia's next major equal pay test case proceedings, the 
1985 Nurse's Case.1* The 1983 National Wage Case decision, 
and its implications for equal pay for Australian women 
will now be discussed with particular reference to the 
ACTU's equal pay claim in the 1985 Nurse's Case.
1983 TO 1986 - THE ACCORD AND THE OPERATION OF EQUAL PAY 
PRINCIPLES
1 7The 1983 National Wage Case1' saw the introduction of 
eleven basic wage principles designed to tightly regulate 
national wage adjustments in line with movements in the 
Consumer Price Index, and increases in national 
productivity. These principles endorsed the main 
components of the Statement of Accord which, as a result of 
the 1983 National Wage Case, was to influence fundamentally 
the process of wage negotiation in Australia up to and 
including the 1990's. The principles held a number of 
implications for the setting of women's wage rates, and the 
implementation of equal pay for work of equal value. Of 
particular significance was the Commission's approach to
16 (1986) 300 CAR 190
17 (1983) 291 CAR 3
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determining the grounds for wage increases resulting from 
work value assessments under the work value principle.
Prior to the abandoning of wage indexation in July 1981, a 
strict series of principles applied to the determination of 
work value claims. Any party seeking a wage increase based 
on work value considerations was required to establish 
changes in the nature of the work, skills, and 
responsibilities required by the job being performed. Such 
a change had to constitute a significant net addition to 
work requirements, and the measurement of any increase in 
money terms would normally depend on the past work 
requirements, and the wage previously fixed.1® In the 1983 
National Wage Case decision, the Commission restated this 
approach for determining work value increases under 
Principle 4 of the 1983 national wage fixing guidelines:
"The correct test for an alteration in wage rates is 
that the change in the nature of work should 
constitute such a significant net addition to work 
requirements as to warrant the creation of a new 
classification. These are the only circumstances in 
which rates may be altered on the ground of work 
value and the altered rates may be applied only to
18 National Wage Case 1981 (1981) 254 CAR 347 at 386
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employees whose work has changed in accordance with 
this Principle."^
Award wage adjustments based on work value grounds were, in 
summary, to remain based on considerations relating to 
previous work requirements, and applicable wage rates. This 
was so even in circumstances where wage rates might be 
demonstrated as being partially fixed with regard to past 
relativities based on discriminatory criteria. No 
allowance was to be made, for example, for the possible 
undervaluation of wage rates in respect of job 
classifications predominantly performed by women even where 
the wage fixing history of the award subject to the work 
value claim might indisputably have been based on 
considerations directly connected to the family wage 
concept.
Most significantly in relation to the topic of equal pay, 
the 1983 National Wage Case was notable for its rejection 
of calls for a more comprehensive system for the evaluation 
of the value of women's work. Intervening in the 
proceedings to support the return to a centralised wage 
fixing system, and to present equal pay submissions on the 
subject of women's work value were the National Council of 
Women, the Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) and the Union of 
Australian Women. These groups contended that the 
implementation of the 1972 equal pay principles had not
19 (1983) 291 CAR 3 at 32
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been accompanied by proper work value exercises. It was 
suggested that work value procedures should be reappraised 
to enable work value assessments to be carried out as 
individual awards came up for variation. It was argued in 
essence that wage fixing methods should be revised to 
enable a more complete implementation of the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value. The Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission was, however, unprepared to accept 
these proposals:
"We consider that such large scale work value
inquiries would clearly provide an opportunity for the
development of additional tiers of wage increases,
which would be inconsistent with the centralized
system which we propose for the next two years and
would also be inappropriate in the current state of
unemployment especially among women. Moreover, many
of the problems which the WEL has raised are matters
for management, unions and governments rather than for
9 naward provision. w
Although the Commission appeared at least to allow for the 
possibility that some of the pay equity matters raised 
during the proceedings could be treated by adjustments to 
award provisions, no comment is to be found on the need to 
accommodate such changes through a more thorough
20 (1983) 291 CAR 3 at 31
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implementation of the 1972 equal pay principles,21 or 
alternatively, the application of revised wage fixing 
procedures. Such considerations were it seems outside the 
Commission's objectives of providing an acceptable 
framework for maintaining wage stability, and incompatible 
with the Commission's perception of the likely effects of 
any wage increases in terms of Australia's broader national 
economic development.
Within this framework the parameters fixed for the 
determination of work value issues provided little scope 
for work value inquiries directed towards the review of 
discriminatory wage practices arising from the 
undervaluation of women's work. It is important to 
recognise in this context that this form of indirect 
discrimination is not commonly associated with 
circumstances where changes in work value can be easily 
demonstrated in terms of significant net additions to work 
requirements. The review of indirect sex discrimination 
through the undervaluation of women work substantially 
fell, in short, outside the normal work value principles 
prescribed within the federal wage fixing system as 
prescribed under the terms of the 1983 National Wage 
Case.22
21 See National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 
172
22 (1983) 291 CAR 3
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THE 1983 NATIONAL WAGE CASE AND INDUSTRIAL AWARD CLAIMS FOR 
EQUAL PAY INCREASES
The ways in which equal pay claims could be processed 
through the industrial arbitration system following the 
1983 National Wage Case leads to a close consideration of 
Principle 6 of the 1983 national wage fixing principles. 
Principle 6 provided the basic mechanism for dealing with 
anomalies and inequities within the wage setting process. 
Industrial award claims for equal pay increases were to be 
allowed under this principle, but only in special 
circumstances where no wage increases would flow on to 
other award classifications and no economic flow on effect 
would result.
The anomalies and inequities procedures had their origins 
in submissions put by the principal parties to the 1975 and 
1976 National Wage Cases proceedings. J The procedures 
developed from these proceedings were formally incorporated 
by the Commission as a national wage fixing device to deal 
with special and extraordinary cases warranting award wage 
increases. Although the anomalies and inequities 
procedures extended to facilitate equal pay claims, the 
principles were never specifically designed to address 
equal pay issues, and essentially were limited to claims of 
an anomalous, isolated, or unique nature.
23 National Wage Case 1975 (1975) 171 CAR 79 at 85? 
National Wage Case 1976 (1976) 177 CAR 335 at 348
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Principle 6 of the 1983 national wage fixing principles 
required an anomaly or inequity to be processed through an 
anomalies conference. Here, the matter would first be 
discussed between the parties for the purpose of seeking 
agreement as to the existence of the anomaly or inequity 
raised. Where no agreement was possible, the President of 
the anomalies conference would be called upon to determine 
the issue, and either dismiss the application, or where an 
arguable case existed, refer it to a Full Bench of the 
Commission for consideration. The 1983 guidelines provided 
no precise definition of the different concepts of an 
anomaly, or an inequity under the terms of Principle 6.
This was due to the Commission's determination that an 
exhaustive explanation of the concepts would be 
inappropriate to the effective operation of the 
Principle.^ The Commission here attached weight to the 
fact that such guidance had not been sought by any of the 
parties to the national wage case proceedings.^ 5
The anomalies and inequities principle was strictly subject 
to a requirement that it could not be used as a means for 
generally improving wage conditions, or lead to any wage 
flow on effect. In the resolution of anomalies, the 
overriding concept is that the Commission must be satisfied 
that any claim under this Principle will not be a vehicle
24 National Wage Case 1983 (1983) 291 CAR 3 at 34
25 id
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for wider improvements in pay and conditions. The 
circumstances warranting the improvements must accordingly
o cbe of a special and isolated nature. ° These overriding 
requirements were to significantly effect the outcome of 
Australia's next major equal pay decision, the 1985 Nurse's 
Case. ^
It has been suggested that the incorporation of the terms 
of the Accord agreement within the principles established 
by the 1983 National Wage Case ignored the specific rights 
and needs of women employees through an overriding emphasis 
on the maintenance of existing wage relativities, and the 
systematic containment of wage increases. ° The 
determination of the 1985 Nurse's Case lends some support 
to this general view, and will now be separately 
considered.
THE 1985 NURSES TEST CASE - NEW LIMITS TO THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES
In October 1985 an application was lodged before the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission on behalf of the 
Royal Australian Nurses Federation, and the Hospital
26 ibid, at 53
27 Private Hospitals' and Doctors' Nurses (ACT) Award 
(1986) 300 CAR 190
28 M. Power, S. Outhwaite, & S. Rosewarne, "Writing Women 
Out Of The Economy", Paper Prepared for the ANZASS 
Centenary Congress, May 17, 1986 p 12
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Employee's Federation to vary the Private Hospitals' and 
Doctors' Nurses (ACT) Award 1972. The proceedings were 
initiated by the ACTU as part of a developed strategy to 
reduce the structural inequality of women in the labour 
market by remedying the problem of the traditional 
undervaluation of women's work. * The substance of the 
ACTU's case was that nursing represented an occupation 
which had been traditionally undervalued because it was a 
female occupation, and that wage increases were justified 
to rectify this undervaluation in keeping with the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value.
Prior to any detailed review of nurses' wage rates, 
preliminary rulings on two threshold matters were sought by 
the ACTU. These included first, a ruling that the 1972 
equal pay decision was still available to be implemented 
and second, that the Commission was not constrained in 
implementing the 1972 decision by virtue of the 1983 
national wage fixing principles. The ACTU also sought to 
argue that the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value embraced the doctrine of comparable worth as 
developed within various overseas jurisdictions, most 
particularly the United States.
In relation to the threshold issues, the Commission 
acknowledged that the 1972 equal pay principles were
29 ACTU, Working Women's Charter; Implementation Manual 
No 2, Equal Pay, ACTU, Melbourne, February 1985
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available to be implemented, but only in cases where they 
had not been already applied.^0 Equal pay claims were to 
be constrained, but not prohibited by the 1983 national 
wage fixing principles, and were required to be processed 
in accordance with Principle 6 relating to anomalies and 
inequities. Equal pay claims were to be permitted, but
only in circumstances where no wage flow on effect would 
31occur.J
The Commission expressly dismissed the concept of 
comparable worth described in the submissions presented 
before it on the basis that it was incompatible with, and 
potentially threatening to the scheme of Australia's 
centralised wage fixing system:
"Such an approach would strike at the heart of long 
accepted methods of wage fixation in this country and 
would be particularly destructive of the present Wage 
Fixing Principles. The countries to which we were 
specifically referred in which the doctrine is 
applied, namely Canada, United States of America, and 
the United Kingdom have very different industrial 
relations backgrounds from our own. In addition
30 Private Hospitals' and Doctors' Nurses (ACT) Award 
(1986) 300 CAR 190 at 191
31 id
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different approaches have been taken to the doctrine
H *5 Oin each of these countries*
It is important to note that in the presentation of 
argument to the Commission no precise definition of 
comparable worth was provided by the ACTU, other than to 
state that the concept involved methods of job evaluation 
employed overseas and could equate with the 1972 principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value.
It is possible that the Commission's blunt rejection of the 
comparable worth approach may possibly have been due, in 
part, to the lack of more detailed submissions regarding 
the suitability of the comparable worth approach to the 
review of discriminatory wage practices within the 
Australian industrial relations context. The absence of 
any clear evidence to demonstrate the presence of indirect 
discrimination in the determination of female wage rates, 
also appears to have had an important bearing on the 
Commission's decision in the test case proceedings.
Stronger arguments showing the need for a more 
comprehensive approach to the application of the 1972 equal 
pay principles were , in the Commission's view, plainly 
required. As the Commission pointed out in relation to the 
evidence presented in the proceedings:
32 ibid, at 190
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"...there was no analysis of this Commission's 
decisions or the methods by which rates are fixed in 
its awards or determinations to indicate 
that... inequalities were reflected in award rates of 
pay."^
The absence of any detailed analysis of the ways in which 
discrimination might be reflected in award wage payments, 
or the award making functions of the Commission is 
difficult to understand given the strong emphasis placed by 
the ACTU on the importance of the proceedings as a test 
case for the implementation of equal pay principles.
Another feature lacking from the case similarly involved 
the omission of any detailed analysis regarding the 
applicability of the different overseas developments for 
the review of gender bias to the Australian wage 
determination process. No proper mention was made, for 
example, during the proceedings as to how particular job 
evaluation procedures and methods could practically and 
effectively be employed in the context of the Australian 
industrial arbitration process.
The problems associated with this lack of detailed evidence 
are especially highlighted when examining the broad 
comparative analysis presented to the Commission in 
relation to the issue of work value assessment. The 
overseas countries referred to in the material put to the
33 id
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Commission almost exclusively apply a measurement of work 
value in terms of worth to the employer. Yet, the 
Commission has consistently stated that work value in the 
Australian context refers to worth in terms of salary- 
fixation.'^ The failure to address such a basic 
difference, or to propose possible solutions compatible 
with the Australian approach to the evaluation of work 
value, clearly diminished the acceptance of the concept of 
comparable worth proposed. The 1985 Nurse's case did not 
accordingly result in any substantial reform allowing 
access to clearer procedures to facilitate the effective 
comparison of work value between the sexes within the 
Australian industrial wage fixing process.
DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THE DETERMINATION OF EQUAL PAY 
ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE 1985 NURSES TEST CASE
In direct contrast to the 1969 and 1972 equal pay 
decisions, it is significant to note in relation to the 
Commission's decision in the 1985 Nurses test case, the 
absence of any reference to Australia's international 
treaty obligations under either ILO Convention 100, Equal 
Remuneration For Work Of Equal Value, or ILO Convention 
111, Equality in Employment and Occupation.
34 Equal Pay Cases (1969) 127 CAR at 1159; National Wage 
and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172 at 180
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The Commission also appeared to impliedly reject the type 
of earlier parallels drawn with the United Kingdom in 
relation to the conduct of work value inquiries. Unlike 
the earlier equal pay decisions, the Commission appeared to 
discount the overseas developments in the area of equal pay 
as having little, or no bearing to the Australian 
industrial scene.
A major gap in the Commission's reasons for decision was 
the absence of any discussion of the provisions of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) . This legislation had come 
into force in August 1984, immediately prior to the 
commencement of the Nurses test case proceedings. The 
federal Sex Discrimination Act was introduced for the 
purpose of implementing certain provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women within Australia municipal 
law. The United Nations Convention is scheduled to the 
federal Sex Discrimination Act, and provides in Article 11 
l.(d) for the right to equal remuneration in respect of 
work of equal value including equality of treatment in the 
evaluation of work. In considering the legal effect of 
Article 11 1(d), it is significant to note the provisions 
of Sections 14 and 26 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth). Section 14 broadly prohibits both direct and 
indirect discrimination in the terms and conditions of 
employment. Section 26 of the Act broadly prohibits 
discrimination in relation to the acts and practices of
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person exercising or performing functions under 
Commonwealth law.
Extracts from the above provisions were tabled by the 
Commonwealth in the course of the Nurses Case proceedings, 
and were further referred to by separate women's groups
“3  Cintervening in the proceedings. J In the course of these 
submissions, particular recommendations were put relating 
to the need to address discrimination in the workplace in 
accordance with the principles of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth). Despite these submissions, the 
Commission's decision contained no discussion of the legal 
requirements, or effects of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth) , or the United Nations Convention on which the Act is 
largely based. One reason for this may again have been 
related to the absence of sufficiently detailed 
presentations to the Commission by the relevant parties on 
either the operation of Australia's domestic discrimination 
legislation, or Australia's international treaty 
obligations directed towards equal treatment in employment.
The inadequacy of the submissions presented to the 
Commission in the Nurses Case cannot wholly explain, 
however, the Commission's inability to more completely 
assess the role of discrimination laws in developing
35 See Submissions of the National Council of Women of
Australia, and the Council For Action For Equal Pay in 
the Nurses Case, Private Hospitals' and Doctors'
Nurses ACT (Award) 1972, Transcript of Proceedings, 12 
December 1985
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procedures for the application of equal pay principles. 
While it is possible that the Commission may have 
considered that these laws operated separately, or in 
isolation, to the Australian industrial wage fixing process 
with which it is concerned, such an approach rests uneasily 
with the terms of the Sex Discrimination Act (Cth) 1984.
It should be mentioned here that orders and awards of 
federal industrial tribunals generally cannot be made 
inconsistently with laws of the Commonwealth.*^ It is also 
worth noting at this point that the terms of the Sex 
Discrimination Act (Cth) 1984 attempt to provide a 
legislative scheme which requires persons acting under 
Commonwealth law to remove direct and indirect 
discrimination from within the area of employment, and
■3 *7government decision making practices.
Another reason for the Commission's lack of discussion of 
the effect of Australia's sex discrimination laws on the 
equal pay issues raised by the Nurse's case may possibly 
have been connected to an underlying view that no purpose 
was to be served by providing any explanation of the 
influence of discrimination laws on the operation of the 
federal industrial wage fixing system. The absence of any
36 Termination, Change and Redundancy Case (1984) 8 IR 
34. The issue of whether this rule applies to the 
provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
forms the basis of more detailed discussion in Chapter 
Ten
37 See, for example Sections 14 and 26, Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
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basic guide setting out the relationship between 
discrimination legislation, and the operation of the 
federal industrial wage system, has arguably, however, led 
to considerable uncertainty regarding the role, if any, 
that discrimination legislation may have in the area of 
industrial conciliation and arbitration. The decision of 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the 1985 
Nurse's Case regrettably provides little indication of the 
way in which the industrial wage negotiation process may be 
influenced or affected by such laws. The same may be said 
of the industrial wage proceedings following on from the 
Commission's decision on the threshold issues raised by the 
1985 Nurses Case. The outcome of these further wage 
proceedings will now be discussed.
BEYOND THE THRESHOLD ISSUES - THE NURSES CASE PROCEEDINGS 
1986-1987
Following the decision of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in the 1985 Nurse's case, an anomalies 
conference was held in March 1986 to determine the issue of 
whether an anomaly or inequity arose in relation to the 
several nursing awards under review. 8^ The President of 
the anomalies conference was persuaded that there had been 
no prior application of the 1972 equal pay principles to 
the relevant award wage salaries, and that due to a range
38 Re RANF Application (A No 257). Decision of Maddem J, 
President, Melbourne, 2 April 1986
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of factors an arguable case existed for the issues to be 
referred to the Full Bench for determination. These 
factors included unusual features relating to the increased 
rates of pay for nurses under State award provisions, the 
shortage of nurses, changes in work value with the use of 
new technology, new innovations in relation to hospital 
administration and training procedures, added technical and 
administrative responsibility, as well as changes to 
nursing career structures.
On the basis that these circumstances constituted a rare 
and isolated case, the matter was referred to a hearing of 
the Full Bench to determine the issue of wage adjustments 
arising under the anomalies and inequities provision of the
“3  Q1983 national wage fixing principles. * Because of the 
interrelated nature of the work value issues arising under 
Principle 4 of these principles, and the anomalies issues 
arising under Principle 6, relevant to the application of 
equal pay, the two matters were jointly referred for the 
consideration of the Full Bench.
In proceedings conducted before the Full Bench in 1987,^® 
the Royal Australian Nurses Federation (RANF) claimed that 
the rates of pay of registered nurses had been fixed with 
regard to the fact that the majority of nurses are female,
39 ibid, p 7
40 Re RANF Applications (A No. 257). Dec 224/87 Print 
G7200, May 1987
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and that wage levels had become depressed on account of 
gender bias. The wage fixing history was presented in 
relation to the various awards being considered, and 
specific arguments were put regarding the effect of a 1970 
Full Bench decision in which gender bias was apparent on 
the face of the award wage determination. This 1970 wage 
fixing decision involved a previous work value inquiry and 
was presented by the ACTU as evidence of the non 
application of the 1972 equal pay principle to the ACT 
nurses award. It was accepted by the Commission in the 
course of the hearing that this award had influenced the 
wage rate fixed in relation to all Commonwealth nurses.^
It is important to appreciate that the success of the 
applicant's claim depended on the Union establishing that 
the 1972 equal pay principles had not already been applied 
to the award classifications subject to review. The 
percentage increases of nurses' wages compared with the 
increases awarded to the predominantly male occupation of a 
fitter during the same period were detailed to support the 
Union's argument that no equal pay increases had been 
previously allowed. It was further submitted by the RANF 
that the education, training and duties of nurses were such 
that they were entitled to rates equivalent to other 
professional officers within the health care industry. It 
was also recommended that a single salary and career 
structure apply to allow for greater stability in the
41 ibid, p 19
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fixation of nurses wage rates throughout Australia. Most 
importantly recent developments in the salary and career 
structures of nurses covered by State awards were detailed. 
These included several industrial agreements relating to 
wage increases and changed award structures for nurses in 
Victoria, N.S.W., South Australia, Western Australia, and 
Tasmania. These agreements occurred between 1986-87, 
involving wage negotiations based on various considerations 
relevant to work value assessment.^
The issue of work value was considered separately by the 
Commission in accordance with Principle 4 of the 1983 wage 
fixing principles. The major changes agreed to by 
Commonwealth and State Governments to the education and 
training of nurses were outlined by the RANF to illustrate 
the changing professional nature of the nursing occupation.
Numerous factors were advanced for consideration in 
relation to work value in terms of significant net 
additions to work being performed. These included such 
changes as increased patient dependency, educational and 
technological changes in medical treatment and drug 
administration, delegation of responsibility from medical 
officers, and staff shortages. Several work inspections 
were carried out and the evidence of 41 witnesses was
42 M Thornton, "Pay Equity: An Australian Perspective", 
Paper prepared on behalf of the International Labour 
Organisation, May 1989, p 15
114
presented relating to aspects of changes to work value in 
keeping with the traditional work value principle.
THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION OF AWARD WAGE INCREASES
The decision of the Full Bench of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission in relation to the Nurse's case was 
ultimately handed down in May of 1987. In recognition of 
the gender bias present within the determination of the 
1970 ACT nurses award, the Commission was prepared to 
accept that the nurses' wage rates in question had been 
assessed in 1970 on the basis that nursing was a 
predominantly female occupation.The Commission found, 
on balance, that no positive application of the 1972 equal 
pay decision had been demonstrated, even though it was 
accepted that wage rates for nurses in New South Wales, in 
which equal pay increases had been allowed, had probably 
been an influence on the wage payments set under 
Commonwealth rates. Had there been any prior direct 
application of the 1972 equal pay principles, any further 
equal pay increments would presumably have been refused by 
the Commission.
The Commission confirmed that an anomaly existed with 
respect to rates of all nurses covered by the awards under 
review, and that inequities also existed in certain awards
43 Re RANF Application (A No 257) Dec 224/87 Print G7200, 
May 1987, p 19
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in respect of dissimilar rates paid to nurses under State 
industrial awards.44
The Commission accepted that the factors listed in relation 
to the issue of work value led to a "special element within 
the existing situation of the pay and career structure of 
nurses."45 Indeed, an emphasis was placed throughout the 
decision on the unusual and "possibly unique"45 
circumstances surrounding the nurses' work value claim.
The Commission was satisfied on the material provided that 
ongoing work value changes had occurred in several areas. 
Changes in the nature of work skills and responsibility 
were established in most of the awards under 
consideration.4^
The RANF's work value claim for professional rates had 
rested on the argument that the preparation for nursing 
duties was comparable to that of a scientist undertaking a 
three year degree. Comparative rates of pay of nurses and 
technical science grades were tendered, along with duty 
statements of employees within the fields of physiotherapy, 
and medial technology. This material was not, however, 
considered by the Commission to be pertinent to the 
application of work value principles:
44 ibid, p 32
45 ibid, p 25
46 id
47 ibid, p 36
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"We consider this material to be of no assistance in 
respect of work value comparisons and we are unable to 
make any analysis of the type contemplated by the 1972 
equal pay decision. Nor are we in a position to 
measure the worth or status of the UG2 nurses director 
in relation to the academic qualification of a 
hospital scientist or technician. We also express 
some doubt as to whether the non-application of the 
1972 Equal Pay Principle can be used to justify the 
lifting of the wage rates of nurses to a professional 
level* 48
Despite the rejection of the arguments that nurses' wages 
should be afforded professional status, limited wage 
increases were granted to the nursing award classifications 
under consideration. The RANF's application for a 
retrospective wage increase was, however, denied, and a 
three month transition period was established for wage 
increases to be phased in. These wage increases were 
predominantly set to match rates applicable to nurses in 
State public hospitals.
THE 1985 NURSES DECISION - AN EQUAL PAY CASE?
From a close analysis of the 1985 Nurse's case, it is 
difficult to see how the ultimate outcome of the
48 ibid, p 41
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proceedings might properly be characterised as a case 
involving the application of the equal pay principles. As 
Short,^ Hunter,^0 and Thornton^1 point out, the resolution 
of the 1985 Nurse's case appeared to depend not so much on 
the determination of equal pay issues, as on a range of 
special features relevant to the nursing industry at the 
time the proceedings were brought. These features included 
changes to the delivery of nursing services, the relatively 
strong industrial bargaining strength of the nurses' 
unions, the high level of trade union organisation in the 
nursing industry, and ongoing labour shortages in relation 
to nursing staff. For women in other predominantly female 
occupations where such special factors could not be 
identified, the decision of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission in the Nurse's case offered little 
by way of constructive precedent for the further 
application of equal pay principles within the Australian 
wage fixing process. If anything, the Nurse's test case 
proceedings tended to suggest a narrowing in the range of 
circumstances in which wage increases might result from the 
application of equal pay measures. This is especially so 
when considering the prevailing requirement that no wage 
increases of any nature were to be permitted with respect
49 C Short, "Equal Pay - What Happened?", (1986) Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol 28 Number 3,, p 33
50 R Hunter, "Women Workers and Federal Industrial Law: 
From Harvester to Comparable Worth" (1988) Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 147, p 169
51 Thornton, op. cit♦, p 17
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to equal pay claims processed through the anomalies and 
inequities procedure in cases where a wage flow on effect 
was likely.
The Nurse's case decision serves in addition to illustrate 
the difficulties attached to ensuring the systematic 
assessment of the extent of gender bias within award wage 
rates in the course of collective wage bargaining. The 
lack of any requirement for the Commission to provide a 
statement of reasons as to how wage increases are arrived 
within an industrial award wage determination^ largely 
inhibits any precise measurement or breakdown of the equal 
pay increment arrived at within the award determination 
process. The final wage increases granted as a result of 
the 1987 Nurses' case appear, for example, to have been 
substantially adjusted having regard to comparable State 
award wage rates. ^ 3 Adjustments to State awards may in 
turn have been influenced by the "in principle" decision of 
the 1985 Nurses Case confirming that access to equal pay 
principles was still available within the Australian wage 
fixing system.^ It is, however, difficult, if not 
impossible, to assess in these circumstances the component 
of the wage increase finally awarded in the 1987 Nurses 
Case attributable to the application of equal pay
52 Askew v Fields 1984 57 CLR 225
53 See, Re RANF Application (A No 257) Dec 224/87 M Print 
G7200, p 42
54 Thornton, op. cit., p 15
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principles. This situation unfortunately provides little 
basis for the evaluation, or review of procedures for the 
identification and treatment of discrimination within the 
conciliation and arbitration process. The problems 
associated with the review of gender bias through the 
determination of equal pay claims within the industrial 
arbitration process forms the subject of the following 
Chapter. Chapter Five presents a critical assessment of 
the application of equal pay principles within the 
conciliation and arbitration process from 1974, up to and 
including the conclusion of the 1986 Nurse's case 
proceedings.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A REVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES WITHIN 
THE FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION SYSTEM 1974-1986
The dramatic improvement in the relative wage outcomes for 
women workers as a result of the 1969, 1972 and 1974 equal 
pay decisions^- led to an implicit assumption on the part of 
some observers that institutionalised wage discrimination 
had been effectively treated within the Australian 
industrial award making system.2 This reform had 
presumably occurred as a combined result of equal pay 
legislation under State law, and the introduction of 
federal industrial wage fixing principles referable to the 
application of equal pay for equal work, and equal pay for 
work of equal value.
By way off contrast, other studies directed to examining 
the nature of the persisting male/female wage gap in 
Australia imply that wage discrimination continues to form 
an underlying component of
1 See Equal Pay Cases (1969) 127 CAR 1142; National Wage 
and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172; National Wage 
Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
2 R G Gregory and V Ho, "Equal Pay and Comparable Worth: 
What can the US learn from the Australian 
Experience?", Discussion Paper No. 123, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, p 10
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In analysing thisthe male/female wage differential.3 
issue, several commentators have identified weaknesses 
relating to the accessibility, and nature of the procedures 
laid down for determining work value in the course of 
implementing the equal pay for work of equal value 
principle within the industrial wage process. This Chapter 
is directed to exploring some of the themes which these 
writers have raised as part of a broad review of the 
implementation of equal pay principles within the federal 
industrial jurisdiction from 1972-1986.
THE LIMITED APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF THE 1972 EQUAL PAY 
DECISION
A common thread within the literature directed to the 
analysis of equal pay developments within Australia over 
the past fifteen years relates to the restricted 
application of the equal pay principles established by the
3 M R  Killingsworth, The Economics of Comparable Worth, 
Rutgers University, W E Upjohn Institute, Michigan 
1990, p 265; R Drago, "The Extent of Wage 
Discrimination in Australia", Australian Bulletin of 
Labour, Voi 15 No 4, 1989, 314
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1972 Equal Pay decision.'* Short records^ that from 1972 to 
1986 only 35 awards were changed to allow for equal pay for 
work of equal value. Work value inquiries to evaluate the 
training, skills, responsibilities and working conditions 
of award classifications were on the whole absent in the 
award determinations surveyed, and in all but two cases 
work inspections were not conducted.
As Burton points out in relation to the same period,^ no 
attempt was made in the course of determining equal pay 
cases within the federal wage fixing process to compare 
dissimilar jobs, or award classifications in work value 
terms in such a way as to reappraise the value of work 
traditionally performed by women in relation to work 
traditionally performed by men. Comparisons between job 
classifications arising within the industrial wage 
determination process have consistently focused on 
similarity in work content, as distinct from work value. 
As Burton points out, the possibility that similarity in
4 M Thornton, "(Un)equal Pay for Work of Equal Value” (1981) The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 23, 
Number 4, p 473; C Short "Equal Pay - What Happened?", 
(1986) The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 28, 
Number 3, p 324; C O'Donnell and H Golder, "A Comparable Analysis of Equal Pay in the United States, 
Britain and Australia", 1986, 3 Australian Feminist 
Studies, p 78; P Hall and C O'Donnell, Getting Equal, 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p 54; L Bennett, "Equal 
Pay and Comparable Worth and the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission", Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 30, 1988, p 534
5 Short op.cit. p 324
6 C Burton, The Promise and The Price, Allen & Unwin, 
1991, p 132
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work value could exist in dissimilar work has yet to be 
fully investigated. While it could be argued that this 
approach to wage determination has been equally applied in 
relation to male and female award wage rates across 
industries and occupations, it is an approach which holds 
particular disadvantages for the determination of award 
wage increases where the implementation of equal pay for 
work of equal value is in issue. The reluctance to more 
fully compare male and female job classifications in 
situations involving different work tasks has arguably 
limited the effective review of indirect discrimination 
through the undervaluation of work on the basis of sex.
In the common situation where no male classifications exist 
with which female classifications can be compared under the 
same award, a comparison of male and female classifications 
in different awards would appear to provide the only 
satisfactory way of evaluating whether wage rates may have 
been indirectly determined with reference to the sex of an 
employee. The secondary option of comparing the 
traditionally depressed wages of one female dominated 
occupation, with the depressed wages of another would not 
appear to provide any proper basis for the implementation
pof the equal pay for work of equal value principle.
7 id
8 See Submission of the National Pay Equity Coalition to 
the 1988 National Wage Case; P Hall & C O'Donnell,
op.cit.
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The extremely low incidence of cases before industrial wage 
tribunals involving the comparison of predominantly male 
and female job classifications in different awards has 
further led to a situation where no clearly defined methods 
have been routinely devised to allow for the effective 
comparison of work value between the sexes. This is 
despite the availability of procedures under the broad 
terms of the 1972 Equal Pay Case  ^which allow for the 
comparison of different award classifications between 
predominantly male and female occupational groups. The 
overriding emphasis on the requirement of strict 
comparability of job content raises the issue of whether 
sufficient distinction has been maintained within the 
Australian wage fixing system between the two principles of 
equal pay for equal work on the one hand, and equal pay for 
work of equal value on the other. Strict comparability in 
job content may be highly relevant to the principle of 
equal pay for equal work, but should not operate as a 
precondition to the implementation of equal pay for work of 
equal value.
9 National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172
10 See International Labour Office, Report III (Part 4B), 
General Survey of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations on the 
Application of the Equal Remuneration Convention (No 
100) and Recommendation (No 90) 1951, International 
Labaour Conference, 72nd Session, ILO, Geneva 1986, 
Chapter 3
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EQUAL PAY CLAIMS AND THE OPERATION OF WORK VALUE PRINCIPLES
For some time, the application of the equal pay for work of 
equal value principle has required the carrying out of work 
value inquiries "in the manner in which such inquiries are 
conducted in our wage fixing environment".^ This approach 
is, however, underscored by the fact that the traditional 
work value principles applied in the conduct of work value 
inquiries may not always facilitate wage adjustments on the 
grounds of equal pay for work of equal value. In 
Australia, industrial claims seeking wage adjustments on 
work value grounds have traditionally been restricted to 
situations where significant net additions to work value 
could be proved. This restriction often precludes, 
however, the negotiation of equal pay claims where the 
undervaluation of work on the basis of sex is in issue, in 
whole or in part.
In 1986, another barrier to the determination of work value 
claims involving the application of equal pay principles 
was set by the constraints imposed by the anomalies and 
inequities principle.  ^ From this period, industrial 
claims seeking to rely on the equal pay for work of equal 
value principle could only be determined under the 
conditions laid down by the national wage fixing guidelines
11 Private Hospitals7 and Doctors' Nurses (ACT) Award 
(1986) 300 CAR 183 at 190
12 id
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concerned with the granting of anomalies or inequities.
This requirement limited equal pay increases in relation to 
industrial award wage claims to strictly isolated 
circumstances in which no wage flow on effect could arise. 
Such a restriction was to impose major restraints on the 
assessment and determination of work value claims alleging 
indirect wage discrimination.
The qualifications placed on the access to equal pay 
principles within the Australian wage fixing system are 
difficult to reconcile with the basic legal concept of the 
right to equal pay for work of equal value irrespective of 
sex. This right is contained within the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, and ILO Convention 100, 
Equal Remuneration, agreed to and ratified by the 
Australian Government. The extent of Australia's 
international obligations under these conventions is more 
fully discussed in Chapter Eleven of this thesis which 
examines Australia's compliance with its international 
treaty obligations in the area of equal pay.
GENDER BIAS WITHIN THE INDUSTRIAL WAGE DETERMINATION 
PROCESSES
Burton's study of the methods employed in the determination 
of work value raises sensitive issues regarding the gender 
neutrality of the arbitral decision making process in the
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1 1determination of work value claims. J Under the terms of 
the 1972 Equal Pay Case,1"* equal pay claims were required 
to be processed in accordance with "normal work value 
practices" calling for "the exercise of the broad judgment 
which has characterised work value inquiries^ Yet as 
Burton suggests:
"The exercise of broad judgment and the choice of 
comparable jobs for the determination of relative work 
value requirements appears to have been more flexible 
in some decisions not involving equal pay claims than 
paragraph 5(b) of the 1972 Equal Pay Principle would 
allow. It would appear that there have been different 
applications of the "equal pay for work of equal 
value" principle and that the application of it has 
applied to the advantage of predominantly male 
classifications. It has been applied more narrowly 
and less flexibly with respect to predominantly female 
classifications."^
It is relevant to note that even if a discernible gender 
bias existed in the establishment of a federal industrial
13 Burton, op.cit., Chapter 11
14 National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172
15 ibid at 179
16 Burton, op.cit., p 143
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award or wage fixing principle, few, if any legal remedies 
would be available to review the decision making process.^
CONSENT AWARD AGREEMENTS - THE NEED FOR REVIEW PROCEDURES
Australia's federal industrial legislation contains no 
express provision by which wage fixing tribunals or 
individual industrial arbitrators must be satisfied that 
equal pay principles have been effectively incorporated 
within awards. This lack of a review mechanism is 
especially relevant to awards entered into by consent 
agreements negotiated between employers and trade union 
organisations in the course of the industrial wage 
negotiation process. Reflecting on the impact of the 1972 
Ecrual Pay Case. Hall and O'Donnell summarise the situation 
as follows:
"The content and adequacy of consent agreements varied 
considerably according to the level of women's 
representation and organisation in unions negotiating 
agreements. Many of the agreements reached in 
settlement of equal pay claims were for considerably 
less than equal pay, and some were no more than
I Qcosmetic changes to classification titles."A
17 The legal effect of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth) on the powers exercised by federal wage fixing 
tribunals involves a complicated set of legal issues 
and is more fully dealt with in Chapter Ten
18 P Hall and C O'Donnell, op.cit.. p 55
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For many years this situation was compounded by the lack of 
any available procedure for the review of equal pay claims 
in circumstances where equal pay increases were previously 
granted at some stage in the wage history of an award.
This restriction would appear to apply even where equal pay 
principles may not have been fully, or properly 
implemented. 9 As will later be seen in relation to the 
1988 Dental Therapist's Case,20 the application of this 
principle may more recently be susceptible to a greater 
degree of flexibility. As will later be discussed in 
Chapter Eight, it would seem that the principle may be of 
less relevance in the 1990's where the application of the 
structural efficiency principle would appear to facilitate 
the review of discrimination in awards. The principle that 
no further equal pay increases may be available in 
circumstances where wage adjustments have already been 
permitted in accordance with the 1972 Equal Pay decision 
has yet , however, to be expressly discarded.
The development of equal pay principles by industrial 
tribunals within the Australian wage fixing system poses an 
extremely difficult task given the parameters of the 
arbitral functions to be performed in conciliating 
industrial disputes. Federal industrial wage tribunals are
19 ibid, p 58
20 Professional Officers Association, General Conditions 
of Employment; A.C.T. Health Authority Award 1986 A No 
344, 13 July 1989
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prohibited from exercising judicial power, and are required 
to flexibly conciliate wage outcomes in accordance with 
changing national wage fixing principles. It is important 
to recognise in this context the limits of industrial wage 
fixing authorities in determining the existence of legal 
rights, and in enforcing legal obligations.^
The federal Industrial Relations Commission may not, on the 
other hand, make award determinations or other wage orders 
inconsistently with laws of the Commonwealth. This raises 
difficult issues regarding the operation of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) on the functions of 
Australia's federal wage fixing authorities in the 
conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes. These 
issues will later be discussed in Chapters Ten and Eleven 
where the legal rights and remedies established under the 
terms of Australia's discrimination laws are more closely 
examined.
THE MAINTENANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF PAST WAGE RELATIVITIES
The institutionalisation of sex segregation and gender bias 
has been evident, over many years, within the Australian 
wage fixing system. The awarding of separate basic wage 
rates and margins for male and female workers, the distinct
21 Re Cram: Ex Parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Ptv Ltd 
(1987) 163 CLR 140 at 148, 158? Re Ranger Uranium 
Mines Ptv Ltd; Ex Parte Federated Miscellaneous 
Worker's Union of Australia (1987) 163 CLR 656
131
division of separate male and female wage classifications, 
and the non-extension of the minimum wage to women, are all 
examples of the ways in which the institutionalisation of 
gender bias can occur in the industrial wage fixing 
process.
From 1974 - 1986, the implied acceptance by federal wage 
fixing authorities that past relativities should be a 
relevant consideration in the determination of wage claims 
imported, in part, a lack of recognition or understanding 
of the past, and hidden effects of institutionalised 
discrimination within the wage fixing process. It was 
perhaps generally assumed over this period that sufficient 
and available mechanisms were inbuilt within the Australian 
industrial wage fixing model to adjust for discrimination 
in the wage setting process. The effect of discriminatory 
attitudes and practices leading to the systematic 
devaluation of women's work was not, it seems, an issue to 
be resolved within the Australian industrial wage 
determination process. It should again be emphasised in 
this context that the objectives of the industrial wage 
system are primarily directed to the conciliation and 
arbitration of industrial disputes. This process involves 
a primary need to maintain industrial harmony within the 
general framework of existing wage structures to minimise 
economic flow on and disruptive wage effects. Although the 
maintenance of fixed wage relativities might be appreciated 
in the light of these underlying objectives, the subtle
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entrenchment of wage relativities is nonetheless 
problematic where such relativities are partially based on 
past or hidden discriminatory wage setting practices. This 
is particularly so having regard to the objects and 
provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) which 
relate to the removal of all forms of direct and indirect 
discrimination in the area of employment. *
The implied acceptance of pre-existing award relativities 
as a relevant factor in the determination of equal pay 
claims raises direct questions in relation to the adequacy 
of the procedures applied within the industrial relations 
system for the removal of systemic discrimination in the 
wage setting process. The lack of attention given to 
devising appropriate methods for determining the ways in 
which discriminatory wage practices might be assessed and 
remedied raises particular concerns regarding the ways in 
which the equal pay for work of equal value principle may 
operate within the Australian wage fixing system.
From 1985-1989 the procedural mechanisms for the 
negotiation of equal pay award increases within the federal 
industrial arbitration system remained substantially
23unchanged. As a result of the 1988 National Wage Ca.se, 
special cases for wage increases previously referred to 
anomalies conferences were required to be processed through
22 See Section 3, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
23 (1988) 25 IR 170
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the National Wage Case, or through a specially constituted 
Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Commission. This 
new requirement extended the wage fixing principles then 
operative to industrial claims seeking the application of 
equal pay principles in the form of award wage increases. 
Apart from this restriction in procedural access, the basic 
framework for processing award claims connected with the 
implementation of equal pay principles remained largely 
static from 1986-1990.
Since 1986 separate changes have, however, more recently 
taken place within the Australian wage fixing system 
relevant to equal pay developments and the practical 
negotiation of equal pay claims. The background to these 
changes once again involves some understanding of the 
national wage fixing principles adopted within the 
Australian centralised wage fixing system. The continuing 
development of national wage fixing principles within the 
broader industrial and economic context following on from 
1986 forms the subject of the following Chapter. Chapter 
Six attempts to outline this development with reference to 
its possible effect on the implementation of equal pay 
measures.
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CHAPTER SIX
NEW DIRECTIONS WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN WAGE FIXING SYSTEM: 
1986-1990
By 1986, a major deterioration in the balance of trade, 
high interest rates, and rising inflation had led to a 
recognition by the major industrial parties that further 
wage restraint was essential if the Australian system of 
wage fixation was not to be abandoned, or at least 
substantially weakened. In response to the apparent 
economic downturn, wage increases in line with movements in 
the Consumer Price Index were refused by the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission under the terms of the 1986 
National Wage Case.1 23 National wage case proceedings were 
adjourned to the following year when it was agreed that a 
proposal by the ACTU to establish a two-tiered wage 
mechanism would be examined. This took place in March 1987 
when the Commission approved a two-tier wage system 
providing for award wage increases in two separate stages.
A first tier flat wage increase of $10 was granted to all 
wage and salary earners,  ^and a new wage fixing principle 
known as the restructuring and efficiency principle was 
introduced to determine second tier award wage increases.
1 (1986) 15 IR 395
2 National Wage Case 1987 (1987) 17 IR 65 at 99
3 id
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The restructuring and efficiency principle was designed to 
establish more efficient and productive work patterns 
involving broad changes in work organisation. It aimed at 
removing inefficient and restrictive industry practices 
through the development of a more highly skilled, 
streamlined and flexible workforce. This was to be 
achieved by a process of award restructuring which included 
such measures as the reduction in the number of industrial 
awards, the extension of multiskilling within the labour 
force and the broadbanding of job classifications.
Second tier wage increases were dependent on the 
negotiation of revised work practices in keeping with the 
restructuring and efficiency principle and were subject to 
a 4% ceiling.4 5 In applying the restructuring and 
efficiency principle in relation to the assessment of work 
value the requirements of the existing work value principle 
were to be satisfied. The national wage case decision of 
March 1987 emphasised that the work value principle would 
continue to play its established role in situations where 
employees were affected by significant net additions to 
work requirements.^
The Commission's decision of March 1987 further provided 
that another first tier increase would be considered in 
October of that year on application by trade union groups.
4 id
5 ibid at 100
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This hearing was delayed until the National Wage Case of
February 1988,® under which wage and salary earners were 
granted a flat $6 first tier increase. Following this 
decision, conferences were held between the major 
industrial parties to discuss the proposed review of 
national wage fixing principles. A review of these 
principles was then formally considered by the Full Bench 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the 
National Wage Case proceedings of August 1988.^
At this hearing before the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission , the problems facing women workers in relation 
to equal pay under the two-tier wage system formed the 
subject of detailed submissions by the National Pay Equity 
Coalition (NPEC). The submissions presented to the August 
1988 National Wage Case proceedings by the NPEC will now 
briefly be outlined.
THE 1988 NATIONAL WAGE CASE PROCEEDINGS - EQUAL PAY ISSUES 
REVISITED
Intervening in the 1988 National Wage Case, with the 
support of several women's organisations,® the National Pay 
Equity Coalition presented a series of detailed arguments
6 (1988) 22 IR 461
7 (1988) 25 IR 170
8 National Pay Equity Coalition, Submission to the 1988 
National Wage Case, June 1988, p 1
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relating to aspects of pay equity within the federal wage 
fixing system. These submissions sought to demonstrate 
that:
"in overall terms, a gap between male and female 
earnings persists, and that that gap is not explicable 
by over-award payments, hours of work, additional 
loadings (shift, penalty, overtime, commissions, etc). 
In short that part of the male/female earnings gap 
resides in award rates of pay."^
This gap was stated to derive in part from the non­
application of the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value. The NPEC noted that further information had 
previously been sought by the Commission in its previous 
equal pay determinations in relation to the issue of - 
discrimination in awards.^ The NPEC went on to 
demonstrate the difficulties in establishing that the equal 
pay for work of equal value principle had not been 
adequately implemented within particular award 
classifications through the application of the 1972 Equal 
Pay Case decision.1 -^ It was contended that much of the 
information needed to establish such a claim was either 
unavailable or inaccessible due to its complexity and
9 National Pay Equity Coalition, Submissions to the 1988 
National Wage Case, p 2
10 See for example, Private Hospitals' and Doctors''
Award (1986) 300 CAR 190
11 National Wage and Equal Pay Case (1972) 147 CAR 172
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volume. The basis of the wage agreements made in relation 
to consent awards, for example, were not usually recorded. 
Often, no analysis was possible of the way in which the 
1972 equal pay principle had, or had not been applied in 
such circumstances.
Even in relation to the majority of arbitrated equal pay 
claims, where no work value inquiries were conducted, 
insufficient or no information existed regarding the way in 
which award rates had been determined when implementing the 
equal pay for work of equal value principle. This problem 
was compounded, in the NPEC'S view, by the strict 
restriction against re-opening or reviewing the ways in 
which the 1972 equal pay principle had been applied in 
respect of award wage rates.
The NPEC recommended, therefore, a broader approach to the 
assessment of gender bias to facilitate the implementation 
of equal pay principles. The primary issue identified by 
the NPEC was :
"the assessment of work value in a way that fully 
recognises the knowledge, skills and experience of 
the female workforce and the demands of the jobs in 
which women work."x^
12 See National Pay Equity Coalition, Submissions to the 
1988 National Wage Case, p 3
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The need to comprehend this issue was seen as paramount to 
the process of award restructuring incorporated within the 
Commission's national wage fixing principles:
"If the outstanding issues relating to the assessment 
of work value are not resolved equitably as part of 
that restructuring, the need for equal pay proceedings 
to redress the implicit devaluing of women's work 
relative to that of men will persist well into the
I *3next century. J
The NPEC submission went on to recommend that both consent 
awards and arbitrated wage claims be available for review 
on application by interested parties to determine whether 
the 1972 equal pay for work of equal value principle had 
been appropriately applied. It was further argued that the 
application of the 1972 equal pay principle should not be 
constrained by prevailing national wage fixing principles. 
Award restructuring methods should, it was suggested, allow 
for a skills audit of existing and proposed award 
classifications involving skills analysis in a non- 
discriminatory manner in keeping with the provisions of the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) .
A range of other strategies relating to the promotion of 
pay equity were advanced. These included measures to 
ensure quarterly Consumer Price Index wage adjustments, the
13 id
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extension of supplementary payments, measures for better 
education and training opportunities for women, the need 
for greater skills formation for female employees and the 
encouragement of women into traditional areas of male 
employment. These combined steps were viewed by the NPEC 
as critical to the removal of the high levels of 
occupational segregation in the labour market.
It is not clear, even on a close reading of the 
Commission's 1988 National Wage Case decision,1  ^in what 
ways the Commission's determination was influenced by the 
arguments advanced by the NPEC. It is worth noting that no 
reference to the provisions of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act appears in the Commission's reasons for 
decision. On the other hand, it is significant that the 
Commission's decision expressly acknowledged the need to 
address cases where award provisions discriminated against 
sections of the work force.^ The outcome of the 1988 
National Wage Case will now be described with particular 
reference to this aspect of the decision.
THE 1988 NATIONAL WAGE CASE - DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 
STRUCTURAL EFFICIENCY
The Commission's decision in the 1988 National Wage Case 
allowed for wage increases in two separate portions,
14 (1988) 25 IR 170
15 ibid, at 179
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subject to parties entering into bargaining at the 
workplace level on restructuring and efficiency 
principles.1  ^ The first portion involved the negotiation 
of a 3% wage increase for wage and salary earners. The 
second portion involved a further flat increase of $10 
which was to be available six months from the date of the 
initial 3% increase. Building on the restructuring and 
efficiency principle, a new wage fixing principle was 
introduced known as the structural and efficiency 
principle. This principle was designed to encourage 
sustained improvement in productivity and efficiency at the 
enterprise level and established a basic set of guidelines 
to be applied in the negotiation of wage claims within the 
award restructuring process. The measures to be considered 
under the structural and efficiency principle included:
"* establishing skills-related career paths which 
provide an incentive for workers to continue to 
participate in skill formation;
* eliminating impediments to multiskilling and 
broadening the range of tasks which a worker may be 
required to perform;
* creating appropriate relativities between different 
categories of workers within the award and at 
enterprise level;
16 ibid, at 178
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* ensuring that working patterns and arrangements 
enhance flexibility and the efficiency of the 
industry;
* including properly fixed minimum rates for 
classifications in awards, related appropriately to 
one another, with any amounts in excess of these 
properly fixed minimum rates being expressed as 
supplementary payments;
* updating and/or rationalising the list of 
respondents to awards;
* addressing any cases where award provisions 
discriminate against sections of the work force"17
The Commission once again restated its approach to the 
alteration of rates on the ground of work value as 
requiring significant net additions to wage requirements to 
warrant the creation of a new classification:
"These are the only circumstances in which rates may 
be altered on the ground of work value and the altered 
rates may be applied only to employees whose work has 
changed in accordance with these principles."
The reinstatement of the traditional methods for 
determining work value claims once again provided little 
opportunity for the use of this general wage fixing
17 ibid, at 179
18 id
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principle to facilitate the full implementation of the 
equal pay for work of equal value principle within the 
industrial wage setting process.
The Commission in addition confirmed the continued 
operation of the anomalies and inequities principle. 
Following the Child Care Workers Case in September 1990, 
the extent to which this principle will continue to operate 
as the primary wage fixing procedure for the direct 
application of the equal pay for work of equal value 
principle is largely in doubt. * An analysis of this 
decision would suggest that the most effective means for 
processing equal pay award increases presently rests with 
the negotiation of wage increases through the structural 
efficiency principle. This is examined further in relation 
to the Childcare Worker's decision which is considered in 
the following chapter.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS PRINCIPLE
Another important feature of the 1988 National Wage Case 
was the confirmation of a separate wage fixing principle of 
indirect but significant relevance to the application of 
equal pay principles. This was the supplementary payments 
principle, reintroduced to the Australian wage fixing 
system under the terms of the 1987 National Wage Case. The
19 See Child Care Workers Case, Decision of the
Industrial Relations Commission, September, 1990, S 
Print J4316
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aim of this principle was twofold. First, it sought to 
assist the poor economic position of low paid workers with 
little or no access to over award payments. Second, it 
aimed to provide for more consistent treatment between 
minimum rates and paid rates awards. ^ 0 A supplementary- 
payment is defined as being:
"a separate amount in a minimum rates award which is 
in addition to the minimum rate and which together 
with the minimum rate becomes the award rate below 
which no employee may be paid."'6'1-
A supplementary payment acts as a substitute for overaward 
payments which may otherwise have been paid to an employee. 
Supplementary payments are prescribed in minimum rates 
awards to form part of the award wage rate. The award-rate 
in an award containing supplementary payments is therefore 
made up of a "base rate" plus a "supplementary payment".
When added together these two rates will represent the 
minimum amount which an employer is legally required to pay
20 A paid rates award has no statutory definition under 
the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1988
(Cth). A paid rates award is one in which all of the 
rates and conditions which are prescribed under the 
award actually apply as maximum rates. Employers 
bound by the award are prohibited from paying more 
than the rates prescribed: National Building Trades 
Construction Award, per Evatt J, April 1975, Print 
C7322.
21 (1987) 17 IR 65 p 100
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Theto employees of the classification in question.^ 
amount of a supplementary payment award is determined 
following a review of the level of actual payments made to 
employees covered by the particular award under 
consideration. This has in the past generally been 
achieved through surveys conducted under the direction of 
the relevant wage fixing authority.
Supplementary payments can only be granted to workers 
receiving minimum award rates or earning low overaward 
payments falling below the appropriate supplementary 
payment attached to an award. If, for example, an employee 
was earning $360 per week on a minimum award rate, plus $10 
in overaward payment, a supplementary payment award of $15 
would only increase the employee's wage to a total amount 
of $375. This same wage would be paid to an employee'not 
in receipt of overaward payments.
The 1987 and 1988 National Wage Case decisions required 
that commitments regarding the absorption of overaward 
payments had to be given by trade unions up to the level of 
the supplementary payment. This was to ensure that workers 
already receiving amounts in excess of the minimum rate 
did not benefit from supplementary payments to the same 
extent as those workers not in receipt of overaward 
payments.
22 For a clear and more detailed explanation of the
supplementary payment scheme see, State Wage Case. 
Industrial Commission of NSW. (1989) 27 IR 360
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Another important criterion for determining any wage 
increments by way of supplementary payments involved:
"A clear understanding and acceptance by the unions 
concerned in the award that the introduction or 
adjustment of supplementary payments may alter 
relativities of actual rates within the award and with 
other awards.”23
Finally, the supplementary payments principle was 
predominantly subject to the ceiling set for second wage 
tier increases. This ceiling referred to the total actual 
wages paid to employees covered by the relevant award 
including overaward payments. Where this caused extreme 
financial hardship to an employer, arguments concerning an 
incapacity to pay were to be considered in determining the 
availability of supplementary payments.
Because fewer women than men receive overaward wage rates, 
supplementary payments can be of particular benefit to low 
paid female workers in certain.industries. Since 1988 such 
benefits have been evident in award wage increases in 
several areas involving high levels of female employment.
In Victoria, for example, certain groups of clerical 
workers employed in the retail sector, employees in the 
furnishing trades industry, domiciliary staff employed by
23 National Wage Case (1988) 25 IR 170 at 180
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municipal councils and community service employees have all 
obtained wage increases resulting, in part, from the award 
of supplementary payments.^ In other States women in the 
textile clothing and footwear industry have also achieved 
marked award wage increases through the introduction of 
supplementary payments.
THE 'FEBRUARY REVIEW' 1989
In February 1989, the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission reconvened the national wage case proceedings to 
consider the progress of award wage reviews and the 
development of general wage fixing principles arising from 
its August 1988 decision. In the National Wage Case 
decision of May 1989,^^ the Commission expressed 
satisfaction with the operation of the structural 
efficiency principle and provided further guidelines in 
respect of its implementation. The Commission endorsed in 
its decision a joint statement produced by the ACTU and the 
Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) dealing with 
matters contained in a 1987 government survey of federal
24 Labour Resource Centre. Pay Equity for Women in 
Australia, National Women's Consultative Council, 
AGPS, Canberra, 1990, p 51-2; J Doran, Women Workers; 
The Effect of the Two-Tiered Wages System, ACTU, 
Melbourne, 1988, p 21-22
25 See, Clothing Trades Award 1982 C No 20258 of 1988 , 
Print H 2282 May, 1988
26 (1989) 30 IR 81
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award provisions which differentiated between men and women 
in the workforce.
The Commission stated that it would encourage the parties 
to awards to take the joint suggestions of the ACTU and the 
CAI into account when considering structural efficiency.
The Commission's support for this proposal was described as 
being consistent with Section 93 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) which came into force in March 
1989. This Section requires the Industrial Relations 
Commission (the wage fixing authority which has superseded 
the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission) to 
take into account the principles embodied in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
The Commission's 1989 statement represented the first" 
occasion on which the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) had 
received formal reference within a federal national wage 
case decision.
THE NATIONAL WAGE CASE DECISION OF AUGUST 1989
In August 1989, the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations 
Commission granted further wage adjustments subject to the 
achievement of cost savings through more efficient work 
practices in keeping with the structural efficiency
27 The legislative effect of Section 93 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) is more fully considered in 
Chapter Ten
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principle. The National Wage Case decision of August
O Q1989 provided for the negotiation of wage increases in 
two stages. A sliding scale of wage rate adjustments was 
established with minimum increases of two $10 weekly- 
payments for unskilled workers. For skilled tradespersons 
increases at the top of the wage scale of $15 or 3% of 
salary rates were to be allowed.
Most significantly for women workers, a process of minimum 
rate adjustments was also approved for the benefit of low 
paid workers.
Minimum classification rates were established for a metal 
industry tradesperson and a building industry tradesperson 
at $356.30 per week with a supplementary payment of $50.70 
per week. Using this rate as a base guide it was 
determined that new relativities should be set for several 
key classifications: "Minimum classifications rates and 
supplementary payments for classifications throughout 
awards should be set in individual cases in relation to 
these rates on the basis of relative skill, responsibility, 
and the conditions under which the particular work is 
normally performed. The Commission will only approve 
relativities in a particular award when satisfied that they 
are consistent with the rates and relativities fixed for 
comparable classifications in other awards. Before that
28 (1989) 31 AILR 286
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requirement can be satisfied clear definitions will need to 
be established."^
Over the period of 1987-1990, the flat wage increases 
introduced through the two-tier wage system, the scheme 
devised for the phasing in of supplementary payments, and 
the developing focus on the review of minimum award wage 
rates have had a combined and positive impact on 
maintaining the relative position of women's wage rates in 
Australia. The ways in which these wage fixing procedures 
have come to influence developments towards the maintenance 
of pay equity for female workers will now be considered.
1987-1990 CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL WAGE FIXING SYSTEM - 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELATIVE EARNINGS OF MALE AND FEMALE 
WORKERS
From 1987-1990 the national wage fixing procedures adopted 
within the federal conciliation and arbitration system have 
continued to preserve the overall position of women's wage 
rates in comparison to those of men. In relation to the 
total earnings of full time adults, Australian women 
received by 1990 78% of male total earnings and 83% of the 
ordinary time earnings paid to men.^ Where award wage 
rates for non managerial employees are isolated, a 9% wage
29 National Wage Case (1989) 31 IR 286
30 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6301.1, 
Canberra, 1990
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gap exists between the wage rates payable to men and 
women.^ Although in relation to average total earnings 
the gender wage gap has marginally widened, other wage 
indices, including award wage rates and full time adult 
weekly earnings show certain slight percentage improvements 
in the relative wage rates of women workers since the 
introduction of the two-tier wage system. A The above wage 
differences between male and female employees arguably 
incorporate, however, a persisting component of wage
■3 Odiscrimination on the basis of sex. J
A key area in which wage differences between men and women 
have noticeably increased, however, is in the area of 
overaward payments. In 1987, women were receiving 55.9% of 
the overaward rates paid to men.^ By 1988, this figure 
had declined to 46.9%.^ It is worth noting when reviewing 
these national average figures that the ratio of female to 
male overaward payments varies greatly from industry to 
industry and from State to State. Female employees in the 
retail and trade industry, for example, earn only 31.7%,
31 P Hall, "The Price of Wage Justice, the Costs of 
Delay", Paper presented at the seminar conducted by 
the Business and Professional Women's Club of
Rvde/Hunters Hill, July 1989, p 5
32 J Doran, op.cit., p 31
33 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see 
Chapter One ante
34 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0. 
Canberra, 1989
35 id
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and 29.2%, respectively, of the overaward payments received
o cby male employees. In the Northern Territory and 
Tasmania, women's total overaward payments amount to 13.5% 
and 24% respectively, when compared with those of men's.^ 
The limited access to overaward payments has been 
attributed to such factors as direct discrimination, the 
undervaluing of women's work and the lack of women's
•3 Qindustrial bargaining power. ° Given the current and 
expanding trend towards enterprise bargaining in 
conjunction with a more deregulated approach to the wage 
determination process it would seem that the wide 
discrepancies between the overaward payments made to men 
and women are unlikely to be reduced in the immediate 
future. The possible legal remedies which may be available 
to address the problem of discrimination in relation to 
overaward wage payments made outside industrial wage fixing 
orders are canvassed in Chapter Ten.
WOMEN'S WAGE RATES AND THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL WAGE FIXING 
PRINCIPLES 1987-1990
Despite the decrease in the level of overaward payments 
provided to women over the period of 1987-1990, the
36 Labour Resource Centre, op.cit., p 39
37 ibid at p 40
38 Labour Resource Centre, op.cit., p 38; V Pratt, House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Reference on Equal Opportunity 
and equal status for Australian women, Official 
Hansard Report, 6 February, 1990, p 15
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Australian wage fixing system has essentially served to 
protect the wage improvements which have flowed to women 
since the early 1970's. While the relative wage position 
of women has not dramatically improved as a result of the 
wage fixing mechanisms adopted through the 1980's and the 
early 1990's, it has not regressed. The wage fixing system 
has, moreover, facilitated a greater participation of women 
in the Australian labour market in times of ongoing 
economic restraint.
The flat rate, as distinct from the percentage rate, wage 
increases provided under the 1987-1990 federal wage fixing 
principles were considered to lead to greater proportional 
benefits to workers on lower wages. Since women fall 
predominantly within this category of workers, benefits 
have it seems flowed to provide for indirect improvements 
in female wage rates. The relative wage advantages 
achieved with the introduction of flat wage increases have, 
however, been offset by the delays experienced by workers 
in predominantly female occupations in securing second tier 
wage increases.^ This tendency strongly points to the 
weak industrial bargaining position of women, resulting in 
part from the low level of women's overall participation in 
the industrial relations process.
39 J Doran, op.cit., p (i)
40 C Burton, The Promise and the Price, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, 1991, p 146; See too, Dr M Burgmann cited in S 
Powell, "Wage Gap Widening", Australian Society, April 
1988, p 11
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Balancing out these kinds of negative industrial wage 
effects are the indirect gains for women workers derived 
from the application of the supplementary payments 
principle. Although not specifically directed to the 
implementation of equal pay the supplementary payments 
principle operates in much the same way as flat wage 
increases and minimum rates adjustments, to assist the 
position of low paid female employees within the wage 
market. The overriding impact of the supplementary 
payments principle on women's wage levels should not, 
however, be overstated.
The incidence of supplementary payments is, to begin with, 
hardly widespread. Of the 5,500 State and federal 
industrial wage awards in Australia, only 37 provide for 
supplementary payments.41 Significantly, supplementary 
payments are not available in respect of paid rates awards 
which determine the wage rates for large numbers of women 
employed in the public sector. It is worth noting that in 
general, awards applying to the public sector are paid 
rates awards, as distinct from minimum rates awards which 
by and large apply to private sector employment.4^
In relation to private sector employment, access to 
supplementary payments is largely confined to manufacturing
41 Labour Resource Centre, op.cit., p 45
42 See, State Wage Case, (1989) 27 IR 360
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industries, and is in a growing range of circumstances 
subject to an employer's incapacity to pay. The Industrial 
Relations Commission has further indicated that the 
benefits of supplementary payments may not extend to casual 
workers,^ and in some cases the full level of 
supplementary payments may be contingent on the length of 
service performance by an employee. These latter 
restrictions raise concerns regarding the disparate impact 
on women's supplementary wage rates in industries, and 
small business where predominantly female labour is 
characterised by high levels of turnover, and casual 
employment.
In addition, continuing problems have been encountered in 
relation to the implementation of the supplementary 
payments principle in the conduct of wage surveys to 
determine the actual level of total wage payments made to 
employees. Delays have been experienced in obtaining 
accurate and comprehensive wage information from employer 
groups and disagreements have also arisen in relation to 
the definition of overaward rates relevant to the 
negotiation of supplementary payment increases.^
Strong employer resistance to the supplementary payments 
principle would on balance suggest that the continued
43 See Transport Workers Award. Industrial Relations 
Commission, 26 February 1988, Print H 11699
44 Labour Resource Centre, op.cit.. p 54
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operation of the supplementary payments mechanism cannot be 
assured. The 1989 National Wage Case decision4  ^has 
further cast doubt on the feasibility of the supplementary 
payments principle in its existing form by suggesting that 
overaward surveys in relation to individual awards will 
ultimately be abandoned. The efficacy of the supplementary 
payments principle as a vehicle for addressing differences 
in male and female wage rates is yet to be fully 
determined.
Most importantly it needs to be recognised that the 
application of the supplementary payments principle plays 
an integral, but subordinate role to the application of the 
structural efficiency principle: supplementary payments 
will not be granted in circumstances which would endanger 
or inhibit necessary changes with respect to award 
restructuring.4  ^ It is the structural efficiency 
principle, more than any other wage fixing mechanism, which 
in the 1990's is likely to provide the primary means for 
the removal of discrimination in award rates of pay.
In conclusion, it is important to note that while the 
national wage fixing procedures allowing for the 
application of supplementary payments, flat wage increases 
and minimum award rate adjustments may have led to more
45 (1989) 30 IR 81 at 45
46 Visypack Ptv Ltd & the Printing & Kindred Union, 
Industrial Relations Commission, 22 March 1989, Print 
H 6636
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favourable outcomes for women, as low paid workers, these 
wage measures were never specifically designed to address 
the implementation of equal pay principles within the 
federal Australian wage fixing system. Overwhelmingly the 
focus of these different wage fixing procedures has been on 
the fundamental achievement of improved wage outcomes for 
low paid workers, rather than the realisation of equal 
treatment between the sexes in the determination of wage 
rates. At no stage have any of the above wage fixing 
methods been overtly characterised by Australia's wage 
fixing authorities as representing the practical means for 
the application of equal pay measures.
The ways in which the express implementation of equal pay 
principles has taken shape within the Australian wage 
fixing system since 1986 forms the subject of the next 
Chapter of this thesis. Chapter Seven attempts to trace 
the procedures adopted in the application of equal pay 
principles within the industrial arbitration process 
through the presentation of a series of case studies.
These case studies will aim to illustrate the methods 
applied in relation to equal pay award claims through the 
use of anomalies and inequities procedures. The most 
recent developments with-regard to the negotiation of equal 
pay award increases through the application of the 
structural efficiency principle will also be discussed with
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reference to the Child Care Workers Case^  determined by 
the Industrial Relations Commission in September 1990.
47 September 1990, S Print J 4316
159
CHAPTER SEVEN
INDUSTRIAL WAGE CLAIMS AND 
THE APPLICATION OF EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES
THE ANOMALIES AND INEQUITIES PROCEDURES AND THE LIMITS TO 
WORK VALUE REVIEWS
From 1986-1990 the express implementation of equal pay 
measures has remained confined to claims under the 
anomalies and inequities provisions of the national wage 
fixing guidelines established under the 19 83 National Wacre 
Case.^  Although certain categories of women workers, such 
as nurses, secured wage increases under these provisions, 
the use of the anomalies procedure has been restricted.
This is, of course, consistent with the definition of an 
anomaly provided under the terms of the national wage 
fixing guidelines prescribed.
A clear division can be detected over the period of 1986- 
1990 between the application of the anomalies and 
inequities provision and the work value principles applied 
within the Australian wage fixing system. During this time 
access to the equal pay for work of equal value principle 
was generally restricted to industrial award claims brought 
under the anomalies and inequities procedure. As outlined 
in Chapter Five, this procedural limitation largely
1 (1983) 291 CAR 3
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detracted from the broader evaluation of work value issues 
concerned with gender bias in the setting of wage rates. 
This restriction was especially relevant to the review of 
wage rates in predominantly female occupations where the 
undervaluation of women's work was in issue.
Ideally the review of gender bias should be directly 
relevant to any investigation or assessment of work value 
within any particular wage determination process. In the 
case of Australia, such a development would appear to 
require major changes in the approach to the investigation 
and appraisal of work value delineated by the work value 
principles established within the industrial arbitration 
process. The restriction of work value claims to 
circumstances where net additions to skill requirements 
must always be demonstrated clearly detracts from a broader 
appraisal of work value concerned with identifying and 
removing gender bias from wage practices.
The limitations imposed on bringing equal pay cases through 
the anomalies and inequities provision, the restrictions of 
the existing work value principle, and the clear reluctance 
within the federal industrial jurisdiction to engage in 
work value comparisons between male and female award 
classifications, have offered minimal encouragement to 
trade unions seeking to pursue equal pay arguments on 
behalf of women members.
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Following on from the Nurses Case proceedings in 1985, a
discernible restraint in relation to the bringing of equal 
pay claims can be traced within the Australian industrial 
wage fixing system. This is reflected in the small number 
of equal pay claims processed within the federal 
conciliation and arbitration system from 1986 to 1990. The 
few equal pay claims which have been considered within the 
federal industrial relations forum over this period have 
provided little guidance to parties seeking to review 
discriminatory wage practices in the course of industrial 
award fixation. Even where equal pay issues have been 
raised by trade union groups in the negotiation of wage 
claims, the parameters for determining equal pay increases 
appear to have inhibited the presentation of any 
comprehensive analysis of the undervaluation of wage rates 
on the basis of sex.
These constraints will now be discussed with reference to 
particular award wage claims brought within the Australian 
wage fixing system from 1985 to 1990 of special relevance 
to the implementation of equal pay principles.
These cases have included several industrial wage claims 
brought by the Professional Officer's Association (the POA) 
directed to ensuring the recognition of equal pay 
principles in the determination of wage rates within key 
areas of women's employment. This series of cases
2 See Chapters Four and Five, ante
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highlight, in various ways, the difficulties in relying on 
the equal pay for work of equal value principle as a means 
of addressing gender bias in award wage rates. A review of 
the proceedings instituted by the Australian Miscellaneous 
Worker's Union (the AMWU) in the Child Care Workers Case 
finally determined in September 1990 will then follow.
THE THERAPIST'S CASE
The first in the group of industrial wage claims initiated 
by the POA of relevance to the formal application of equal 
pay principles, was the Australian Public Service (APS) 
Therapist's Case.^  These proceedings sought to improve 
wage conditions for those therapist professionals employed 
as physiotherapists, occupational therapists, and speech 
pathologists within the federal public sector. It was 
argued that the therapist group should be included under 
the Science (Australian Government Employment) Award 1985 
which provided higher wage rates to predominantly male 
employees performing science-based work.
The therapist's claim was brought in late 1985, immediately 
prior to the hearing of the 1986 Nurses Case. By agreement 
between the parties, the claim was presented without 
reference to equal pay principles. This was viewed by the 
union as being critical to avoiding any adjournment of the
3 Print G1499, Sydney, 23 December 1985
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proceedings pending the outcome of the Nurse's test case.^ 
It has since been suggested that had the matter been set 
aside until the finalisation of the Nurses Case:
"the association's claim would have had no prospect of 
succeeding, owing to the Commission's rejection of the 
concept of comparable worth.
Detailed arguments were presented in the case with respect 
to the educational qualifications of the two groups of 
science and therapist professionals. Some of the factors 
raised included the higher entrance standard for therapy- 
courses, the longer duration of therapist's training and 
the common feature of a mandatory degree in science for 
both groups. Using other criteria such as work skills, 
responsibility, complexity of tasks and accountability, the 
work of the therapist's group was measured against the work 
of science professional such as dieticians and pharmacists. 
A Full Bench of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
agreed to allow the therapist's claim on the basis that the 
position of the therapist professionals was anomalous and 
satisfied the various requirements of the anomalies 
provision under national wage fixing guidelines. The 
Commission's decision placed a strong emphasis on the 
similarity of the educational qualifications between the
4 F Rafferty, "Equal Pay - Past Experience, Future 
Directions: A Practioner's Perspective", Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Volume 3, December 1989, p 526
5 ibid, p 530
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two groups, the negligible cost involved in the wage 
increases allowed and the long term cost savings to be 
achieved by attracting therapists to public sector 
employment. Although the Commmission's reasons for 
decision also expressed recognition of the comparable work 
tasks performed by the science and therapist groups, these 
arguments alone would clearly not have satisfied the 
requirements of the anomalies and inequities provision in 
such a way as to justify the award wage increases sought.
THE SOCIAL WORKER'S CASE
The second case brought by the POA as part of the union's 
strategy to improve the position of its female members, was 
the Australian Public Service Social Workers Case of 1988.^ 
These proceedings sought to adjust the wage rates of social 
workers in line with the more highly paid and traditionally 
male award classification of psychological counsellors.
The case involved a complex range of argument presented in 
several arbitral proceedings extending over six months.
Part of the Union's argument involved a claim that the 1972 
equal pay for work of equal value principle had not been 
applied and that an inequity existed between the wage rates 
of social workers and counsellors. At the anomalies 
conference convened to arbitrate the issues an 
unwillingness to determine the equal pay aspects of the
6 Social Workers, Professional Officers Association 
Australian Public Service Award 1985, Decision 
Anomalies Conference, 10 February, 1981
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claim under the anomalies principle led to an investigation 
of the union's claim under the inequities provision of the
nnational wage fixing principles. This provision requires 
that wage increases may be allowed in circumstances where 
the work under review is "truly like with like as to all 
relevant matters, and there is no good reason for
odissimilar rates of pay."°
The President of the Commission decided that the work of 
the social workers and counsellors was "like with like", 
and went on to recommend a Full Bench hearing to deal with 
the matter. Prior to this hearing, the Social Worker's 
Case was resolved by agreement between the parties and 
ratified by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
under the terms of the inequities provision of the 1987 
national wage fixing guidelines. As in the Therapist's
QCase, improved wage conditions for a predominantly female 
group of employees were achieved, yet without any express 
application of the equal pay for work of equal value 
principle. It is worth recalling that although the 
inequities provision may indirectly operate to facilitate 
greater pay equity for certain groups of women workers, it 
does not appear to extend to implement the equal pay for 
work of equal value principle where precise similarity in 
work tasks is not present.
7 F Rafferty, op.cit., p 53
8 National Wage Case (1987) 17 IR 65 at 92
9 Print G 1499, Sydney, 23 December 1985
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THE DENTAL T H E R A P IS T 'S  CASE
The final case brought by the POA concerned with issues of 
equal pay for women workers was the Dental Therapist's Case 
of 1988.10 This case was brought before the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission in August 1988 for an initial 
hearing at anomalies conference. A series of lengthy 
proceedings then followed ultimately concluding in May 
1989 .
The union's claim directly sought to rely on the equal pay 
for work of equal value principle as a primary ground to 
justify the award wage increases under review. It was 
argued that the 1972 equal pay principle had not been 
applied in determining wage rates for the exclusively 
female occupational classification of dental therapist. It 
was also submitted that an inequity existed between the 
wage rates of dental therapists and dentists employed 
within the Commonwealth public sector. The POA here 
attempted to evaluate the work of dental therapists, in 
providing primary school dental health care services, 
against the work of more highly paid dentist 
classifications elsewhere within the public sector.
10 Professional Officer's Association, General Conditions 
of Employment; A.C.T. Health Authority Award 1986, A 
No 344. 13 July 1989
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The report to the anomalies conference prepared by 
Commissioner Lewin involved a detailed consideration of the 
wage fixing history of the therapist's group. The 
Commissioner found that, being a solely female occupation, 
no equal pay adjustments had been awarded to dental 
therapists under the terms of the 1969 equal pay ruling.
Nor had suitable adjustments been made by the relevant wage 
fixing authority, the Public Service Board, in accordance 
with the provisions of the 1972 Equal Pay decision.
In reaching this latter conclusion, consideration was given 
to the effects of a 1975 wage determination of the Public 
Service Board which purported to approve a new wage scheme 
for dental therapists, "comprehending equal pay for work of 
equal value."11 The internal submissions relevant to the 
Board's wage deliberations at the time were not made  ^
available in the course of the proceedings and no other 
clear information was available to show that the equal pay 
for work of equal value principle had been adopted. 
Commissioner Lewin determined that all indications pointed 
to a situation where no positive application of the 1972 
equal pay could be demonstrated within any of the consent 
wage settlements reached.
A range of other special circumstances further suggested 
that wage increases were justified. Unusual features 
relating to the acute shortage of dental therapists were
11 ibid at p 4
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particularly relevant. It was estimated that without 
substantial changes to recruitment and retention rates, the 
operational viability of the dental health services 
provided would cease over the next five to seven years.
The problem of job retention also highlighted issues 
regarding the poor career structure for dental therapists'. 
These elements when aggregated with the other special 
features of the case, placed the salary and career 
structure of the therapists "in an unusual and possibly 
unique situation" for the purpose of satisfying the 
anomalies requirement.
Other special circumstances included in the dental 
therapist's claim concerned the lack of any "true" market 
for the purpose of salary fixation. The absence of 
sufficient market comparators to allow for a market survey 
system through the history of the therapists group was seen 
by the Commission as being a significant factor. The 
regulatory environment applicable to dental therapy 
training also placed the dental therapists case in an 
unusual category. This was further reinforced by 
significant changes occurring in the delivery of school 
dental services. With the withdrawal of dentists from 
school dental clinics much of the work involved in 
providing primary school dental services had passed to the 
dental therapist's group. These changes had not been 
reflected in any wage increases outside of standard
12 ibid at p 7
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national wage fixing increments. Another special factor in 
the case was the "budget realisable" savings achieved by 
the dental service of $89,600 per annum as part of award 
restructuring and efficiency improvements. By way of 
contrast the cost of the 4% salary increase for dental 
therapists had constituted an amount of $25,226 per annum.
The overall circumstances of the claim were found to 
constitute an anomaly which warranted wage increases in 
excess of the 4% ceiling set under the 1987 National Wage 
Case:
"Together all of the above constitute an anomaly 
warranting wage fixation properly implementing the 
1972 equal pay principle and taking into account the 
relevant changes to the conduct at the ACT School- 
dental service and work of dental therapists in that 
service.
The Union's arguments in relation to the inequities 
provision of the national wage fixing guidelines were 
discounted. Commissioner Lewin acknowledged that dental 
therapists performed a wide range of dental clinical tasks 
involving a particular expertise in child preventative and 
procedural dentistry. The significantly different 
qualifications of dentists and the different nature of the
13 ibid, at p 10
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dental procedures undertaken by them formed however, no 
basis for submissions under the inequities provision.
Following Commissioner Lewin's report, the matter was 
referred back in August 1989 to the President of the 
Commission. A round of further anomalies conferences were 
next convened and a wage settlement was finally agreed 
between the parties in late 1989. Although wage increases 
were achieved, the POA's claim for the full implementation 
of equal pay principles was not finalised as a result of 
the consent agreement negotiated. The notification of a 
further industrial dispute in relation to award 
restructuring was lodged following on from this agreement. 
This dispute once again partly involved equal pay issues 
concerned with the removal of elements of gender 
discrimination in the payment of wage rates.^
It was claimed by the Union in relation to the dispute that 
the wage levels of dental therapists fell below the scale 
of professional rates afforded to other science 
professionals employed within the Public Sector.
On 16 August 1990, agreement was reached between the 
parties that the dental therapists were entitled to receive 
the same wage earnings as other science professionals. Pay 
conditions were to remain fixed, however, under the
14 From discussions with the industrial advocate for the 
Professional Officers Association, Felicity Rafferty
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Professional Officer's Association General Conditions ACT
Health Authority Award 1986. This award did not extend to 
facilitate the classification of professional wage rates. 
The issue of whether parity would be reached for dental 
therapists with other professional officers was adjourned 
to enable a more comprehensive assessment of the 
qualifications and responsibilities of dental therapists by 
the employer. It was anticipated that this study will form 
the basis for further wage negotiation in the course of the 
award restructuring process.
THE CHILDCARE WORKER'S CASE
The growing influence of award restructuring and the 
structural efficiency principle in the review and treatment 
of discrimination in the wage fixing system has become 
especially apparent since the proceedings arising from the 
1988 negotiation of the Childcare Industry (ACT) Award 1985 
and the Childcare Industry (NT) Award 1986. These 
proceedings will now be considered having regard to the 
approach and principles most recently developed by the 
Industrial Relations Commission relevant to future equal 
pay wage claims.
The Child Care Workers Case was originally brought by the 
Australian Miscellaneous Workers Union under the anomalies 
and inequities provision of the 1987 national wage fixing 
principles. The Union's application was first heard before
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the President of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in August 1988, when it was determined that the 
broad issues raised by the claim required a preliminary 
investigation and report. This report was carried out by a 
single Commissioner, Commissioner Laing, and required a 
comprehensive study of all matters relating to wages and 
conditions in the child care industry in the ACT and the 
Northern Territory. The ACTU moved to support the claims 
which it maintained were fundamental to the child care 
industry as a whole. It was acknowledged by the ACTU that 
child care industry awards generally fell under the 
jurisdiction of State industrial tribunals, and that no 
automatic flow on of wage increases to other awards was to 
be sought.
The enquiry involved some 40 sitting days and extended^ for 
almost a year in its investigation. The proceedings 
involved a total of twenty nine witnesses, over two hundred 
exhibits, thirteen inspections, and a range of 
supplementary submissions and materials. Wage increases 
were sought on numerous grounds. Among these it was 
claimed that:
award rates had never been properly determined or 
subject to proper work value examination 
an inconsistency and dissimilarity existed in relation 
to other State childcare awards
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significant additions had occurred to the work, skill 
and responsibility of child care workers 
a revision of training standards for child care workers 
had taken place
adjustments to provide proper career structures for 
child care workers were called for
high staff turnover and staff shortages in children's 
services had adversely disrupted industry operations 
award wage rates and entitlements for child care workers 
had fallen behind industry generally 
child care workers are truly low paid workers who 
present a strong case for supplementary payments 
child care workers rates are held to artificially low 
levels due to industry funding arrangements 
considerable cost savings and efficiencies were to be 
achieved by the restructuring and efficiency principle
The Union sought to demonstrate that there had been no 
variation of classifications, definitions or changes to the 
bases of pay rates since 1974. In relation to the ACT 
award, the materials relevant to the consent award 
agreement entered provided little assistance in showing how 
rates and conditions were established.^ No wage benefit 
could be identified as resulting from the application of 
any equal pay decision.
15 F Rafferty, op.cit., p 9
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It was argued that award provisions had historically never 
been established allowing for proper classification 
structures, conditions or rates of pay. It was here 
suggested by the applicant Union that work value exercises 
had not been based on any clear criteria and that 
throughout the industry rates had been set on inappropriate 
bases in relation to skill and responsibility. The Union 
went on to contend that:
"rates were originally undervalued because they 
related both to work which does not require the skill 
and responsibility of child care workers and because 
it mainly involves females doing what was seen to be 
female work.”^
The Union parties submitted that child care rates in the 
ACT had been set in relation to areas which were 
traditionally female work in the domestic, cleaning and 
hospital fields. It was suggested that:
"while some of these other employees have received 
later adjustments in relation to equal pay, child care 
workers have received no adjustment in relation to 
this issue since the making of the first award in 
1974.”17
16 ibid, at p 12
17 ibid, at p 41
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Evidence was provided to illustrate how wage levels for
child care workers had relatively declined in comparison to
other workers. The virtual non existence of overaward
payments and the absence of supplementary payments were
also noted by the Union. It was demonstrated by example
that from 1975-1988 wage rates for private industry
cleaners increased more than those of child care helpers
and assistants and only marginally less than the qualified
child care workers. This form of comparison was rejected
by the private employer organisations joined in the
proceedings as being inappropriate and irrelevant to the
i ftdetermination of the wage rates in issue. ° Employer 
groups further sought to argue that at the time the award 
wage rates were first established, equal pay considerations 
had impliedly been taken into account in such a way as to 
satisfy equal pay principles.
In relation to the arguments concerned with work value, the 
Union's submissions pointed to several changes leading to 
significant net additions to skill. These related to such 
matters as adapting to changing health issues, 
responsibility in relation to child abuse, the integration 
of children with disabilities and so on.
Although extensive reference was made in the course of the 
applicant's case to the issue of work value, little 
detailed examination was made of the issue of the
18 ibid, at p 39
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undervaluation of work performed due to gender bias. No 
evidence was presented, for example, that the duties being 
performed by predominantly female child care workers 
involved the same level of effort, skill and responsibility 
as certain jobs carried out in predominantly male 
classifications for higher wage rates. While net additions 
to effort, skill and responsibility were relevant to the 
determination of the claim, little precise analysis was 
presented to show the way in which past and present wage 
relativities may have been affected by indirect sex 
discrimination in the setting of wage rates.
The absence of a more detailed appraisal of the issues of 
gender bias may arguably have been attributed in part to 
the procedural barriers imposed within the industrial 
arbitration process when determining equal pay claims. It 
is important to note that the lodgement of the applicant's 
case well predated the National Wage Case of August 19891  ^
and the developments arising from that case with regard to 
the structural efficiency principle. Second, it is highly 
unlikely, on the basis of the 1986 Nurses Case decision, 
that any submissions relating to work value involving 
gender comparisons between different award classifications 
would have been favourably viewed by the Commission. The 
reluctance to engage in gender comparisons between award 
classifications has led to this approach being expressly 
discounted by other Union groups as not worth pursuing in
19 (1989) 30 IR 81
177
The Commission's clearthe light of the Nurses' Case.^O 
rejection of the concept of gender wage comparisons appears 
similarly to have limited the broad assessment of work 
value issues in the course of the Childcare Workers Case.
It is pertinent to note the absence of argument presented 
by the Commonwealth on the need for a broader approach to 
the determination of work value in circumstances where 
issues of sex discrimination arise. The Commonwealth's 
submissions in the proceedings were essentially limited to 
expressions of concern relating to the operational 
viability of the industry and the need to provide improved 
career paths and training for childcare workers. As will 
be detailed in Chapter Eleven, the Commonwealth is 
obligated to promote the principles contained in Article 11 
l.(d) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. This Article incorporates 
the right to equal treatment in respect of work of equal 
value as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of 
the quality of work. Interestingly, in the Child Care 
Case, no discussion was provided within the Commonwealth's 
submissions of the effect of these principles on 
developments relevant to the industrial wage fixing 
process. More especially, no discussion was presented
20 J Biddington, J Clarke, E Hallebone, H Marshall, 
"Banking, Insurance and Computing - Three Case 
Studies", in Department of Employment Education and 
Training Women's Bureau, New Brooms, AGPS, Canberra 
1989, p 50
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regarding the incidence of indirect discrimination through 
the undervaluation of women's work in the predominantly 
female award classifications relating to child care 
services.
THE CHILDCARE WORKER'S ANOMALIES AND INEQUITIES CLAIM - THE 
JULY 1990 REPORT
On 11 July 1990 the report of Commissioner Laing in 
relation to the Child Care Worker's claim was provided to 
the President of the federal Industrial Relations 
Commission.^1 This report commenced by setting out the 
historical ...ckground to the establishment of the child 
care industry, including a description of the previous wage 
fixing procedures applied. The report moved on to then 
outline the various submissions presented by the parties 
and concluded with a review of the significant issues 
raised.
As a preliminary matter it was noted by Commissioner Laing 
that during the enquiry, account had been taken of the 
ongoing national wage fixing decisions up to and including 
the principles established under the August 1989 National 
Wage Case. In relation to these decisions, the 
Commissioner stated that:
21 Matter A 349 Anomalies and Inequities Claims - Child
Care Industry (ACT) Award 1985 and Child Care Industry 
(NT) Award 1986; Enquiry and Report, July 1989
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"the comprehensive nature of the August 1988, February 
1989 review and August 1989 decisions in relation to 
the Structural Efficiency Principle has largely 
overtaken all previous National Wage Case decisions 
relating to this and other industries and the parties 
now, acknowledge, that all the issues raised in the 
enquiry proceedings can and should be dealt with under 
the current structural efficiency principle."^2
The acceptance by the parties of the major effect of the 
structural efficiency principle had a noticeable bearing on 
the work value claim lodged on behalf of the child care 
workers. On the issue of work value and other changes, the 
Commissioner's report indicated that;
"The structural efficiency principle however, now 
provides a new and perhaps, different approach to the 
issue which is broader in concept than the work value 
principle which essentially was the only avenue 
previously available to the Union.
Commissioner Laing's Report appears to suggest that the 
degree of actual change to work value may be of lesser 
significance than previously considered in the 
determination of industrial wage claims involving work 
value issues. In the Child Care Workers Case the lowered
22 ibid, at p 2
23 ibid, at p 61
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emphasis on the need for clear net additions to work value 
was reinforced by the absence of sufficient information to 
determine the basis upon which wage rates had originally 
been established. The overriding influence of the 
structural efficiency principle in the negotiation of the 
claim most significantly pointed to a clear change in 
direction in the processing of equal pay award wage 
increases.
The endorsement given by Commissioner Laing in his Report 
to the eleven work value criteria established under the 
1968 Vehicle Industry Case^  suggested a broadening of the 
criteria adopted in more recent years to the determination 
of work value claims involving equal pay issues. In 
dealing with the question of what constitutes work value, 
the following criteria were, in Commissioner Laing's view, 
said to be relevant: qualifications, training period, 
attributes required for work performance, responsibility, 
work conditions, quality of work required, versatility and 
adaptability, skill exercised, additional or acquired 
knowledge, supervision and the importance of the work to 
the organisation. The wider approach to the consideration 
of work value issues might be constructively interpreted as 
providing a possible base for the negotiation of future 
wage claims concerned with the removal of gender bias in 
the determination of award rates and the application of the 
equal pay for work of equal value principle.
24 (1968) 14 AILR 185
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THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION IN 
RELATION TO THE CHILD CARE WORKERS CLAIM
Following the presentation of the Report of Commissioner 
Laing, the child care workers' proceedings were referred to 
a Full Bench of the Commission for further determination.
On 16 September 1990, the Full Bench of the Industrial
Relations Commission handed down its decision in the 
25case.
The Commission acknowledged that the two awards under 
review were inadequate in many respects, most especially 
with regard to salary rates and structure. It was 
determined that the low wage levels of the industry's
*workforce placed the child care workers group within the
disadvantaged class of workers qualifying for special
attention under the principle established by the 1989
National Wage Case °^ in relation to minimum award rate
adjustments. In addition, it was accepted that rates of
pay had not been varied to give effect to the 4% adjustment
2 7available under the terms of the 1987 National Wage Case. 
The Commission was in addition satisfied that existing 
award rates had not been adequately established in the past 
and that an inequity existed as a result of child care
25 Dec 1001/90 S Print J 4316
26 (1989) 31 AILR 286
27 (1987) 17 IR 65
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workers performing similar work for different rates. It 
was further acknowledged that significant changes had 
occurred in relation to the skills and responsibilities of 
child care workers and that an improved career structure 
was required for workers in the industry.
In determining the actual rate of the pay increase to be 
allowed in relation to the awards, the Commission had 
regard to the principles established in the August 1989 
National Wage Case ° relating to the adjustment of wage 
relativities consistently with rates provided under 
comparable classifications in other awards. * It was held 
that an appropriate comparison could be drawn between a 
Child Care Worker Category Level 3, after one year's 
service, and an Engineering Tradesperson Level 1 employed 
under the Metal Industry Award.
The innovative approach of the Industrial Relations 
Commission to the comparative evaluation of award wage 
adjustments might reasonably be interpreted as bearing a 
distinct similarity to the comparable worth approach 
expressly rejected in the 1986 Nurses Case^  decision. The 
Commission was, however, quick to dismiss any such 
interpretation:
28 (1989) 31 AILR 286
29 (1987) 17 IR 65
30 Private Hospitals' and 'Doctors' Nurses (ACT) Award 
(1986) 300 CAR 190
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"It was not suggested, of course, that these 
classifications could be 'compared' in the 
conventional sense, but by reference to the training 
requirements for each classification, a guide was 
found to the level of competence which must be 
attained. Both classes of worker must hold a 
certificate which is awarded after completion of a 
course provided by a College of Technical and Further 
Education."^
The content of the Commission's comparative analysis 
appeared to strictly revolve around the level of training 
accredited to the respective categories of child care 
worker and engineering tradesperson selected for the 
purpose of establishing base rates from which wage 
relativities for other categories of child care employees 
were to be fixed.
In relation to the issue of the appropriateness of broader 
comparisons between different job classifications in terms 
of skill, responsibility and working conditions, the 
Commission expressed the following view:
"It is apparent that the decision in the National Wage 
Case August 1989 did not require that direct
31 Dec 1001/90 S Print J 4316 at p 5
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comparisons of skill, responsibility and work 
conditions had to be found before relativities could 
be approved: if this was required, very few 
categories of worker in awards other than the trades 
award would qualify”.
The narrow approach taken by the Commission in limiting the 
comparison of child care workers and engineering 
tradespersons to the criteria of formally accredited 
training requirements appears to have once again reinforced 
the general prohibition against broader work value 
comparisons between different award classifications where 
the same, or similar work tasks are not involved.
Certain problems are also evident in the actual comparison 
undertaken by the Commission in respect of the training 
qualifications accredited to the two groups of child care 
workers and engineering tradespersons. A basic guide for 
comparing the two different award classifications was 
identified in the form of the Register of Australian 
Tertiary Education published in May 1990 by the Australian 
Education Council. It was noted by the Commission that 
both award classifications required work experience to 
compliment the academic studies undertaken, and that 
training in a range of skills was to be applied in the 
exercise of various responsibilities. Evidence established 
that students in child care studies would be involved in
32 ibid, at p 8
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approximately twice the number of hours as students 
pursuing the trade certificate course in engineering 
industries. The academic courses taken by the Child Care 
Worker Level 3 were in addition rated higher than the 
levels for which certificate trade courses were ranked. 
Despite the higher overall accreditation given to the child 
care workers group, the Commission determined that an 
appropriate comparison of the two groups warranted wage 
adjustments eguating the Child Care Worker Level 3, after 
one year's service, with the Engineering Tradesperson Level 
1. From this base the classification structure, and salary 
levels for other child care workers was developed.
The Commission's decision in the case was seen as 
constituting an historic and major wage determination which 
was to afford a greater recognition of the skills, training 
and responsibilities of child care workers in the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. 3^ 
Significant pay rises were introduced for child care 
workers in these Territories which included adjustments for 
the 4% wage increase permitted under the 1987 National Wage 
Case, the application of minimum rate adjustments and the 
second 3% wage increase under the terms of the structural 
efficiency principle. Given that the ACT and NT awards 
were amongst the lowest pay rates applicable to any child 
care award in Australia, flow on wage increases to other
33 Canberra Times, December 18, 1990, p 2
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Australian states were not anticipated as a result of the 
Commission's decision in the 1990 Child Care Workers Case.
The outcome of the Child Care Workers Case clearly signaled 
a firm shift away from the use of the anomalies and 
inequities procedures established under Australia's 
national wage fixing principles as the primary method for 
the determination of equal pay increases. The case again 
reinforces the close connection between the application of 
equal pay principles and the development of national wage 
fixing principles by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission. The next Chapter of this thesis is directed to 
the continuing implementation of equal pay for women 
workers leading into the 1990's. It explores the potential 
for the award restructuring process and other current wage
- <tfixing procedures to assist in the removal of gender 
discrimination in the wage determination process.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
NATIONAL WAGE FIXING PRINCIPLES AND THE APPLICATION OF 
EQUAL PAY MEASURES - THE 1990 'S
INTRODUCTION
The preceding examination of the equal pay claims 
negotiated through the federal industrial wage fixing 
system from 1985-1990 serves to highlight the overriding 
influence of national wage fixing principles on the 
determination of equal pay claims in Australia. From 1986 
to 1990, the terms of the anomalies and inequities 
principle predominantly shaped the way in which equal pay 
claims were determined within the Australian industrial 
relations system. The terms of these basic principles 
required, for example, the existence of special and 
extraordinary circumstances prior to the granting of equal 
pay award increases. Equal pay claims were further limited 
to situations where the containment of wage flow on effects 
was assured.
More recently, the national wage fixing procedures 
resulting from the 1988 and 1989 National Wage Cases  ^have 
come to affect the way in which wage discrimination claims 
may be determined within the Australian industrial wage
1 (1988) 22 IR 461; (1989) 30 IR 81
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fixing process. The Child Care Workers Case2 34involving the 
negotiation of award wage increases through the application 
of the structural efficiency principle, in particular, 
illustrates a discernible shift in the approach to be 
applied to the removal of gender bias within the industrial 
arbitration system. The Child Care Workers Case  ^might 
reasonably be interpreted as confirming the operation of 
new procedures for the effective determination of equal pay 
claims within the federal industrial jurisdiction.
Certain elements of the 1988 and 1989 national wage 
principles suggested a potential widening of the 
possibilities for the review and treatment of 
discrimination in award provisions.
Of particular relevance to the area of equal pay are the 
changes brought with award restructuring and the 
implementation of the structural efficiency principle. In 
expressly seeking the removal of award provisions which 
discriminate, the structural efficiency principle 
represents a special component of the 1989 national wage 
fixing guidelines. Other wage fixing procedures 
established by the 19 89 National Wage Case** may also 
indirectly have a role in developments towards the removal 
of wage discrimination. The principles for determining
2 September 1990, S Print J 4316
3 id
4 National Wage Case (1989) 31 AILR 286
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minimum wage adjustments, for example, should continue to 
facilitate the review of many minimum award 
classifications. It has been suggested that this review 
may extend to enable irregularities such as the 
undervaluation of women's work to be corrected.^ In common 
with the supplementary payments principle, the process of 
minimum wage rate adjustments should continue to assist in 
improving the relative wage position of low paid female 
employees.
It should be remembered at this point that the achievement 
of equal pay for women essentially requires the adjustment 
of wage relativities between predominantly male and female 
classifications. Significantly, the implementation of the 
1988-1990 wage fixing principles rests on an acceptance by 
all industrial parties that relativities between awards 
rates may alter. On one view, the ongoing shift away from 
the strict maintenance of wage relativities potentially 
offers scope for the fixing of award rates, more flexibly 
in keeping with principles of non-discrimination. The 
likelihood of broadly achieving this outcome is not, 
however, assured. Whether the procedures established by 
Australian wage fixing authorities will operate in such a 
way as to sustain and improve wage relativities for 
Australian women workers into the 1990's remains uncertain.
5 B Kelty, "ACTU Blueprint and Women Workers" in 
Realising the Potential, Women and Award 
Restructuring, Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Office of the Status of Women, OSW, Canberra 
1990, p 11
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Some of the barriers posed with respect to the 
identification and removal of institutionalised 
discrimination within established wage setting practices 
will next be considered with regard to the industrial 
relations framework of the early 1990's.
AWARD RESTRUCTURING FOR WOMEN - POLICY INITIATIVES FROM 
1988-1990
Following the outcome of the 1988 and 1989 National Wage 
Case decisions, a discernible interest amongst government 
policy makers, trade union organisations and industry 
groups began to emerge regarding the capacity of the 
structural efficiency principle to sustain the labour 
market position of Australian women.^ In response to the 
issues raised, a range of government programs and policies 
were introduced to assist in the promotion and application
6 See Women's Bureau, Department of Employment,
Education and Training, New Brooms, Restructuring and 
Training Issues for Women in the Service Sector, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1989; Women's Bureau, Department of 
Employment, Education and Training, Clean Sweep,
Better Printing Service, Canberra, 1990; Australian 
Council of Trade Unions, Restructuring Awards Issues 
for Women Workers, ACTU Melbourne, July 1988; 
Australian Council of Trade Unions, Restructuring 
Awards Issues for Women Workers Further Information, 
South Australian Department of Labour, Women's 
Adviser's Unit, "Award Restructuring and Women 
Workers", Discussion Paper, Adelaide, 1989; Department 
of Industrial Relations and Employment, Women's 
Directorate of N.S.W., Dangerous Opportunities: 
Industry Restructuring and Egual Employment 
Opportunity, Sydney, April 1990; M Beaumont, "Award 
Restructuring and Nursing", Labour Resources No 6, 
November 1989, p 6; Women's Employment Branch, 
Department of Labour, "Women and Award Restructuring", 
Discussion Paper, Melbourne, 1989
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of equal employment opportunity measures within the award 
restructuring process.
At a federal level, the Australian Women's Employment 
Strategy was devised in 1988 in consultation with 
Commonwealth and State Governments to endorse eight 
nationally agreed goals to improve women's working 
conditions. These goals included increasing women's 
access and participation in employment, education and 
training, reducing gender segregation in employment, 
developing appropriate awards and conditions for especially 
disadvantaged women and the promotion of pay equity for 
women. Within these broad goals the position and movement 
of women within the award restructuring process was 
specifically identified as one of the major factors 
relevant to the achievement of greater wage justice for
owomen.
Consultative mechanisms between government, employers and 
unions were consequently established as a means of 
reviewing the award restructuring process and its effects 
on women's labour market position. Such government policy 
initiatives included the preparation of Guidelines To 
Assist Industry Representatives in Monitoring The Position
7 Department of Employment Education and Training, 
Women's Bureau, Australian Women's Employment 
Strategy, AGPS, Canberra, 1988
8 ibid, p 5
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gof Women In The Process of Award Restructuring, in which a 
series of recommendations were put. These recommendations 
advocated such measures as the conduct of wage surveys to 
ascertain non-award remuneration for women, the examination 
of wage structures for broad gender bias, the carrying out 
of skills analysis directed to take account of 
discrimination issues, the review of minimum rates 
adjustments with regard to its likely impact on gender wage 
differentials and greater planning to provide equitable 
access to training and education programs.
Other policy strategies included an undertaking to 
incorporate equal opportunity measures within the 
Australian Government's Workplace Reform Program,9 10 part of 
which was designed to improve workplace skills, and the 
recognition of those skills through the realisation of“ the 
structural efficiency principle. The monitoring of the 
effects of award restructuring for women were 
simultaneously included as part of the Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey which was anticipated to gather 
information on the effectiveness of equal employment 
opportunity programs. These programs were devised to
9 National Board of Employment, Education and Training, 
The Employment and Skills Formation Council, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1989
10 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office 
of the Status of Women, Mid-Term Implementation 
Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1990 p 25
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complement national procedures for the setting of national 
standards and accreditation for training.^
A series of seminars and workshops relevant to award 
restructuring and equal employment opportunities were, in 
addition, sponsored by various government agencies with a 
view to assisting in the development of suitable training 
strategies, skills audits and non-discriminatory methods of 
job evaluation.  ^ To ensure the dissemination of 
information relevant to the changes taking effect with 
award restructuring, federal financial grants were provided 
under the Work Change Assistance Scheme.^ Of most 
relevance to the issue of discrimination in the payment and 
determination of wage rates, an Equal Pay Unit was
11 L Bannerman, "Skills Formation and Industry Training", in Realising the Potential, op.cit., p 35
12 ibid, p 1; New Brooms, op.cit.; Women's Directorate 
N.S.W. Department of Industrial Relations and 
Employment, Breaking Barriers Building Careers, A 
Conference on Women's Employment and Industry 
Restructuring, Masonic Centre, 1989; Australian 
Federation of Business and Professional Women Inc., 
"Pay Equity: The Gender Gap - Justice Delayed is 
Justice Denied", Proceedings of Seminar Conducted by 
the Business Women's Club of Rvde/Hunters Hill and 
Macguarie University, July 1989
13 It is interesting to note, however, in relation to 
this scheme that by June 1990 only a quarter of the 
$3.2 million allocated to industry specific grants was 
reported as being transferred to industries with a 
high female participation rate: P Clark, "Equal Pay,
A Hollow Victory", Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 
1990, p 19
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established within the Commonwealth Department of 
Industrial Relations in late 1990.^
Parallel to government policy initiatives, activity was
generated within certain trade union organisations
concerned with the impact of award restructuring on women
in the workplace. The 1989 ACTU Congress resolved that a
range of approaches was required to maximise the benefits
to women in the restructuring of awards. These approaches
included the pursuit of genuine work reorganisation to
break down gender segmentation, the proper recognition of
skills used by women, the development of gender bias free
skills assessment procedures and the design of new training
15arrangements for women.
In recognition of the changing environment brought with the 
implementation of the structural efficiency principle 
employer groups likewise began to focus on the potential of 
the award restructuring process to deliver equity and 
efficiency in the workplace.Signs of employer 
participation became evident in a number of jointly 
organised research surveys, and seminar programs involving 
tri-partite consultation with government and trade industry 
groups. A good example of this consultative interaction is
14 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of 
the Status of Women, Women Budget Statement, Canberra, 
1990 pp 31, 157, 164
15 Clean Sweep, op.cit., kp 15
16 See New Brooms, op.cit.
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provided by the joint government industry research surveys 
carried out in respect of service sector employment. This 
project will now be briefly described to illustrate the 
kind of issues surrounding the joint industry studies 
undertaken.
INDUSTRY CONSULTATION IN THE SERVICE SECTION
The service sector employs the large majority of Australian 
women in such areas as financial services, retail trade, 
hospitality, community services and clerical work. Over 
55% of Australian female employees in the paid workforce 
fall, for example, within the two occupational groups of 
clerical and sales work (78.4% of clerical workers in 
Australia are women). Because of its high percentage of 
female employees the service sector represents a key area 
for review within the award restructuring process. As 
such, it is logically well placed to form the basis for 
research and consultation between industry groups concerned 
with the effects of award restructuring for women. This 
was achieved in 1989 through a collaborative set of case 
studies funded by the Women's Research and Employment 
Initiatives Program.
These studies suggested that a close relationship existed 
between the services provided by women in the service
17 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 6203.0, 
Canberra, November 1989
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This, it isindustry and women's domestic skills.^-® 
argued, has led to a situation where many industry skills 
within the service sector have been traditionally regarded 
as coming naturally to workers or as involving minimal 
training. These industry skills have, consequently come to 
be perceived as appropriately receiving low levels of 
remuneration.19 Another feature noted by the studies 
presented was the high level of gender segregation within 
the service industry. This feature, it was suggested, 
reinforced patterns of employment discrimination, resulting 
in fewer training and career opportunities, as well as 
lower wage levels for women. Word processing and data 
entry in the computer service industry are, for example, 
almost exclusively carried out by female workers with few 
formally certified skills. Less skilled manual work in the 
field of computer operating, a largely male area of ^ 
employment, involves, by way of contrast, greater formal 
skills recognition and higher wage rates. u Technical 
skills associated with the handling and servicing of 
machines, are , by way of further example, valued more 
highly than the technical skills and dexterity involving in 
performing keyboard and typing tasks. Similar kinds of 
wage discrepancies were noted in the retail trade industry 
where men tend to work in the transport and wholesaling
18 ibid at pp 276, 138
19 id
20 ibid, p 20 ff
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Thefunctions and women in selling and clerical roles, 
failure to recognise the skills and experience of women has 
been viewed as one of the significant factors contributing 
to the low wages paid to women and high industry attrition 
rates. * It has been suggested that this situation results 
partly from the lack of any systematic procedure for the 
review of work value and partly as a consequence of service 
related tasks being predominantly carried out by women.^3
Another feature of the studies was the identification of a 
growing tendency towards a 'contingent' workforce involved 
in casual and part-time employment.^4 Given that this 
workforce predominantly involves women workers with little 
access to training opportunities, or career paths, 
unresolved issues were seen to arise in relation to the 
possible negative effects of industry restructuring for 
women.
The discussion within industry forums of the type of issues 
outlined above has arguably assisted in promoting a greater 
awareness of the need for workplace reform and the removal 
of discriminatory employment practices. The broader policy 
initiatives adopted from 1988 to 1990 ideally should 
facilitate a clearer understanding of equal employment
21 ibid, p 85 ff
22 ibid, p 139 ff
21
23 id
24 ibid, p 24 ff
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opportunity issues in the workplace and a wider recognition 
of women's traditionally undervalued skills. Whether these 
policy initiatives will effectively result in improving the 
wage conditions for Australian women workers has yet, 
however, to be fully determined. In particular, the effect 
of the award restructuring process on the relative wage 
levels between men and women workers is especially unclear. 
The difficulties associated with realising any further 
improvements to women's wage levels within the operation of 
the existing national wage fixing principles will now be 
discussed.
CHALLENGES FOR WORKPLACE REFORM - NATIONAL WAGE FIXING 
PRINCIPLES AND THE INTEGRATION OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN 
EMPLOYMENT
The main legislative and policy emphasis of the late 1980's 
and early 1990's directed towards improving women's 
relative wage position in the Australian labour market 
appears to rest primarily with the integration of the 
principles of equal employment opportunity within the award 
restructuring process. It has been assumed that measures 
included in this process, such as multiskilling, job 
redesign, improved training, enhanced educational 
opportunities and the creation of broader career paths will 
assist to achieve long term improvements to women's 
employment conditions. Such developments are 
simultaneously viewed as providing the means of reducing
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the high level of occupational segregation between the 
sexes, and the removal of certain kinds of employment 
barriers from the workplace. The removal of wage 
discrimination is seen to flow as a necessary consequence 
of these combined measures.
The extent to which the above benefits have been conferred 
on women workers through the process at award restructuring 
to date is, however, extremely difficult to assess. Up 
until late 1990, the slow pace of enterprise negotiations 
appeared to be affecting restructuring measures industry 
wide. J This delay has been attributed to the complexity 
and difficulty of the processes in reviewing skills, work 
practices, training needs and facilities.^  As a result, 
little information has been collated overall regarding the 
effects of the skills audits and work redesigns being" 
undertaken in the course of award restructuring.^7 While 
certain advances have been apparent in the metal trades, 
building, warehousing, chemicals, transport and timber
25 M Rimmer, and C Verevis, "Progress of Award
Restructuring: Case Studies", Industrial Relations
Research Centre Monograph, Monash University and the 
University of New South Wales, September 1990, p 100
26 id
27 A Byrne, "Award Restructure: The Need for Work Design 
and Skill Audits," in Dangerous Opportunities:
Industry Restructuring and Equal Employment 
Opportunities, Women's Directorate, NSW Department of 
Industrial Relations and Employment, April, 1990, p 19
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industries, negligible progress has been reported in 
connection with restructuring within predominantly female 
industries outside the area of clothing and textile trades. 
The small amount of current research which touches on the 
effects of award restructuring on women workers, moreover, 
points to a continuing trend towards the
institutionalisation of women's disadvantaged labour market 
positron.
In respect of the more specific problems of discrimination 
in the wage determination process, it would appear unlikely 
for a variety of reasons that the promotion of equal 
employment opportunity strategies in the course of award 
restructuring would, alone, be sufficient to reduce the 
component of the male/female wage gap arising from indirect 
wage discrimination. The difficulties attached to thé 
practical application of equal pay principles in the course 
of implementing the various workplace reforms taking place 
within the industrial relations system will now be 
considered.
28 See P Hall, "Award Restructuring and Equal Employment 
Opportunities," in Dangerous Opportunities, op.cit. , p 4
29 C Vellekoop Baldock, "Award Restructuring for Women: 
Tool of Change or Stagnation?", Australian Feminist 
Studies, No 12, Summer 1990, p 49; D Loxton and P 
Harris, "Job Evaluation and Broadbanding in the 
Western Australian Public Service", Discrimination in 
Government Policies and Practices: Section 82(b) 
Report No 4, Equal Opportunity Commission, Perth,
1989, p 155
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THE REMOVAL OF DISCRIMINATORY WAGE PRACTICES - A MATTER FOR 
CONSENSUS?
The program of workplace reform designed to facilitate the 
inclusion of equal employment opportunity principles within 
the award restructuring process relies fundamentally on co­
operative agreement being reached between the major 
industry parties on the need and value of ensuring non- 
discriminatory treatment in the wage determination process. 
Although much of the groundwork has been laid in an effort 
to persuade industry groups that mutual benefits may be 
derived from the restructuring of awards consistently with 
the interests and needs of women, there is of course no 
guarantee that adequate industry support will be
forthcoming. Employer organisations concerned essentially
. *with the delivery of maximised business profits will 
predictably be seeking to maintain low level wage costs.
The traditional reluctance of certain sections of the trade 
union organisational base to support fully the concept of 
higher wage increases for women might also reasonably be 
expected to play a role in the outcome of wage bargaining 
negotiations concerned with equal pay adjustments. u
Realistically, it should also be acknowledged that the 
majority of wage negotiations take place in an industrial
30 See M Thornton, "Discrimination Law - Industrial Law: 
Are They Compatible?" (1987) 59 Australian Quarterly 
162
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wage bargaining process still characterised by an ignorance
of equal employment 
appreciation of the
some cases an overt 
31pay.
opportunity principles, an inadequate 
systematic barriers facing women and in 
antipathy towards the issue of equal
PROCEDURES FOR TRAINING ACCREDITATION AND NON- 
DISCRIMINATORY SKIDDS EVALUATION
Serious concerns have been expressed as to whether the 
challenge to create methods for the proper recognition of 
women's work skills across occupational levels will be 
effectively met by the central institutional processes of 
the industrial relations system. Questions continue to 
surface relating to the ability of the legal and industrial 
processes to respond to the need to evaluate more fully 
women's skills and contribution in the area of employment. 
Similarly concerns have been raised regarding the 
systematic training and accreditation arrangements being
31 E Callendar, "Overview, Work Organisation, Skills 
Analysis", Realising the Potential, op.cit., p 76
32 C Burton, "Equal Opportunity - Equal Pay", Paper 
Presented to the Conference: Anti Discrimination, 
Equal Opportunity, Privacy Laws and Employment 
Practice; The Second Decade, Sydney 26-27 April, 
1990; V Pratt, Affirmative Action Agency, Submission 
to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Official Hansard 
Report, 6 February 1990, p 15; J Scutt, "Equal Pay - 
The Long Haul", Paper Presented to the Seminar 
conducted by Australian Federation of Business & 
Professional Women Inc., July 1989; V Pratt & E Davis 
(Eds) Making the Link: Affirmative Action and 
Industrial Relations, AGPS, Canberra, 19990
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Many of theintroduced with industry restructuring.^
accreditation reforms have, for example, been structured on
methods derived from accreditation mechanisms developed for
the metal trades industry. The issue here arises as to
whether the inbuilt assumptions, values and methodologies
incorporated within such industry based mechanisms may in
fact operate to disadvantage women in the course of
restructuring. Although it is arguable that any process
involving a more systematic development and recognition of
skills generally should lead to greater benefits for women
workers, the extent of these benefits will largely depend
on whether training structures, skills audits and job
reclassifications are adequately designed to take account
of the special differences relevant to predominantly female 
34occupations.J
The unpredictable nature of the wage outcomes to be 
achieved by women workers as a result of award 
restructuring highlights a basic concern that the rigidity 
of award structures could simply be replaced in the course 
of restructuring by another set of structures in which 
gender inequality is transferred:
33 Dangerous Opportunities, op.cit., p 14; B Pocock, 
Demanding Skill, Women and technical education in 
Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p xiv
34 Dangerous Opportunities, op.cit., p 5; P Hall "Award 
Restructuring and Equal Employment Opportunities", 
Discussion Paper, Industry Restructuring Workshop, 
Department of Industrial Relations and Employment, 
Sydney 1989, p 1 ff
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"For women the restructuring process will either 
reinforce the existing division of labour by sex or it 
will mean the revaluation of women's traditionally 
undervalued skills."35
There is here an essential need to ensure that the
strategies which underpin wage practices are critically
evaluated in a context which appreciates that certain job
evaluation criteria may involve issues of gender bias. As
research studies have consistently shown skills audits and
work value assessments are not necessarily gender neutral
in their application.*^ In circumstances where new award
wage structures are meant to remove gender discrimination
from their provisions, a lack of trained expertise in
dealing with issues of gender bias in the process of wage
*
determination can only be viewed as problematic. There 
remains the ever present and underlying risk that unless 
comprehensive skills identification exercises are carried 
out in a non-discriminatory manner, prior to, or in the 
course of, award restructuring, existing inequities within 
award provisions might only be entrenched.
This risk could be said to apply equally to the process of 
minimum wage adjustments. It will be recalled that the 
procedures for the establishment of these rates were set
35 National Board of Employment Education and Training, 
op.cit., p vii
36 C Burton, "Gender Bias in Job Evaluation", Monograph 
No 3/ Affirmative Action Agency,, Sydney 1988
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down by the Industrial Relations Commission, in the August 
1989 National Wage Case.37 The Commission determined in 
these proceedings the minimum award rate and supplementary 
payment payable to a metal industry and building industry 
tradesperson. Having set this minimum classification 
rates, the Commission went on to state:
"Minimum classification rates and supplementary 
payments for other classifications throughout awards 
should be set in individual cases in relation to these 
rates on the basis of relative skill, responsibility 
and the conditions under which the particular work is 
normally performed. The Commission will only approve 
relativities in a particular award when satisfied that 
they are consistent with the rates and relativities 
fixed for comparable classifications in other 
awards."38
This aspect of the Commission's decision is difficult to 
interpret, implying as it does the ultimate réintroduction 
of comparative wage justice principles. The manner in 
which relativities will be established through the setting 
of minimum wage adjustments nonetheless points to a 
critical role for the assessment of work, skills and 
responsibilities on gender neutral grounds. The 
significance of this process is reinforced by the
37 (1989) 31 AILR 286
38 ibid at 289
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Commission's future proposal that once the minimum rates 
exercise had been completed across awards:
"minimum classification rates will not alter their 
relative position one to another unless warranted on 
work value grounds.
The Commission's decision to restrict future arguments 
relevant to the alteration of wage relativities to cases 
involving changes to work value, once again raises the 
problem of the limits to existing work value principles 
where the broader determination of equal pay adjustments 
are in issue.^ While these problems will conceivably be 
addressed through the development and application of the 
structural efficiency principle, such developments have yet 
to unfold clearly .
INDUSTRIAL WAGE FIXING PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES - NO SEX 
DISCRIMINATION HERE?
Along with the emphasis placed on industry agreement, the 
policy approach to removing discrimination within the award 
restructuring process relies heavily on the capacity of 
industrial wage fixing authorities to appreciate the 
operation of anti-discrimination principles and to devise 
appropriate methods for their implementation. Industrial
39 ibid at 290
40 See, Chapter Five, ante
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wage fixing bodies are simultaneously called upon to 
effectively adjudicate between the numerous competing 
interests involved in the determination of industrial wage 
disputes.
The degree of significance to be attached to the 
implementation of equal pay principles in the determination 
of an award wage order or other wage determination is a 
matter essentially for the discretion of the relevant wage 
fixing tribunal. This offers considerable advantages in 
special circumstances where the flexibility of the 
industrial wage fixing process may extend to adjust for 
wage levels to redress elements of wage discrimination. In 
other instances, however, the prevailing constraints 
imposed by national wage fixing principles might be 
construed to operate in such a way as to diminish the "full 
implementation of equal pay principles within specific 
awards. The lack of any consistently identifiable 
procedures to enable the determination of equal pay award 
wage increases, continues to operate as an underlying 
disincentive to the lodgement of industrial disputes 
concerned with the removal of discrimination in the wage 
fixing process. This general lack of uncertainty is 
exacerbated by the absence of review procedures within the 
Australian industrial arbitration system concerning the
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identification and treatment of direct and indirect 
discrimination in the wage discrimination process.^
WOMEN AND THE INDUSTRIAL WAGE FIXING PROCESS - A CASE FOR 
GREATER PARTICIPATION?
The overall extent to which the relative wage conditions of 
Australian women may improve through such means as award 
restructuring, the process of minimum rate adjustments and 
the application of the supplementary payments principle is 
clearly difficult to predict. It can safely be assumed 
that wage improvements for women workers will be largely 
conditional upon the level of women's active involvement 
and participation in the industrial wage negotiation 
process. The low representation of women within this 
process is not suggestive, however, of significant change 
through collective bargaining means. As of 1988, only 44% 
of all female employees were members of trade union 
organisations with women comprising 35% of all trade union 
members.^ Of all trade union officials, 11% were women.^
It is interesting to note that as of mid 1991 the 
proportions of women and men within the Australian 
workforce covered by industrial wage awards were fixed at
41 See, Chapter Five, ante; Chapter Ten, post
42 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6323.10, 
Canberra, 1988
43 Australian Women's Employment Strategy, op.cit., p 50
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It yet remains to be seen83.5% and 77.3%, respectively.44 
as to whether this shift will be represented in a higher 
level of women's participation in trade union 
organisations.
The lack of women participants in the industrial decision 
making structure is further evident through the senior 
levels of industry and government. Although statistical 
information concerning employer organisations is 
unavailable, it is generally recognised that few women 
occupy senior, or middle management positions in the area 
of wage decision-making. Within the Australian Public 
Service, women formed, in 1990, a low 10.9% of the key 
decision making unit, the Senior Executive Service. J In 
relation to the sitting members of the Industrial Relations 
Commission as of July 1990, three Deputy Presidents, ànd
two members of the 46 member Industrial Relations
46Commissioners were women.
44 K Harbutt, The Australian, 29-30 June 1991, "Coverage 
by awards drops 5pc", p 2
45 Office of the Status of Women, Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, National Agenda for Women, Mid 
Term Implementation Report, AGPS, August 1990, p 11
46 ibid, p 27
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TOWARDS A GREATER RECOGNITION OF EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES
It might be suggested that until a greater emphasis is 
placed within the industrial wage fixing system on the 
explicit achievement of equal pay, little improvement to 
wage disparities between Australian men and women will be 
likely. For this kind of emphasis to develop, a heightened 
awareness is clearly needed of the ways in which 
discrimination may indirectly operate to effect wage 
conditions established within the industrial wage fixing 
process. One possible means of developing a broader 
understanding of this issue may lie within the terms of 
Section 93 of the Industrial Relations Commission Act 1988 
(Cth) . This provision requires the Industrial Relations 
Commission to have regard to the principles embodied in 
Australia's federal sex discrimination legislation in the 
performance of its wage fixing functions. It is worth 
noting that the removal of all forms of employment 
discrimination is one of the primary matters covered under 
the terms of the federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
The implementation of equal pay principles is similarly an 
area included under the Articles contained in the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
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Discrimination Against Women. This Convention is a
schedule to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).^
The extent to which the provisions of Australia's federal 
discrimination laws may influence the removal of 
discrimination in the payment and determination of wage 
rates raises a number of complex legal issues. These 
issues involve a detailed analysis of the ways in which 
discrimination legislation may affect the regulation of 
wage rates. This topic forms the basis of further 
discussion in the following two Chapters. Chapter Nine 
begins with examining the role of Australia's sex 
discrimination legislation in providing adequate methods 
for the implementation of equal pay principles and the 
removal of discriminatory wage setting practices.
47 A more detailed study of Australia's international
treaty obligations in the area of equal pay is set out 
in Chapter 11
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CHAPTER NINE
DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THE REGULATION OF WAGE RATES 
DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION - AN OVERVIEW
From 1975-1990, the gradual introduction of State and Federal 
discrimination legislation has led to the development of an 
extensive statutory framework designed to remove and prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex. Australia's first sex 
discrimination laws were passed in 1975 with the enactment of 
the South Australian Sex Discrimination Act.^  In 1977, 
similar legislation was introduced in New South Wales with the 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) and in Victoria with the 
Equal Opportunity 1977 (Vic).^  This legislation was followed 
in 1984 with the enactment of the federal Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) and the Western Australian Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 (WA). Since the commencement of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act in August 1984, limited legal rights to 
equal treatment irrespective of sex have been made available 
in all Australian States and Territories in relation to such 
areas as employment, the provision of goods and services, 
education, accommodation and the administration of
1 This legislation has since been superseded by the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 ((SA)
2 This legislation has since been superseded by the Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)
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The Sex Discrimination ActCommonwealth laws and programs.^
1984 (Cth) remains, in 1991, the only source of legal 
protection for persons affected by sex discrimination within 
the States of Queensland and Tasmania, the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory.
Discrimination laws providing legal remedies in respect of 
unequal treatment on the basis of sex are complemented by 
affirmative action laws directed to the promotion of equal 
opportunity in employment. Such legislative measures include 
the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 
(Cth) and the Equal Employment Opportunity (Commonwealth 
Authorities) Act 19 87 (Cth).'* These laws are primarily 
designed to implement equal employment opportunity at the 
organisational level with a view to removing systemic 
discrimination within employment practices."* Affirmative 
action requirements under federal law are aimed at identifying
3 Although the nature of the legal rights conferred by 
federal discrimination legislation has not formed the 
subject of detailed judicial consideration, there is 
legal authority with respect to State law which suggests 
that only procedural rights to lodge a formal complaint 
of discrimination are provided under discrimination legislation: R v Sex Discrimination Board: ex parte 
Gadsby (1984) EOC 92-029
4 See too Section 22B, Public Service Act 1922 (Cth), Anti- 
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Part IXA; Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), Part IX; Section 15A Public 
Service Act 1974 (Vic)
5 See C. Ronalds, Affirmative Action and the Sex
Discrimination Act: A Handbook on Legal Rights for 
Women, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1987; C. Ronalds, "Principles 
of Affirmative Action and Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation", Monograph No 1, Affirmative Action Agency, 
1988
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existing structural barriers which inhibit women's equal 
participation in the workforce by providing measures to be 
applied in employment situations involving more than one 
hundred employees. These measures concentrate on the review 
of personnel policy and management practices, and include such 
steps as the issue of policy statements, employee 
consultation, statistical analysis, the setting of 
organisational objectives and the preparation of forward 
estimates to reduce the structural impediments to women's 
participation in the employment process.
EQUAL PAY MEASURES - THE LEGISLATIVE FOCUS
In terms of the legislative response to the removal of 
discrimination within the wage determination process, a major 
focus has been given to the provisions of the Affirmative 
Action (Equal Opportunity For Women) Act 1986 (Cth). As 
outlined above, this Act is aimed at improving women's access 
to jobs, promotion and training opportunities with a view to 
eliminating discriminatory work patterns through the promotion 
of equal opportunity.
The Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 
(Cth) is administered by the federal Affirmative Action Agency 
and requires private sector employers and higher educational 
institutions to report annually on the development of 
affirmative action programs. The Act does not extend, 
however, to cover the 54% of employees in the private sector
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Thewho work in enterprises with fewer than 100 employees.^
Act also excludes from its coverage casual and contract 
employees including a large percentage of the female workforce 
in the hospitality and retail trade sector.
The scheme of Australia's affirmative action legislation is 
facilitative only in that it seeks to encourage a recognition 
amongst employers of the need for active measures to ensure 
equality of treatment in employment, as distinct from legally 
requiring the application of such measures. The role of the 
Affirmative Action Agency is primarily concerned with 
assisting employers to introduce employment standards 
consistent with the principles of anti-discrimination laws.
In the context of pay equity, it is important to recognise 
that the Affirmative Action Act does not operate to confer 
legal rights in respect of equal pay for women, nor is it 
designed to require compliance by employers with regard the 
implementation of equal pay principles. The only sanction 
for failure to comply with federal affirmation action laws is 
that an employer may be named in Federal Parliament in a
6 C Burton, "Equal Opportunity-Equal Pay", Paper presented 
to the Conference: Anti-Discrimination, Equal 
Opportunity, Privacy Laws and Employment Practice: The 
Second Decade, Sydney April 1990, p 13
7 See V Pratt, Submission to the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Official Hansard Report, 6 February, 1990, pp 6-17
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report submitted by the Director of Affirmative Action. 
Legislative prohibitions in respect of sex discrimination in 
employment are contained under the terms of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) which aims to provide legal 
remedies to persons affected by discrimination in the terms 
and conditions of employment. The limited coverage of the Sex 
Discrimination Act in relation to discriminatory wage 
practices forms the topic of detailed examination in Chapter 
Ten of this thesis.
Although affirmative action policies and programs have an 
essential role to play in the area of equal pay for women 
through the development of change in the structural pattern of 
women's employment,^ it should be emphasized that this thesis 
is more directly concerned with the analysis of legal rights 
and remedies in relation to alleged discrimination in the wage 
determination process.
Q
THE OPERATION AND IMPACT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
Under the terms of State and federal discrimination 
legislation, legal remedies are available in relation to both 
individual and representative complaints of sex
8 See Section 19, Affirmative Action (Equal Employment 
Opportunity for Women) Act 1986 (Cth)
9 See C Burton, The Promise and The Price: The Struggle 
for equal opportunity in women's employment, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1991, pp 37-76
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discrimination.-^ Complaints of discrimination in employment 
may be dealt with by either State or federal anti- 
discrimination bodies^ whose functions include the 
conciliation and determination of claims of alleged sex 
discrimination. Upon receipt of complaints of sex 
discrimination, conciliation procedures are initially employed 
by anti-discrimination agencies in an effort to resolve 
disputes by way of negotiation and mutually agreed settlement 
between the parties. Where this is not possible, State and 
federal anti-discrimination tribunals are empowered to 
determine alleged claims of sex discrimination by way of 
public enquiry. This may involve the making of various 
determinations of a quasi-judicial nature, including the
payment of damages and the making of orders prohibiting the
11continuance of discriminatory acts and practices.
The exercise of these powers has lead to the formal 
adjudication of many claims of sex discrimination in relation 
to a wide category of public and private sector activity. The
10 Representative complaints are not available, however, 
under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)
11 Under instruments of delegation authorised by the federal 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission co­
operative agreements have been entered between State and 
Federal Governments to enable State anti-discrimination 
agencies to administer complaints of sex discrimination 
falling within the jurisdiction of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
12 See Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Section 81; Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), Section 127; Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 (SA), Section 96; Equal Opportunity Act (Vic) 
1984, Section 43; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). 
Section 113
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pursuit of legal rights under the statutory appeal provisions 
and enforcement procedures established by State and federal 
discrimination legislation has in addition led to the judicial 
determination of numerous claims of sex discrimination by 
State Supreme Courts, the Australian Federal Court and the 
High Court of Australia. The effect of sex discrimination 
laws has, over the past 15 years, been highlighted by several 
important proceedings where declarations have been granted 
prohibiting discriminatory conduct and in which substantial 
monetary damages have been awarded as a result of unlawful sex 
discrimination.1  ^ The outcome of these decisions has clearly 
been instrumental in promoting a greater awareness and 
understanding of sex discrimination issues within the 
community at large.^ A broader recognition of the general 
principle of equal treatment, irrespective of sex has also 
been facilitated by the performance of the wide statutory 
functions of anti-discrimination agencies. These functions
13 See Ansett Industries (Operations) Ptv Ltd v Wardlev 
(1980) 142 CLR 237; Allders International Ptv Limited v 
Anstee (1986) EOC 92-157; Squires v Oantas Airways 
Limited (1985) EOC 92-135; Thompson & Ors v Oantas Airways Limited (1989) EOC 92-251; Hall & Ors v A & A 
Sheiban Ptv Ltd & Ors (1989) 85 ALR 503; Aldridge v Booth 
(1988) 80 ALR 1; Australian Iron and Steel Ptv Ltd v 
Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165. ..See too generally, Equal 
Opportunity Cases, Australian and New Zealand Equal 
Opportunity Law and Practice, CCH Australia Limited
14 C Ronalds 1987, op.cit., p 19; C. O'Donnell and P Hall, 
Getting Equal: Labour Market Regulation and Women's 
Work, Alen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p 92; Kramar R 
"Affirmative Action: A Challenge to Australian Employers 
and Trade Unions", Journal of Industrial Relations,
Volume 2, June, 1987, p 176. For a useful critique of 
the deficiencies of Australia's sex discrimination 
legislation see, however, M Thornton, "Sex Discrimination 
Legislation in Australia", The Australian Quarterly. 
Summer, 1982 p 394-401
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include the development of educational materials, the conduct 
of research programs, community consultation and the promotion 
of the principles of equality incorporated within the terms of 
discrimination legislation.
A REVIEW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE AREA OF EMPLOYMENT
The effect of Australia's sex discrimination legislation has 
been most pronounced in the area of employment. It is in 
relation to discrimination in employment that most complaints 
are brought under sex discrimination laws.^  The development 
of case law with respect to sex discrimination matters has 
similarly been most intensive in the employment field.^
The steady increase in the participation of women in the 
Australian labour force1 has arguably reinforced the need for 
a sustained focus on ensuring compliance with the requirements
15 77.9% of all sex discrimination complaints brought under the federal Sex Discrimination Act over the period of 
1988-1989 were in relation to alleged sex discrimination in employment: See, Human Rights Australia, Annual 
Report 1988-89, p 26. A similar pattern has emerged in 
relation to complaints of sex discrimination handled by 
State anti-discrimination agencies.
16 As of February 1989, of the 85 reported decisions arising 
under State and federal sex discrimination legislation, 
complaints of discrimination in employment constituted 
64% of all cases
17 Participation in women's employment has nearly doubled 
from 1.6 million in 1968 to 3 million in 1988. Between 
1983-88 women's labour force participation rose by 5.3% 
to approximately 50.1%. By June 1990 the participation 
rate had further increased to 52%: Office of the Status 
of Women Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
National Agenda For Women, AGPS, Canberra, 1990, p 21
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of discrimination legislation and the principles of equal 
opportunity in employment. In response to these labour market 
changes, major policy and legislative reviews have been 
initiated with a view to ensuring the removal of 
discriminatory practices and the development of equal 
opportunity within the various areas of government, industry 
and trade union activity. Such policy initiatives are to be 
found in the review of discriminatory legislation and 
industrial award restrictions, ° changes to discriminatory 
practices affecting superannuation benefits^ and the ongoing 
development of broad employment strategies designed to
18 Anti-Discrimination Board N.S.W. "Discrimination in Legislation", Report of the Anti-Discrimination Board in 
Accordance with Section 121 of the Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977, 1977, Part I, Volumes 1 & 2, 1978; L Phillips; "Casual and Part-Time Work, A Survey of the Provisions Contained in New South Wales Awards, Women's Co- 
Ordination Unit, NSW Premier's Department, 1982; J O'Dea, D Byrt and Baumanis, Review of Discrimination Provisions 
in South Australian Awards and Agreements, South 
Australia Department of Labour, 1987; D Loxton, 
"Discrimination in By-Laws", A Review of the By-Laws of Municipalities in Western Australia, Report No. 1, Equal 
Opportunity Commission, Perth, 1988; Department of 
Employment, Education and Training, Women's Bureau & 
Office of The Status of Women, Survey of Sex 
Differentiating Provisions in Federal Awards, Canberra, 
1987; Q Bryce, "Address to Worksafe Australia National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission", Paper 
presented to the Lead Forum, August 1990.
19 Human Rights Commission, "Superannuation and Insurance 
and the Sex Discrimination Act 1984", Report No. 19. Part 
I, AGPS, Canberra, 1986; Q Bryce, "Fifth Anniversary of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1984", Occasional Papers from 
the Sex Discrimination Commissioner. No 2, HREOC, Sydney, 
1989, p 8; Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
National Agenda For Women, Mid-Term Implementation 
Report, AGPS, Canberra, August 1990, p 45
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encourage the non-discriminatory treatment of women in the
n fllabour market. w
A close examination of the kinds of changes occurring within 
this policy and legislative review process reveals a strong 
interrelationship between unlawful sex discrimination in the 
terms and conditions of employment and various issues central 
to the field of industrial relations. This interrelationship 
has on occasions also been the subject of a series of legal 
proceedings where the effect of discrimination laws on the
O  1powers of industrial wage tribunals has been in issue. A 
Legal arguments have consistently been raised in many of these 
proceedings regarding the effect of discrimination legislation
20 See, for example, Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Office of the Status of Women, "National 
Economic Summit Conference", Information Paper on the 
Economy, AGPS, Canberra, 1963; J Doran, "The Two-Tiered Wage System: Implications For Women, Action Program for 
Women Workers, ACTU Melbourne, 1986; J Doran, 
"Restructuring Award Issues for Women Workers", Action 
Program for Women Workers, ACTU Melbourne, 1988; 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 1990, op.cit.: Department of Employment and.Training, Women's Bureau,
New Brooms; Restructuring and Training Issues for Women 
In The Service Section. AGPS, Canberra, 1990
21 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Ptv Ltd v 
Wardlev (1980) 142 CLR 237; Landsdowne v City of Oakleigh 
(1988) EOC 92-225; Allders International Ptv Ltd v Anstee 
(1986) EOC 92-157; Stoker v Kellogg (Aust) Ptv Ltd (1984) 
EOC 92-021; Caridi v Steiger Australia Ptv Ltd EOC 92- 
156; R V Sex Discrimination Board Ex Parte Cope (1984)
EOC 92-007; Napier v The Public Service Board of NSW
(1984) EOC 92-014; Sguires v Qantas Airways Limited
(1985) EOC 92-135; Thompson & Ors v Qantas Airways 
Limited (1989) EOC, 92-251
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Theon the operation of industrial award provisions.^  
decisions arising from these cases have, on the whole, upheld 
the provisions of discrimination legislation. A steady 
emphasis has been placed in these decisions on the capacity of 
the courts to interpret the terms of discrimination 
legislation as operating consistently within the framework of 
industrial law. Even where jurisdictional overlap with 
industrial legislation has been in dispute, discrimination 
laws have maintained an important influence on the treatment 
of various forms of discrimination in employment.
Significantly, however, this influence has not carried over to 
the review or treatment of claims of sex discrimination in 
relation to the payment of wages, or the determination of wage 
conditions in the course of employment. Very few reported 
decisions exist in the area of discrimination law with respect 
to issues connected in any way to the problem of wage 
discrimination. Even where such proceedings have arisen,
22 For an examination of the legal interrelationship between 
industrial award provisions and Australia's 
discrimination legislation, see G McCarry, "Landmines 
among the Landmarks: Constitutional Aspects of Anti- 
Discrimination Legislation", (1989) Australian Law 
Journal, Vol 63, 327; M Thornton, "Discrimination 
Law/Industrial Law: are they compatible?", The 
Australian Quarterly, Winter 1987, 162
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successful outcomes for complaints have rarely been
O -3achieved. J
The limited effect of discrimination laws in the area of equal 
pay would appear to flow as a result of two distinct, but 
separate causes. First, as discussed in Chapter One, there is 
the difficulty in identifying discrimination from the complex 
mix of factors which lead to the inequality between men and 
women's earnings.^ Second, is the limited application of 
Australia's sex discrimination laws with regard to the 
application of equal pay principles. This second issue will 
now be discussed through the presentation of a detailed review 
of discrimination legislation in so far as it may affect the 
removal of discrimination within the Australian wage fixing 
process.
23 See for example, Koh v Mitsubishi Australia Ptv Ltd (1985 
EOC 92-134; Napier v Public Service Board of NSW (1984) 
EOC 92-014; cf Thompson & Ors v Oantas Airways Limited 
(1989) EOC 92-251
24 See M Rubenstein, Equal Pay For Work of Equal Value,
Macmillan, London, 1984 pp 13-41; P Weiler, "The Wages of 
Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth”, [1986]
Harvard Law Review, Vol 9 1728, at pp 1779-1794
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SEX DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION AND THE DETERMINATION OF 
COMPLAINTS OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION
Sex discrimination in employment is prohibited by a variety of 
federal and State discrimination laws.^  Under these laws it 
is unlawful for employers in all Australian States and 
Territories to discriminate on the ground of sex in either the 
terms or conditions upon which employment is offered, or in 
the terms or conditions provided in the course of
p cemployment.
The legal mechanisms prohibiting unlawful discrimination in 
employment are essentially similar under federal and State 
law. Although reference is made in the following analysis to 
certain legislative provisions under State law, for the 
reasons outlined in Chapter One of this thesis, a primary- 
focus remains throughout on the operation of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth),
25 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Anti-Discrimination 
Act 1977 (NSW) Section 25; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(Vic) Section 21; Equal Opportunity Act 19 84 (SA) Section 
30; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) Section 11
26 It should be noted that very little legislative 
protection against discrimination in employment exists 
however in the States of Queensland and Tasmania with 
respect to State government employment. Only very- 
limited protections may lie under the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth) in this area
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Section 14 of this Act provides that :
Section 14
(1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against a person on the ground of the person's sex, 
marital status or pregnancy -
(a) in the arrangements made for the purpose of 
determining who should be offered employment;
(b) in determining who should be offered employment; 
or
(c) in the terms or conditions on which employment 
is offered.
(2) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee on the ground of the employee's 
sex, marital status, or pregnancy -
(a) in the terms and conditions of employment that 
the employer afford the employee;
(b) by denying and employee access, or limiting the 
employee's access, to opportunities for 
promotion, transfer or training, or to any other 
benefits associated with employment;
(c) by dismissing the employee; or
(d) by subjecting the employee to any other 
detriment.
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The wide terms of Section 14 are consistent with the broad
objects of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) as set out in 
Section 3 of the Act. These objects are:
(a) to give effect to certain provisions of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women;
(b) to eliminate, so far as possible discrimination 
against persons on the ground of sex, marital status 
or pregnancy in the areas of work, accommodation, 
the provision of goods, facilities and services, the 
disposal of land, the activities of clubs and the 
administration of Commonwealth laws and programs.
(c) to eliminate so far as is possible, discrimination 
involving sexual harassment in the workplace and in 
educational institutions, and
(d) to promote recognition and acceptance within the 
community of the principles of the equality of men
0 7and women.
The provision of Section 14 pertain to several of these 
objects, and most particularly to the implementation of 
Article 11 of the United Nations Convention Against the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the
27 Section 3, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
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UN Convention).^  This Convention is a schedule to the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and forms an important reference 
for interpreting the Act's provisions. J The inclusion of the 
United Nations Convention as a schedule to the Act, when 
viewed with the broad terms of Section 14, lends support to 
the argument that the treaty provisions of Article 11 have 
been incorporated within Australian domestic law. The 
constitutional validity of Section 14 would indeed appear to 
depend upon the legislative implementation of Article 11 so as 
to constitute a valid law with respect to external affairs 
within the meaning of Section 51(xxix) of the Australian 
Constitution.^
Article 11 of the United Nations Convention is the main 
provision relating to equal treatment in employment, including 
the payment and determination of wage rates. It covers by 
virtue of Article 11 1. (d):
"the right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and 
to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as
28 For a more detailed analysis of the provisions of the UN 
Convention, see Chapter 11
29 Koowarta v Bielke-Peterson (1982) 56 ALR 625; Gerhardv v 
Brown 57 ALR 472; See too Q Bryce, "The United Nations in 
Public Profile", 1988 Evatt Memorial Lecture, Occasional 
Papers from the Sex Discrimination Commissioner/ Number 
1, 1988 p 24
30 The external affairs power under Section 51 (xxix) of the 
Australian Constitution only authorises laws which give 
effect to a treaty obligation: Koowarta v Bielke- 
Peterson (1982) 56 ALR 625; Commonwealth of Australia v 
Tasmania (1983) CLR 1
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well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the 
quality of work."
The express provisions of Section 14 and Article 11 suggest 
that the payment of wages should be interpreted as a term or 
condition of employment for the purpose of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). This Section may possibly 
extend in appropriate circumstances to prohibit sex 
discrimination in the determination of wage rates. This was, 
significantly, the interpretation expressed in relation to the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) by the ILO Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
in its 1986 General Survey of the Reports on the Equal 
Remuneration Convention ILO Convention 100.^ Although this 
interpretation of Section 14 can clearly be substantiated in 
respect of certain cases of wage discrimination, the limited 
coverage of the Section in respect of the wage conditions of 
the majority of Australian workers needs to be appreciated.
The limits to Section 14 with regard to the problems of wage 
discrimination will now be discussed.
31 See, International Labour Conference, Equal Remuneration, 
General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, 
Geneva, 1986 p 81
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STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS IN RESPECT OF COMPLAINTS OF WAGE 
DISCRIMINATION
Although the terms of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
appear to allow for the review of wage rates as a term or 
condition of employment, the operation of the Act with respect 
to claims of sex discrimination in the payment of wage rates 
is very largely restricted. This is due to a statutory- 
exemption provided under Section 40 of the Act which prohibits 
the review of wage rates subject to existing orders or awards 
of industrial wage fixing authorities. Employers acting in 
direct compliance with orders or awards of industrial 
tribunals are accordingly protected, by virtue of Section 40, 
from complaints of alleged sex discrimination arising in 
respect of wage conditions. Similar statutory exemptions to 
those provided under federal law exist in NSW and Victoria.^2
The purpose of the exemption provided under Section 40 is 
basically twofold. First, it operates to preserve the 
authority of industrial wage tribunals to determine and 
regulate the making of award wage rates. Second, it protects 
employers from experiencing a dual liability in respect of 
discriminatory wage conditions, where such conditions may form 
the subject of a binding industrial award wage determination.
32 See Section 54, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); 
Section 39, Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)
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It is important to recognise, when examining the scope of 
Section 40, that the acts and practices of industrial 
tribunals in the exercise of their wage-fixing functions are 
not specifically excluded from the provisions of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The exemption provided under 
Section 40 operates, rather to prohibit the lodgement of 
complaints of sex discrimination in employment against 
employers acting in compliance with industrial award orders.
It is also worth noting that the general statutory protection 
provided to employers acting in accordance with industrial 
wage determinations is not contained under State legislation 
in either South Australia or Western Australia. Claims of sex 
discrimination in the payment of wage rates may in these 
States be determined under the provisions of the Equal 
Opportunity Act 19 84 (WA) and the Equal Opportunity Act 19 84 
(SA) , whether or not an industrial award attaches to the 
employment contract.J J
One case study in South Australia, by way of example, ^  
involved a sex discrimination claim brought by a female 
accounting officer who alleged she had been classified within 
a lower grade than a male comparator. The negotiation of her
33 The Equal Opportunity (Statutory Exceptions) Regulations 
1987 (WA) ceased operation in relation to industrial 
orders and awards in the State of Western Australia as of 
8 November 1988
34 South Australian Office of the Commissioner for Equal 
Opportunity, "Take Five", Equal Opportunity, Vo1.1 No 5, 
December 1988
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complaint through the conciliation procedures under the South 
Australian Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1984 led to her 
promotion and the payment of back pay for the period since the 
male comparator had commenced employment.
^  CAnother case in Western Australian^ involved the negotiation 
of monetary compensation to a complainant alleging sex 
discrimination in the payment of wages during her employment 
in a horticultural nursery. In this particular case the 
employer had not complied with amendments to the Western 
Australian Horticultural Nursery Industry Award.
While the above examples provide interesting illustrations of 
the ways in which wage discrimination claims may be negotiated 
through the use of discrimination legislation, the successful 
pursuit of such claims is, however, isolated and usually 
dependent upon individual fact circumstances.
Overall the statutory protection afforded to employers acting 
under the authority of wage fixing tribunals significantly 
restricts the extent to which the principles and procedures 
under discrimination law can apply to the determination of 
claims of wage discrimination in the course of employment. In 
a labour market where over 90% of wage rates are
35 Western Australian Office of the Commissioner for Equal 
Opportunity, Opportunity. Vol.3 No 6, April 1989
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determinedunder either State or federal industrial award,36 
the right to seek legal remedies in relation to alleged sex 
discrimination in the wage setting process is strictly 
limited. As mentioned previously, very few cases have been 
determined under Australia's discrimination laws with respect 
to the issue of discrimination in the payment or assessment of 
wage rates.
The reported decisions which can be identified relate 
exclusively to the operation of State discrimination 
legislation and will now be briefly discussed.
CLAIMS DETERMINED UNDER SEX DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 
RELATING TO ISSUES OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION
NAPIER & ORS V THE NSW PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD
The earliest reported Australian decision directly related to 
the issue of discrimination in the payment of wage involved 
the claim of Napier & Ors v Public Service Board of N.S.W.3  ^
The claim involved a complaint of direct discrimination on the 
basis of sex under the provisions of the NSW Anti- 
Discrimination Act 1977. The complaint was brought by a male 
school cleaner seeking equal rates to women school cleaners 
employed under the terms and conditions of a Public Service 
Board wage Agreement. The complainant's wage conditions were
36 Department of Employment, Education and Training, Women's 
Bureau, "Pay Equity: A Survey of 7 OECD Countries", AGPS 
Canberra 1987, Information Paper No 5, p 29
37 (1984) EOC 92-014
233
covered by a separate Crown Award. It was argued that the 
complainant was entitled to the same higher hourly rate of pay 
as female cleaners similarly employed, but paid pursuant to 
the Public Service Board Agreement.
A preliminary objection to jurisdiction was raised by the 
employer who alleged that its conduct was protected from the 
operation of the Act by virtue of the provisions exempting 
acts carried out in accordance with orders and awards of 
tribunals having the power to fix minimum wage conditions.^  
These provisions are similar to, but arguably more extensive 
than, the terms of Section 40 of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth). The employers preliminary objection to 
jurisdiction was dismissed by the NSW Equal Opportunity 
Tribunal on the basis that the Public Service Board Agreement 
in question did not fall within the exemption provisions of 
Section 54 of the Act. The matter was taken on Appeal to the 
NSW Supreme Court^ where the Tribunal's decision was quashed.
The Court held that in making wage payments under the Crown 
Award the employer was engaged in an act which was done in 
compliance with that award. The suggestion that there was 
nothing to prohibit the employer from making over award 
payments to avoid discriminatory wage practices was rejected 
by the Court. Under the terms of the Crown Award nothing less
38 See Section 54(b) and (e), Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW)
39 Public Service Board of NSW v Napier & Ors (1984) EOC 92- 
116
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than the stipulated amount was to be paid, and accordingly the 
complainant's claim was dismissed.
The case in summary reinforces the strength of the exemption 
provisions in respect of award wage payments. It provides in 
its result little guidance in relation to the lodgement of 
claims of discrimination in respect of either non award, or 
overaward wage payments made outside the ambit of industrial 
wage orders.
KOH V MITSUBISHI MOTORS PTY LTD
The second reported decision broadly relevant to the issue of 
wage discrimination involved a complaint of direct sex 
discrimination in employment under the South Australian Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975.  ^ The complaint was lodged by a 
purchasing economist who claimed that her employer had treated 
her less favourably than it would have treated a man by 
denying her access to opportunities for promotion and 
subjecting her to other detriments in the course of 
employment. The complainant alleged that her position had 
been undergraded by the employers job evaluation system and 
that as a result she had been denied benefits including a 
higher wage entitlement.
The South Australian Sex Discrimination Board found as a 
matter of fact that sex had not been a factor which had been 
taken into account in evaluating her grading within the
40 Koh v Mitsubishi Motors Ptv Ltd (1985) EOC 92-122
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company structure. It was determined that the complainant had 
not been subjected to any detriment within the terms of the 
Act. The decision of the Board was taken on Appeal to the 
Industrial Court of South Australia which confirmed the 
Board's ruling that insufficient evidence was available to 
demonstrate that the complainant was treated differently on 
the basis of her sex.^
The case basically highlights the need for clearly
identifiable evidence to discharge the burden of proof which
must be established on the balance of probabilities for a
complaint of sex discrimination to succeed. More
particularly, it demonstrates the need for expert evidence in
the situation where proof of gender bias in relation to job
evaluation systems is in issue. The consequential cost of
*•presenting such evidence may, as this case further 
illustrates, pose obvious difficulties for prospective 
complainants of this type.
THOMPSON & ORS V QANTAS AIRWAYS LTD
The most recent decision touching on the topic of pay equity 
is that of Thompson & Ors v Oantas Airways Ltd (1989),^ a 
case determined under the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.
In common with Koh v Mitsubishi the primary focus of this 
complaint related to the lack of promotional opportunities in 
employment. The case involved seven women complainants,
41 Koh v Mitsubishi Motors (1985) EOC 92-134
42 (1989) EOC 92-251
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formerly employed as Flight Hostesses with Qantas Airways 
during a period where Flight Hostesses could only be promoted 
to the position of Senior Flight Hostess. Male Flight 
Stewards, in comparison, could be promoted to the positions of 
Senior Flight Steward, Chief Flight Steward and Flight Service 
Director.
The complainants argued that, had promotional opportunities 
been available similar to those of male cabin crew, their 
employment with the respondent would have been substantially 
longer. Evidence was provided that each complainant had 
desired an extended career, but that the denial of promotional 
opportunity with its lack of recognition of individual skill 
and experience had promoted earlier retirement. The employer 
sought to argue that the terms of employment of the two groups 
of Flight Hostesses and Flight Steward had been covered 
respectively by the Flight Hostess Award and the Flight 
Steward Award. In complying with these award provisions, it 
was claimed that the employer was exempted from the operation 
of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1987 (NSW).^ The awards, it 
was suggested, constituted a code for these employees which 
jointly "covered the field" in respect of employment 
conditions.
The NSW Equal Opportunity Tribunal rejected the employer's 
arguments and held that the terms and conditions afforded the 
complainants constituted less favourable treatment on the
43 See Section 54, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)
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grounds of sex within the meaning of the NSW Anti- 
Discrimination Act 1977. It was determined that nothing was 
contained in either award which made it necessary to withhold 
promotional opportunities. By way of compensation each 
complainant was awarded the maximum amount payable under the 
Act of $40,000 for loss and damages suffered by reason of the 
employer's work practices.
It is important to note that the decision in Thompson v Oantas 
is not directly concerned with the issue of sex discrimination 
in the actual payment of wage rates. The responsibilities of 
female flight hostesses were not precisely comparable to those 
carried out by male flight stewards ranked with greater 
seniority and it would be wrong to characterise the case as a 
complaint of wage discrimination in the strict sense. The 
position available upon promotion for male employees were, 
however, paid at salary rates higher than the positions 
available for female employees, and due to its broader 
implications for pay equity, an outline of the case has been 
included for the purpose of present discussion. The case 
moreover, serves to illustrate the subtle difference and 
potential overlap with employment discrimination concerned 
with the denial of promotional opportunities and 
discrimination in the payment of wage rates.
The case is also pertinent having regard to its findings in 
relation to the operation of industrial award provisions. The 
rejection of the argument that the awards in question "covered
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the field" so as to require the employer to limit promotional 
opportunities (and consequential wage benefits) restates an 
important line of legal authority which suggests that 
industrial award orders may effectively co-exist with 
discrimination laws in the area of employment.^
As the above cases determined under State discrimination 
legislation amply illustrate, major barriers arise in relation 
to the lodgement of successful claims concerning 
discrimination in, or connected with, the field of wage 
determination. The following Chapter of this thesis is 
directed to more specifically analysing the ways in which such 
limitations extend to the legal provisions contained in 
federal discrimination law. It also seeks to examine the 
potential use of the federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
in respect of the further development of equal pay principles 
within the Australian wage determination process.
44 See Squires v Qantas Airways Ltd (1985) EOC 92-135? 
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Ptv Ltd v 
Wardlev (1980) 142 CLR 237? Metal Trades Industry 
Association of Australia v Amalgamated Metal Worker and 
Shipwrights Union (1983) 152 CLR 632
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CHAPTER TEN
THE LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF AUSTRALIA'S DISCRIMINATION 
LEGISLATION IN THE REMOVAL OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE DETERMINATION OF WAGE RATES
INTRODUCTION
The preceding Chapter served to outline the broad framework of 
Australia's discrimination legislation and the major statutory 
restrictions to the use of this legislation as a means of 
remedying discriminatory wage practices. This Chapter 
examines more closely the legal provisions contained under the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) with a view to analysing the 
limits and potential of Australia's federal discrimination law 
with regard to the removal of wage discrimination and the 
implementation of equal pay principles.
Three areas are basically identified within the existing 
legislative framework which suggest a possible role for the 
use of federal discrimination law in resolving issues of wage 
discrimination. The first concerns situations of alleged wage 
discrimination where no industrial award provisions apply to 
the employment contract. The second relates to overaward wage 
payments made outside the terms of an industrial award. The 
third relates to the influence of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth) on the determination of award wage rates and the 
development of national wage fixing principles by federal 
industrial wage fixing authorities. These three areas will 
now be separately considered, commencing with a discussion of
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the use of discrimination legislation in the area of non-award 
and overaward payments.
COMPLAINTS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE AREA OF NON AWARD WAGE 
PAYMENTS
In circumstances where no award provisions operate with 
respect to the employment contract, it may be open for either 
an individual, or representative complainant to bring a 
complaint of unlawful sex discrimination within Section 14 of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).1 2 Similarly in relation 
to overaward payments unconnected to an existing order or 
award of an industrial wage fixing authority, there would 
appear to be no legal barrier prohibiting the lodgement of a 
claim under the Act in circumstances involving discriminatory 
treatment on the basis of sex. The statutory provisions 
protecting employers acting in accordance with the 
determinations of industrial wage fixing bodies would not in 
such cases apply to preclude an investigation of a complaint 
of alleged discrimination in employment.
Where a complaint of unlawful discrimination is received under 
the Act, it is referred by the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission to the federal Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner for inquiry.^ Conciliation procedures are then 
usually employed to assist the parties to reach a mutual
1 See Section 50, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth),
Section 52
2 Section 52(1), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
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settlement of the complaint.^ where no agreement can be 
reached between the parties, the matter may then be referred 
to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission for 
formal hearing under Part III of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (CthK3 4 5&
In establishing a complaint of unlawful discrimination the 
onus of proof is on a complainant^ within the terms of Section 
14 of the Act and within the definition of discrimination 
provided under Section 5. An examination of the definitions 
of direct and indirect discrimination now follows with 
reference to complaints of alleged sex discrimination in the 
payment and determination of wage rates.
DIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN THE PAYMENT OF WAGE RATES
Section 5 of the Sex Discrimination Act... 1984 (Cth) defines 
direct discrimination in the following way:
Section 5
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (in this sub­
section referred to as the "discriminator”)
3 Human Rights Australia, Annual Report, 1987-88, p 24
4 Section 52(5), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
5 O'Callaghan V  Lodex (1984) EOC 92-023; Australian Iron & 
Steel v Najdovska & Ors (1988) 12 NSWLR 587; Aldridge v 
BGOth (1988) 80 ALR 1; Hall & Ors v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd
& Qrs (1989) 85 ALR 503
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discriminates against another person (in this sub­
section referred to as the "aggrieved person") on 
the ground of the sex of the aggrieved person, if by- 
reason of -
(a) the sex of the aggrieved person;
(b) a characteristic that appertains generally to 
persons of the sex of the aggrieved person; or
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to 
persons of the sex of the aggrieved person,
)
the discriminator treats the aggrieved person less 
favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or 
are not materially different, the discriminator treats or 
would treat a person of the opposite sex.
The terms of Sub-section 5 (1) would appear to be limited to 
claims of direct wage discrimination in circumstances where a 
female employee is performing the same, or substantially 
similar work to that of a male employee at a lesser wage rate. 
If, for example, overaward payments were denied to female 
employees in materially the same circumstances as male 
employees in the same establishment, a claim of direct 
discrimination may arise under Section 5 of the Act.
The definition of direct discrimination may not, however, 
extend to less obvious cases of discrimination, where, for 
example, the undervaluation of work predominantly performed by
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women is in issue. Even if it could be shown that the effort, 
skill and responsibility of female workers was the same as 
that of male comparators working within a different job 
classification, it is unlikely that this kind of situation 
would fall within the terms of Sub-Section 5(1). The 
different tasks being performed by the male comparators in 
such circumstances would almost certainly constitute 
materially different circumstances in such a way as to 
preclude the operation of Sub-Section 5(1).^
Although a liberal interpretation of Sub-Section 5(1) might 
extend to support an argument that no material difference 
could be said to exist where, despite the performance of 
dissimilar tasks levels of skill, effort and responsibility 
are the same, there is no existing judicial authority to
nsuggest that such an interpretation would be adopted.' 
Certainly, the Act's provisions have not been tested on this 
point. The question of whether such complaints of sex 
discrimination might alternatively fall within the legislative 
provisions relating to indirect discrimination in employment 
will now be discussed.
6 See M Thornton, "Sex Discrimination Legislation in 
Australia", Australian Quarterly, Summer, 1982 p 396
7 For a narrow interpretation of the meaning of "material 
difference" with reference to statutory provisions under 
State discrimination legislation comparable to Section 5, 
see, Eoh v Mitsubishi Motors Australia. (1985) EOC 92- 
122? Director-General of Education & Anor (1984) eoc 92- 015. See too with reference to the definition of 
"material difference" under UK legislation, Rainey v 
Greater Glasgow Health Board, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 1017? 1 All 
E. R 65
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INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN THE PAYMENT OF WAGE RATES
Indirect sex discrimination is defined under Sub-Section 5(2) 
of the Act which provides that:
Section 5
(2) For the purpose of this Act, a person (in this sub­
section referred to as the "discriminator") 
discriminates against another person (in this sub­
section referred to as the "aggrieved person) on the 
ground of the sex of the aggrieved person if the 
discriminator requires the aggrieved person to 
comply with a requirement or condition -
(a) with which a substantially higher proportion of 
persons of the opposite sex to the aggrieved 
person comply or are able to comply;
(b) which is not reasonable having regard to the 
circumstances of the case, and
(c) with which the aggrieved person does not or is 
not able to comply.
Applying the terms of this Sub-Section to the fact 
circumstances of a claim of indirect discrimination in the 
payment of wage rates, a possible construction arises in
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relation to the Act's application. Where, for example, it is 
shown that:
(a) an employer has imposed a requirement or 
condition that in performance of Y duties an 
employee will receive $X, or that an employee 
must work in a particular job classification 
before being entitled to a particular wage rate, 
and,
(b) a substantially higher proportion of men than 
women either perform Y duties, or fall within 
the particular job classification in question, 
and,
(c) the requirement is unreasonable in the 
circumstances, and,
(d) the employee does not, or cannot comply with the 
condition imposed because the employee does not 
perform Y duties, or fall within the particular 
job classification under review,
a claim for unlawful wage discrimination might, 
hypothetically, arise.
It is interesting to note the observations expressed with 
regard to Sub-Section 5(2) by the ILO Committee of Experts on
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the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in its 
examination of the legislative provisions contained under the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). In the Committee's 
assessment :
"The qualitative criterion of sub-section 2(a) should 
facilitate the review, inter alia, of job descriptions 
and classifications in the light also of sub-section 
2(b) to ensure equal treatment of women and men in
oemployment and in remuneration."0
Reference to the use of discrimination legislation as a 
possible avenue for the review of job classifications has also 
been noted by local commentators who perceive a key role for 
the use of job evaluation procedures as a means of identifying
qgender bias in the determination of wage rates. Through such 
procedures it is envisaged that the wage value affixed to work 
predominantly carried out by women might in certain
8 International Labour Conference, Equal Remuneration. 
General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations. ILO, 
Geneva, 1986, p 45
9 C Burton, R Hag, G Thompson, Womens Worth, Pay Equity and 
Job Evaluation in Australia. AGPS Canberra, 1987 p 27 ff; 
C Burton, "Gender Bias in Job Evaluation", Monograph No 3 
Affirmative Action Agency 1988 p 16; B Pocock, Demanding 
Skill« Women and Technical Education in Australia, Allen and Unwin Australia, 1990 Sydney, p 15 ff; C Burton, The 
Promise and The Price. Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991, p 
105 ff
247
circumstances be reviewed through the application of 
discrimination laws.^
Although it might reasonably be inferred from an analysis of 
the broad legislative intention of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth)* 11 that such a review process would be facilitated 
under the Act, the likelihood of bringing a successful 
complaint of indirect wage discrimination under the definition 
provided by Section 5 would, in practice, seem highly remote. ' 
Apart from the fact that cases involving non award wage 
payments will seldom arise, very real difficulties attach to 
establishing a claim of indirect discrimination under 
Australia's sex discrimination laws. The complex problems 
associated with satisfying the basic requirements of the 
statutory definition of indirect discrimination will now be 
separately considered.
ESTABLISHING INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION - A DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA
Very little legal authority has developed in Australia on the 
interpretation of the legislative definition of indirect 
discrimination provided under Australia's sex discrimination 
laws. This is particularly so in relation to Australia's 
federal law, where the judicial consideration of the terms of
10 Dr K MacDermott, Department of Employment Education and 
Training, "Pay Equity A Survey of 7 OECD Countries", 
Information Paper No 5 , AGPS, Canberra, 1987, p 14
11 See Senator S Ryan, Second Reading Speech, Hansard 2 June 
1983, pp 1185-1186
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Sub-Section 5(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 fCth^ has 
been limited to two cases.^  Both of these cases involved 
unsuccessful claims relating to indirect discrimination in 
employment. Most significantly, no reported decisions have 
arisen under either State, or federal law where the definition 
of indirect discrimination has been analysed, or sought to be 
applied with reference to issues of discrimination in the 
setting or payment of wage rates.
Of the case law which has developed, considerable uncertainty 
exists regarding the methods to be applied in satisfying the 
definitional requirements of indirect discrimination provided 
by Australia's sex discrimination laws. As Tahmindjis 
notes,11 the lack of any precise or uniform formulation of 
judicial opinion with reference to the definition of indirect 
discrimination has resulted in an insufficiently clear 
indication of the parameters of unlawful discrimination within 
the Australian legal system.14 This may, in part be 
attributed to the complexity of the statutory definition 
itself, which has been described succinctly by the Full Court 
of the Federal Court as involving "an unfortunate lack of
12 S-tyles V  The Secretary of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade & Anor (1989) 88 ALR 621; Australian 
Rublic Service Association v Australian Trade Commission (1988) EOC 92-228
13 P Tahmindjis, "Indirect Discrimination in Australia: the 
High Court Decision in A.I.S. v Banovic", Australian and 
New Zealand Equal Opportunity Law and Practice, CCH,
1990, EOC 90-126
14 See too R Hunter, "Indirect Sex Discrimination", Legal 
Services Bulletin, Vol 14, No 1, February 1989, p 17
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clarity."1  ^ The difficult nature of the definition is 
perhaps self evident from the cumbersome construction devised 
above with reference to a hypothetical claim of discrimination 
in respect of wage conditions. The separate requirements of 
the definition of indirect discrimination will now be analysed 
with reference to this hypothetical construction to 
demonstrate the barriers associated with the use of the 
legislative provisions of indirect discrimination as a means 
of providing legal remedies with respect to discriminatory 
wage practices.
THE EXISTENCE OF A REQUIREMENT OR CONDITION
The first component of the definition of indirect 
discrimination involves the existence of a requirement or 
condition. Australian legal authority, though in this area 
difficult to interpret precisely, appears to suggest that this 
factor should be construed broadly.1  ^ This approach is 
consistent with a number of English decisions concerned with 
the interpretation of similar legislative provisions under the
15 Styles v The Secretary of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade & Anor, (1989) 88 ALR 621 per Bowen CJ 
and Gummow J at p 624
16 Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v BailQYis 168 CLR 165? 
Styles v The Secretary of the Department, of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade & Anor, (1989) 88 ALR 621
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These decisionsSex Discrimination Act 1975 (U.K.).17 
basically confirm that a requirement refers to some term which 
must be satisfied to obtain some benefit. Similarly, the 
position in Australia appears to relate to any stipulation 
which must be fulfilled and which leads to some kind of 
practical outcome.1® Returning then to the hypothetical 
construction posed in relation to a complaint of wage 
discrimination, it is arguable on the basis of the broad 
interpretation applied to determining the existence of a 
requirement or condition, that the first component of the 
definition of indirect discrimination could be met. A 
requirement or condition must on one view, however, relate to 
a sex based criterion. 3 Here it might be alternatively 
argued that an employer is not imposing an identifiable 
requirement or condition by which an aggrieved party is 
compelled to engage in the performance of lower paid duties.
On this construction no requirement or condition might be said 
to apply within the intended ambit of Sub-Section 5(2).
17 Clarke & Anor v Eley, (-IHL-.EyiiQ.C-k..Ltd). (1983) i.c.R. 165; Steel v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] 1 W.L.R. 64; 
Watches of Switzerland v Saveli [1983] I.R.L.R. 141; Home 
Office v Holmes [1984] I.C.R. 678
18 styles V  The Secretary of the Department ...of. Foreign 
Affairs and Trade & Anor (1989) 88 ALR 621 at 628-630; 
Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v BanQvic 168 CLR 165 
at 195-197
19 See, Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic 168 CLR 
165, per Brennan J at 168
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IDENTIFYING A SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER PROPORTION OF PERSONS OF 
THE OPPOSITE SEX TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY ABLE TO COMPLY WITH 
THE REQUIREMENT OR CONDITION
The second component of the definition of indirect 
discrimination involves establishing that a substantially 
higher proportion of persons of the opposite sex to the 
complainant comply, or are able to comply with the requirement 
or condition. The diversity of judicial opinion on the 
approach to be adopted with respect to this particular 
requirement raises considerable uncertainty regarding the 
acceptability of the formulation suggested above to 
substantiate a claim of indirect wage discrimination. It 
should be recalled that a complaint under discrimination 
legislation in respect of discriminatory wage conditions must 
involve circumstances where an individual employer provides 
differential wage conditions with respect to employees within 
the same organisation or establishment. Difficult issues 
emerge in this context with respect to the operation of Sub- 
Paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
As indicated by the High Court of Australia in Australian Iron 
and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic. this sub-paragraph requires:
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an exercise which will ascertain whether sex is
significant to compliance with the condition or 
requirement in question."^w
Within the course of this exercise a major issue arises in 
identifying the group or "base pool" with respect to which the 
comparison referred to in Sub-Paragraph 5(2)(a) must relate.
The application of Sub-Paragraph 5(2)(a) to a situation of 
alleged wage discrimination would arguably involve the 
identification of distinct "base pools" from the class of 
employees affected by the wage conditions fixed within the 
same establishment. This would require the existence of 
clearly defined male and female occupation groups within the 
establishment in question. If by way of practical 
illustration a comparison was to be drawn between a computer 
technician and a clerical worker engaged in computer word 
processing tasks, clear difficulties might arise in 
categorising numerically significant "base pools" for the 
purpose of comparison. Even if appropriately identifiable 
groups could be established, and statistical evidence 
presented regarding the different levels of male and female 
participation in these respective occupations, the question 
remains as to what may constitute a substantially higher 
proportion of men than women for the purposes of Sub-Paragraph
20 (1989) 168 CLR 165 per Deane J. and Gaudron J. at 178
21 See Tahmindjis, op .cit.r para 90-129; Hunter op .cit., p 
19
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5(2)(a). Arguably these kinds of problems may be reduced 
where clearly defined gender divisions occur within 
occupational groups forming part of an organisation in which 
significant numbers of workers are employed.
Ultimately, however, the resulting base groups derived for the 
purposes of comparison may be held merely to reflect the fact 
that sexual imbalance exists in the workforce. As Dawson J 
states in Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic with 
reference to the legislative provisions contained under Sub- 
Section 24(3) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW);22
"The sub-section was not intended to embrace requirements 
which are truly non-discriminatory and it must, 
therefore, require something more than a direct 
comparison between the number of men who comply and the 
number of women who comply with a requirement imposed by 
an employer.
His Honour proceeds to emphasise that:
"Moreover, a comparison upon a proper basis between the 
two proportions has the effect that inequality of the 
sexes in the workforce will not of itself determine 
whether the compliance rate by one sex is substantially
22 These provisions are substantially the same as those
provided under Section 5(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act
im  .¿.cm
23 (1989) 168 CLR at 186
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higher than that of the other, and will not therefore, 
pre-empt the question whether a requirement which has 
been imposed upon a workforce is discriminatory.
This question presumably involves the determination of the 
issue of reasonableness as required by the next limb of the 
definition of indirect discrimination.
Before dealing with this aspect of the definition, it must be 
acknowledged that an underlying flaw may be perceived in the 
presentation of the kinds of gender comparisons suggested in 
relation to the hypothetical model of wage discrimination 
constructed for analysis. Given the circumscribed nature of 
the interpretation afforded to the definition of indirect 
discrimination within the Australian judicial system, it may 
simply be the case that the natural meaning of Sub-Section 
5(2) would be interpreted in such a way as to preclude the 
application of the Section to cases involving the comparison 
of work value between the sexes. The application of Sub- 
Section 5(2) to complaints of alleged indirect discrimination 
in the determination of wage rates may be held, in short, to 
be unworkable and outside the legislative intention of the 
Act's provisions.
24 ibid at 187
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ESTABLISHING UNREASONABLENESS IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
The third requirement to be met in establishing a complaint of 
indirect discrimination is that the requirement or condition 
must be shown to be unreasonable in the circumstances.^ 
Assuming for the purposes of discussion that the preceding 
elements of the definition could be satisfied, real problems 
arise in relation to claims of discrimination in the payment 
of wages where issues of reasonableness strongly interrelate 
with arguments concerned with the operation of economic 
factors and labour market forces. Although mere business 
convenience may not be sufficient to establish that a 
requirement or condition is reasonable in the circumstances,^ 
economic factors, the maintenance of a stable workforce or the 
impact of industrial disputation, ' may be relevant to 
determining whether the provisions of Sub-Section 5(2) will be 
satisfied in any particular case. It is worth noting when 
considering the possibility of equal pay claims under 
Australia’s discrimination legislation that the extent to 
which legitimate commercial necessity may operate to establish
25 Sub-Paragraph 5(2)(b), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
26 The Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade v Styles & Anor (1988) 84 ALR per Wilcox J at p 429
27 Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 
CLR 165 per Deane J and Gaudron J at 181
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that a requirement or condition is reasonable in any given 
fact situation is decidedly unclear.^
In circumstances where financial restraint, economic 
recession, industrial uncertainty and sustained levels of 
unemployment predominate, the difficulties of establishing 
successful claims of indirect wage discrimination would appear 
to be pronounced.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OR CONDITION
The final factor to be established in satisfying the 
definition of indirect discrimination is that the complainant 
does not, or is not able to comply with the requirement or 
condition sought to be challenged. This factor would appear 
to relate to an inability to comply in practice, rather than a 
physical incapacity to comply. ^  Where a female complainant 
does not actually perform the tasks carried out by the 
occupational group sought to be compared this fact alone would 
not appear to provide a sufficient basis to defeat the claim 
by virtue of the requirements of Sub-Section 5(2) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
28 As to the ways in which economic reasons, or other 
reasons such as administrative efficiency may be held to 
justify a particular requirement or condition as being 
non-discriminatory under UK law, see, Qjutiku v Manpower 
Services [1982] I.C.R. 661? Rainey v Greater Glasgow of 
Water [1986] 3 W.L.R. 47; Benveniste v University Qt  
Southampton [1989] IRLR 122
29 The Australian Public Service Association v The 
Australian Trade Commission (1988) eoc 92-228? Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 A.C. 548
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PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO THE REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS OF 
DISCRIMINATION IN RELATION TO NON AWARD AND OVER AWARD 
PAYMENTS
The above analysis with reference to the statutory definitions 
of discrimination clearly indicates that a range of 
restrictions attach to the use of discrimination laws as a 
means of reviewing alleged discrimination in the determination 
of wage rates. The establishment of claims of unlawful sex 
discrimination in relation to non-award and overaward wage 
payments presents, in summary, a formidable task for 
prospective complainants seeking legal remedies in relation to 
discriminatory wage practices. The difficulties of applying 
the legal definition of discrimination, and discharging the 
legal standards of proof required under this statutory 
definition, would in the vast majority of cases severely 
inhibit the use of legal remedies to address alleged 
discrimination in the payment of wage rates.
The limited application of discrimination legislation, and the 
difficulties of establishing claims of wage discrimination 
within the definitions prescribed suggest a minimal potential 
for the complaints based scheme established under the terms of 
Australia's sex discrimination legislation in the resolution 
of equal pay issues.
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The lack of any effective regulatory mechanisms to offset 
discrimination in relation to wage payments made outside the 
centralised wage fixing system presents particular problems 
where the issue of overaward payments is concerned. This is 
due to the fact that a large and growing number of workers 
within the labour force are regularly affected by the payment 
of overaward wage rates. Inequitable access to overaward 
payments has also been identified as being a major 
contributing factor to the wage differences between male and 
female employers.^® Disparities in the payment of overaward 
rates to men and women workers remain pronounced, and indeed 
show signs of becoming more entrenched. This risk seems 
particularly high, given the continuing trends within the 
industrial wage area towards decentralised enterprise wage 
bargaining. Since 1983, average overaward payments provided 
to full time adult non managerial employees across all 
industries reveal the following pattern:^
30 National Women's Consultative Council and the Labour 
Research Centre, Pay Equity For Women in Australia. AGPS, 
Canberra 1990, p 38
31 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0 r 1988. 
It should be noted that the numbers used in sampling the 
incidence of overaward payments raises certain queries in 
relation to the statistical significance of the above 
figures. These figures do not in addition extend to 
incorporate overaward payments made to junior employees 
or managerial employees
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Male Earnings Female Earnings Percentage
Male/Female Earnings
1983 $11.80 $5.20 44.07%
1984 No survey conducted
1985 $13.80 $7.30 52.90%
1986 $10.90 $5.50 50.46%
1987 $10.20 $5.70 55.88%
1988 $9.60 $4.50 46.88%
The gender wage imbalance in the area of overaward payments 
has generally been described as :
"the result of a number of factors ranging from blatant 
discrimination and the undervaluing of women's skills to 
occupational and industry segregation and a lack of 
bargaining power. " 2^
While this may be the case, much clearer evidence is required 
to establish the extent to which differences in overaward 
rates paid to male and female employees may be attributed to 
direct or indirect discrimination in the workplace.
The area of overaward payments has long been identified as a
possible area in which representative trade union complaints
might be brought under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
to remedy wage discrimination within the industrial wage
32 National Women's Consultative Council and the Labour 
Resource Centre, op .cit. . p 38
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The collection of data and evidencenegotiation process. J 
linking overaward wage differentials to unfavourable treatment 
on the basis of sex is yet, however, to be systematically or 
comprehensively undertaken. It is perhaps not surprising 
having regard to the difficulties, and costs associated with 
this task that no complaints in respect of discriminatory 
overaward payments have so far been dealt with under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The uncertainty of 
successfully establishing a representative complaint of this 
nature within the legal definitions provided under the Act has 
in all likelihood also inhibited the lodgement of formal 
complaints under Australia's federal discrimination 
legislation.
Although the use of discrimination legislation as a means of 
identifying and treating discrimination in relation to non­
award and overaward payments cannot be wholly excluded, 
broader measures than the complaint based model established 
under existing discrimination laws will need to be developed 
if the issue of discrimination in relation to wage payments 
made outside the terms of industrial award wage orders is in 
any way to be practically addressed.
33 J Acton, Working Women's Charter. Implementation Manual 
No 2, Equal Pay. ACTU, Melbourne, 1985, p 32; see too, 
International Labour Conference, Equal Remuneration, 
General Survey by the Committee of Experts, on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1986, p 183; P 
O'Neil, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Address to Women 
in Trade Unions Network, Adelaide, February 1986
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The need to develop wider strategies to ensure the recognition 
of the principles contained within Australia's discrimination 
laws in the field of wage determination is of course by no 
means limited to the peripheral area of non-award and 
overaward payments. It is important to recall that the 
payment of women's wages is predominantly governed by the 
centralised wage fixing system developed within the framework 
of industrial law. The extent to which this wage fixing 
system may be influenced by discrimination legislation will 
now be examined beginning with an analysis of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) in so far as it relates to the 
making of awards and determinations of Australia's federal 
wage fixing authorities.
THE EFFECT OF THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 (CTH) ON THE 
FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL WAGE TRIBUNALS
The ways in which discrimination legislation might be said to 
influence the determinations of industrial wage tribunals in 
the exercise of federal power are extremely difficult to 
identify. Complex issues emerge as to how discrimination law 
principles can, or should operate within the context of the 
Australian federal industrial wage fixing system.^
\It is essential to appreciate, nonetheless, that the degree to 
which the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) may assist further
34 See L Bennett, "Equal Pay and Comparable Worth and the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission", 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 30, 1988, pp 534-537
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development towards the removal of wage discrimination will 
largely depend on the Act's capacity to influence outcomes 
within the Australian industrial relations system.
In examining the legislative provisions contained under 
federal discrimination law of relevance to the area of equal 
pay it is instructive to reflect initially on the intention of 
the legislative scheme introduced in 1984 with the enactment 
of the federal Sex Discrimination Act.
To begin with, the Second Reading Speech to the SâX 
Discrimination Bill 1983 placed a strong emphasis on the need 
to address the high incidence of discrimination on the basis 
of sex in the area of employment. The differences in 
male/female earnings were cited in this context as one area of 
structural inequality which required adjustment to ensure the 
removal of unfavourable treatment on the basis of sex within 
the Australian labour market. It was noted that:
"The Bill makes unlawful discrimination against 
applicants for jobs and employees generally and 
discrimination against persons who are Commonwealth 
agents and contract workers. The Bill will extend as 
far as is constitutionally possible and in this regard 
will provide protection not only to the Commonwealth's
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own employees but to employees of other institutions 
such as trading and financial corporations."^
The Second Reading Speech goes on to state that:
"It will also be unlawful for a person who performs 
functions or exercises power under Commonwealth law or 
for the purposes of a Commonwealth program to 
discriminate on the ground of sex, marital status or 
pregnancy in carrying out such functions.
The Bill's broad intention to remove discrimination in 
employment finds its legislative expression in Section 14 of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). As earlier outlined in 
Chapter Nine, the provisions of Section 14 include 
remuneration as "a term or condition of employment".
Although Section 40 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
prevents the lodgement of claims of sex discrimination against 
employers acting in accordance with industrial wage orders, 
this exemption could not reasonably be interpreted as 
providing new opportunities for discrimination under cover of 
industrial awards. This would appear to be especially so 
having regard to the terms of Section 26 of the Act which 
prohibits persons acting under Commonwealth law from engaging
35 Senator Ryan, Second Reading Speech, Hansard 2 June 1983, 
pp 1185-1186
36 ibidr at p 1186
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in discriminatory acts and practices in the performance of 
their statutory responsibilities.
The legislative scheme of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth) suggests that the orders and determinations made by 
industrial wage fixing authorities should not be made 
inconsistently with the Act's provisions. This interpretation 
accords with the general legal principle that awards of 
federal industrial tribunals cannot be made inconsistently 
with laws of the Commonwealth.^7 it is an interpretation 
which is also reinforced by the provisions of Section 109 of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)r and Section 86 of the 
Industrial Relations (Consequential. Provisional.Act,.1988•38 
These two latter provisions will now be briefly discussed.
INDUSTRIAL WAGE DETERMINATION AND AWARDS TO BE MADE 
CONSISTENTLY WITH THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 (CTH)
Up until 1989, Section 109 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth) provided that the Act was a prescribed Act for the
37 Federated Seamen.'s Union of Australia v Commonwealth Steamship Owners Association (1922) 30 CLR 44; William & 
Anor v Commonwealth Banking Corporation Conciliation and 
Arbitration.Commission, c No 989 of i960; Termination Change and Redundancy Case (1984) 8 IR 34; Rockhampton 
City Council Municipal Officer's (Queensland Consolidated Award) Case (1978) 203 CAR 584
38 For a detailed discussion on the constitutional aspects 
of anti-discrimination laws, and the effect of 
inconsistencies arising between federal discrimination 
laws and industrial award clauses, see G McCarry, 
"Landmines Among the Landmarks: Constitutional Aspects 
of Anti-Discrimination Laws", The Australian Law Journal. 
Volume 63, May 1989, p 340ff
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purposes of Section 41A of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission Act 1904 (Cth). Section 41A provided the former 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission with powers to 
override certain laws affecting employment conditions within 
the Commonwealth Public Service. The Section, in effect 
authorised the Commission to make awards which were not in 
accord with a law of the Commonwealth where in the 
Commission's view it was proper to do so. This authorisation 
did not, however, extend to Acts prescribed under Section 41A 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission Act 1904 (Cth). 
The inclusion of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) as a 
prescribed Act for the purpose of sub-section 41A of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission Act 1904 (Cth) 
arguably reflected the legislature's intention that all new 
industrial orders, or awards made following the commencement 
of the federal Sex Discrimination Act would be made 
consistently with the Act's provisions. Such an 
interpretation would also necessarily follow having regard to 
Australia's international treaty obligations arising under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. ^  This indeed was the view adopted by the
39 See Articles 2, 11 and 15 of this Convention. See too, 
ILQ CQnYsntiQn-lQQ (Equal Remuneration)./ Articles l, 2 and 3, and ILQ Convention 111 (Discrimination in 
Employment and Occupation), Articles 2 and 3. For a more 
detailed discussion of the rights and obligations 
established under the international treaty agreements 
ratified by the Australian Government with reference to 
the area of equal pay, see Chapter Eleven
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former Human Rights Commission**® in its submissions to the 
then former Attorney-General, the Honourable Lionel Bowen, in 
relation to the proceedings before the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission in the 1985 Nurses Case proceedings.^
In 1989, Section 109 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
was amended by Section 86 of the Industrial Relations 
(Consequential ProYialgtns) Act, 1988.,.(.CtL). This statutory 
amendment ensures that the Sex Discrimination Act is now a 
prescribed act for the purposes of Section 121 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). This latter Section 
substantially replaces the former Section 41A of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth).
Overall, the provisions contained within the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Industrial Relations 
Act 1988 (Cth) suggest, at least in theory, that Australia's 
discrimination laws are basically intended to be of relevance 
to the processes of industrial wage fixation. Difficult legal 
and procedural issues arise, however, in attempting to 
precisely identify the availability of mechanisms for the 
review of alleged discrimination within the wage setting 
practices authorised by Australia's federal industrial wage 
tribunals. This general uncertainty involves, in part, the 
interpretation of two statutory provisions which suggest
40 Information provided in the course of discussions with 
members of the former Human Rights Commission
41 See, Private Hospitals' and Doctors' Nurses (A.C.T.)
Award (1986) 300 CAR 190
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certain limited possibilities for the review of alleged 
discrimination arising in the exercise of federal legislative 
power by Australia's national industrial wage fixing 
authorities. The first of these provisions is contained in 
Section 26 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The 
second relates to Section 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1988 (Cth). These two legislative provisions will now be 
discussed for the purpose of analysing the legal rights and 
remedies available to persons affected by alleged sex 
discrimination within the Australian wage fixing system.
SECTION 26 OF THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 1984 (CTH)
On the face of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), a 
possible avenue for review of alleged discrimination within 
the federal wage fixing process lies under the terms of 
Section 26 of the Act. This Section relates to persons 
performing functions, or exercising powers under federal law. 
It provides that ;
Section 26
(1) It is unlawful for a person who performs any
function or exercises any power under a Commonwealth 
law or for the purposes of a Commonwealth program, 
or has any other responsibility for the 
administration of a Commonwealth law or the conduct 
of a Commonwealth program to discriminate against
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another person, on the ground of the other person’s 
sex, marital status or pregnancy, in the performance 
of that function, the exercise of that power or the 
fulfilment of that responsibility.
(2) This section binds the Crown in right of a State.
Under Part III of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission is empowered to 
inquire into any alleged infringements of Section 26 on 
receipt of either an individual or representative complaint.^ 
Where a complaint is received, it is referred by the 
Commission to the federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner, who 
is required under Section 52 of the Act to investigate the 
complaint, and to attempt to resolve it through the process of 
conciliation.^
Prior to the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 
(Cth), the issue arose as to whether the terms of Section 26 
could apply to persons exercising federal powers in the making 
of industrial awards, or other wage determinations.^ At the 
time of the Act's introduction, Section 60 of the Conciliation
42 Section 48(1)(a), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 fCth)
43 Section 52(1), Sex Discrimination.Act 1984 (Cth)
44 See, for example, the submissions presented to the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission on the operation 
of Section 26 by the National Council of Women of 
Australia in the 1985 Nurses Case, Transcript of 
Proceedings C No 2219 of 1985, C No 2271 of 1985, 26 
November 1985, p 142
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and Arbitration Commission Act: 1904 (Cth) provided that awards 
made by the former Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
were binding and conclusive. The later enactment of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) made no provision, however, to 
exempt the acts and practices of federal wage fixing bodies 
from the Act’s operation.
On one interpretation, Section 26 of the Act might have 
applied to require the investigation of complaints of alleged 
discrimination by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission in circumstances where the acts complained of were 
carried out pursuant to federal legislative power. The 
likelihood of any such complaint succeeding would, on an 
alternative view, appear remote.
First, it could be argued that the natural construction of 
Section 26 did not apply to the exercise of legislative 
powers^ or, in the case of industrial wage orders, the quasi­
legislative powers of federal industrial wage fixing 
tribunals. Second, while federal industrial tribunals may be 
entitled to have regard to the fact that Australia has assumed 
obligations under international Conventions,4  ^ they will not 
be legally bound to comply with the terms of any relevant 
Convention unless a clear legal obligation exists under
45 See, Gerhardy v Brown (1984) 57 ALR 472 at 478 and 488
46 Termination, Change and Redundancy Case (1984) 8 IR 34 at 
45; Rockhampton City Council Municipal Officers 
(Queensland) Consolidated Awards Case (1978) 203 CAR 584
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Australian municipal law.47 The effect of Section 26 and 
Section 40 of the Sex_.Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) are 
especially ambiguous in this regard.
In any event, the introduction of the federal Industrial 
Relations Act in 1988 might be viewed as finally removing any 
doubt as to the appropriate forum for the review of alleged 
discrimination in the making of industrial orders.4® Part III 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) provides a 
comprehensive scheme for the review of industrial wage 
determinations which would it seems override the terms of 
Section 26 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). Although 
the issue is yet to be legally tested, the terms of Section 26 
would, on balance, appear to exclude the acts and practices of 
persons exercising authority under the Industrial Relations 
Act_19 88 (Cth).
SECTION 93 OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1988 (CTH)
In contrast to the uncertainty presented by the provisions of 
Section 26 of the Sex Disgr.imina.tion ..As.t .1984 (Cth), the 
recognition of anti-discrimination principles within the
47 Bradley V Commonwealth & Anor (1973) 128 CLR 557;KOQvfarta v Bjelke-Peterson & Qrs (1982) 153 CLR 168; Kioa 
v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
48 It should be noted here, however, that the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988 (Cth) might not be interpreted to 
operated in such a way as to wind back the implementation 
of international treaty obligations initially established 
by the prior introduction of the federal Ssx 
Discrimination Act in 1984
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federal wage fixing process is expressly required under the 
terms of Section 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 
(Cth). Section 93 unequivocally states that the federal 
Industrial Relations Commission:
"shall take account of the principles embodied in the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 relating to discrimination in 
employment."
Where it could be demonstrated that the Industrial Relations 
Commission had failed to take into account the principles of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), a breach of the 
Commission's statutory duty could be said to arise. It might 
simultaneously be argued in such circumstances that the 
Commission has no jurisdiction to make an industrial wage 
determination in terms that are inconsistent with the federal 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).49 This latter argument may 
encounter difficulty, however, on the basis that the combined 
provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), and the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) arguably express an 
intention that matters of industrial wage fixation shall be
49 Federated Seamen's Union of Australia v CommonwealthSteamship Owners' Association (1922) 30 CLR 144; see too 
McCarry, op.cit., p 339
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exclusively determined within, and subject to the legislative
5 0framework established under Australian industrial law. w
Assuming, for the purpose of discussion that the circumstances 
relating to the determination of an award wage order were to 
indicate that no account of the principles of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act was taken, it may be possible for the 
appeal provisions under Part III of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1988 (Cth) to take effect. These provisions allow for an 
initial review of industrial wage determinations made by a 
single member of the Commission, before the Full Bench of the 
Industrial Relations Commission.^ Section 45 of the Act 
provides that an appeal lies to a Full Bench of the Commission 
against a decision of a member by way of a finding in relation 
to an industrial dispute, or against an award or order made by 
a member of the Commission, other than a consent award. ^
Leave of the Full Bench must first be obtained in respect of 
any appeal application, and will only be available, if in the 
view of the Full Bench, the matter is of such importance that
50 See Re Professional Engineers Awards (1961) 97 CAR 3 at 
27; a more detailed consideration of the possible legal 
remedies available to review the powers of the Industrial 
Relations Commission to make orders and other wage 
determinations inconsistently with the terms of the Sex
Discrimination Act 1984.jCthl is discussed later in this
Chapter
51 Section 45(1), Industrial Relations Act 19.3.8 (Cth)
52 Section 45(1)(b), Industrial Relations Act 1988 fCth^
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An appeal init should be granted in the public interest.^3 
relation to an order or award, other than a consent award, may- 
only be instituted by an organisation or person bound by the 
award or order.^ Appeals with respect to a finding in 
relation to an industrial dispute or presumably a consent 
award may, however, be instituted by an organisation or person 
aggrieved by the decision concerned.^5
It is also worth nothing that the Commission is empowered to 
refer any questions of legal interpretation in relation to the 
federal Sex Discrimination Act in matters before it for the 
opinion of the Federal Court.^
Limited review procedures exist to enable the interpretation 
of awards by the Industrial Division of the Federal Court. ^
In the event of disputed findings arising in relation to an 
industrial dispute a further avenue for review may lie under 
Section 57 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) to the 
High Court of Australia.
As mentioned earlier, another possible review procedure may be 
available to challenge the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Relations Commission to make industrial wage determinations
53 Section 45(2), Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth).
54 Section 46, Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
55 Section 45(3)(d), Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
56 Section 45(3)(a), Industrial Relations Act^L388 (Cth)
57 Section 50, Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
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inconsistently with the terms of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act. This procedure, known as an application 
for prerogative writ, relates to the authority of the 
Australian High Court to review determinations of the federal 
Industrial Relations Commission in the exercise of the Court's 
original jurisdiction under Section 75(v) of the Australian 
Constitution. In this regard, it is important to note that 
members of the Industrial Relations Commission are officers of 
the Commonwealth for the purposes of Section 75(v) of the 
Australian Constitution.58 Detracting from the use of the 
prerogative writ as a means of immediate review before the 
High Court, however, are the provisions of Section 151 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) . This Section provides 
that awards made by the Commission are final and conclusive, 
and shall not be subject to challenge through the application 
of the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, or 
injunction. While the High Court has been generally reluctant 
to place full reliance on such privative clauses purporting to 
oust its original jurisdiction,^ there is also a clear
58 The King v Galvin &. Anor; Ex Parte Metal Trades Employer's Association & Qrs (1949) 77 CLR 432; R v 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: Ex 
Parte Brisbane Tramways (1914) 18 CLR 54; Australian Coal 
and Shale Employees Federation v Aberfield., Collieries (1942) 66 clr 161; r v The Conciliation and Arbitration Commission: Ex parte The Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 553
59 R V Hickman: Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 
at 615. See too, Australian Labour Law Reporter CCH 
Australia Limited, para 43-410 tt
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judicial reluctance to interfere with a specialist industrial 
tribunal acting within, and with reference to its powers.*^
In summary, therefore, it appears that access to legal 
procedures and remedies may theoretically be available in 
cases where it could be demonstrated that no account of the 
principles embodied in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
had been taken into account within the industrial award making 
process. Legal remedies might alternatively be available in 
cases where an industrial wage determination is made 
inconsistently with the terms of the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act. In practice, however, these legal review 
mechanisms would appear unlikely to facilitate the 
identification and treatment of discrimination within the 
federal industrial wage determination process. The barriers 
posed to the review of discriminatory wage practices through 
the use of existing legal procedures within the area of 
industrial wage negotiation will now be briefly outlined.
PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO THE REVIEW OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT 
WITHIN THE FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL WAGE FIXING SYSTEM
In considering the potential use of legal procedures for the 
review of discrimination in the wage setting process several 
difficulties can be seen to exist. The first of these relates 
to the problems of proof in establishing the presence of sex
60 See R v Dunphy: Ex Parte Maynes 1978 AILR 284; R v Th£
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission: Ex 
Parte The Angliss Group (1969) CLR 546 at 563
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discrimination in the wage setting process. This difficulty 
is especially apparent when dealing with the issue of indirect 
discrimination. It should be recognised in this context that 
any differences in the payment of wage rates for women 
resulting from discrimination in the wage setting process are 
likely to represent only one component of the wage gap between 
male and female workers.*’1 Identifying discrimination from 
the complex mix of factors which comprise the differences in 
male and female earnings presents a formidable evidentiary 
task. The costs involved in the presentation and gathering of 
evidence of gender bias through such methods as job evaluation 
analysis, are frequently high, and unlikely to be incurred in 
relation to a distinctly uncertain legal remedy and outcome.
Second, it should be appreciated that even if discrimination 
in the determination of wage rates could be established within 
the prescribed definitions provided under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 fCth). the fact that the Act's 
principles had been taken into account may sufficiently 
discharge any statutory obligation under Section 93 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). Proving a failure to 
take into account the principles embodied in the Sex 
Discrimination Act (Cth) 1984 in the making of an industrial 
order, award or finding will often be difficult to legally 
establish. This is particularly so given the terms of Section
61 See M Rubenstein, Equal Pay For Work of Equal Value.
Macmillan, London, 1984 pp 13-41; P Weiler, "The Wages of 
Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth", [1986]
Harvard Law Review, Voi. 99, 1728 at pp 1779-1794
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90 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) which requires 
the Commission to have regard to the likely effects on the 
national economy of any awards or orders with special 
reference to the level of employment and inflation.
In relation to the available review processes under 
consideration, there is in addition the legal problem of 
standing. This refers to the fact that claims for review of 
an industrial award can generally only be brought by an 
organisation or person bound by the award or order.^
Although powers exist to enable interested organisations, 
persons or other bodies to be heard in proceedings arising 
under the Industrial Relations Act, 19.8.8 (Cth)/63 or in 
relation to an application for prerogative writ,^ a "real or 
substantial" interest in the outcome of the decision would 
need to be established.*^ Any such application for review 
would almost certainly require strong trade union involvement 
and support. The lower participation of women relative to men 
within trade union organisations, and key union decision 
making structures*^ would not suggest, however, that access to 
the level of resources required to effectively pursue 
industrial claims seeking the removal of wage discrimination
62 See Section 45, Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
63 See Section 46, Industrial RelatiQHS.-Ac.tL_ 1988 (Cth).
64 R v Watson; Ex Parte AWU (1983) 128 CLR 77
65 See CCH, Australian Labour Law Reporter, para 43-280
66 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6325.0, 1988? 
National
278
is likely to be immediately forthcoming. Although it would 
appear that a greater commitment on the part of the trade 
union movement to supporting such actions will be critical to 
influencing higher levels of trade union membership amongst., 
the increasing number of women participants in the Australian 
labour market, there is little indication of any concentrated 
trade union involvement of this kind. While it might be 
argued that the approach of the trade union movement 
throughout the 1980's to secure higher minimum wage levels for 
low paid workers indirectly facilitates the achievement of 
positive wage outcomes for women workers, wage policies of 
this nature would appear to result in little more than the 
maintenance of relative male and female wage differentials. 
Given the legal and institutional framework within which the 
review of indirect sex discrimination in the setting of wage 
rates must take place, it would seem unlikely that the 
barriers to the review of wage discrimination will diminish 
until such time as a more pro-active role is taken by trade 
union organisations to ensure the proper implementation of 
equal pay principles. ^
67 For a discussion of the importance of trade union 
involvement in the removal of discrimination, see 
International Labour Office, "Trade Unions and Women's 
Employment", Women at Work, Number One, ILO Geneva, 1988; 
as to the practical difficulties of securing trade union 
support in the implementation of anti-discrimination 
principles, see M Thornton, "The NSW Labor Council and 
discrimination in employment", The Australian Quarterly. 
Spring 1988, 238
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TOWARDS THE PROMOTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL REMUNERATION 
EMBODIED WITHIN THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT
This Chapter has attempted to analyse the possible ways in 
which federal discrimination law may operate to influence the 
removal of direct and indirect discrimination in the wage 
fixing process. The substantial limitations to the existing 
legislative scheme have been demonstrated with direct 
reference to the review of indirect discrimination in the 
determination of wage rates. The absence of suitable and 
accessible procedures to review alleged sex discrimination in 
the industrial decision making process has also been 
described. The preceding analysis clearly suggests that the 
impact of the federal Sex Discrimination Act in relation to 
the implementation of equal pay principles within the 
Australian wage fixing system has been extremely limited. 
Despite the Act's broad framework under which access to legal 
rights and remedies is available, no use has to date been made 
to the Act's provisions prohibiting discrimination in the area 
of equal pay. The Act's greatest potential in this area 
rests, it seems, with the promotion of change at a policy 
level.
A recent example of the way in which the federal Sex 
Discrimination Act has been able to develop its capacity to 
influence policy within the industrial relations field can be 
found in the Parental Leave Test Case determined in July,
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19 9 0.É3É3 These proceedings represent an important precedent in 
which the federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Quentin 
Bryce AO was granted leave to intervene in proceedings before 
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to present 
submissions on the operation and interpretation of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). The Commissioner's 
intervention on behalf of the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission provides a significant model which 
might arguably also extend, in appropriate cases, to enable 
the presentation of substantive submissions on the ways in 
which the provisions contained within the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) may be applied to ensure a more comprehensive 
implementation of equal pay principles within the national
i
wage fixing system.^
Historically, in the area of equal pay, the Australian 
conciliation and arbitration system has relied extensively on 
the presentation of this kind of argument by various trade
68 See Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia 
and Angus Nugent and Sons Pty Ltd & Qrs C No 23285 of 
1988, Print M J3596 Dec 773/90
69 The concept of strengthening and formalising procedures 
through which more detailed assessments of the impact of 
wage determinations on women may be received in the 
course of industrial wage hearings is by no means a new 
concept. See submissions presented by E Ryan on behalf 
of the Women's Electoral Lobby, in Australia Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission, Inquiry into Wage Fixation, 
Vol II, AGPS, Canberra, 1978 p 175; Women's Electoral 
Lobby Submission to the 1983 National Wage Case. Sydney p 
59; See too M Thornton, "Pay Equity: An Australian 
Perspective", Paper Prepared for the International Labour 
Organisation. May 1989, p 32; the establishment of such 
procedures might arguably provide a critical means of 
ensuring the non-discriminatory assessment of work value 
within the Australian wage determination process
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union organisations, government representatives, and community 
interest groups. In relation to the major equal pay cases 
determined in 196970 and 197271 it is interesting to recall 
the influence of the submissions presented in these 
proceedings relating to the recognition of Australia's 
international legal obligations regarding the development and 
application of equal pay principles.
Over more recent years the importance attached to the 
presentation of arguments concerned with the implementation of 
Australia's international treaty obligations in the area of 
equal pay appears to have substantially diminished. This 
situation would appear to be largely inconsistent with the 
need to promote developments towards a greater recognition and 
acceptance of equal pay principles. The following Chapter is 
aimed at examining the legal obligations arising under the
A  •*
various international treaty agreements ratified by the 
Australian Government relevant to the area of equal pay. It 
seeks to explore the ways in which these international 
instruments may continue to operate in conjunction with the 
provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). as a 
vehicle for the promotion of greater pay equity within the 
Australian industrial wage determination system.
70 Equal Pay Cases (1969) 127 CAR 1142
71 National Wage and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147 CAR 172
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES
Several international treaty obligations relevant to the 
application of equal pay principles have played an 
important part in the development of Australian 
industrial and discrimination law. Since 1973, the 
Australian Government has ratified three international 
treaty instruments under which the implementation of 
measures is required to ensure equal treatment in the 
determination of remuneration between men and women 
workers. These international instruments include:
. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. 1979
. The Equal Remuneration Convention (ILQ 1QQ), 1951, and
. The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 
Convention (ILQ 111). 1958
In this Chapter, the different obligations arising under 
Australia's international treaty commitments will be 
outlined and discussed, together with the implications
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arising from these obligations for further action in the 
area of pay equity. Because of the specific focus of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, and the Equal Remuneration 
Convention (ILQ 100), particular attention is paid to 
these two international instruments as a means of 
promoting the achievement towards greater pay equality 
between the sexes.^
In considering the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, the review and
reporting procedures of the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women are described to
illustrate the ways in which the recommendations of this
United Nation's Committee may serve to influence progress
towards the removal of discriminatory wage practices.
Australia's response to the reporting requirements
established under the United Nations Convention is also
analysed, and a short evaluation is presented of
Australia's general performance with respect to its
obligations under the United Nations Convention relevant
to the area of equal pay. Reference is made in the
course of this evaluation to guidelines prepared by the
Commonwealth Secretariat regarding the implementation of
1 In relation to the scope and requirements of the 
more general provisions of the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention (ILQ 111) and 
Recommendation (No 90) see, International Labour 
Conference, Equality in Employment and Occupation*.. 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1988
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the equal pay provisions set out in Article 11 of the 
United Nation’s Convention.
Attention is also focused on the treaty obligations 
arising under The Equal Remuneration Convention ILQ 1QQ 
and ILQ Recommendation (No 90).. A brief evaluation of 
Australia's compliance with these international 
instruments is presented with special reference to the 
1985 General Survey conducted by the ILO Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations.
Finally, a range of conclusions are drawn regarding the 
implications for the further development of equal pay 
principles within the context of the Australian 
industrial wage determination process.
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
The most legally significant international treaty to 
which Australia is a party and which directly concerns 
the application of equal pay principles is the Convention 
Qn the Elimination. Of All Forms Of Discrimination against 
Women (the UN Convention) . The UN Convention was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979 and came
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Theinto force as a United Nations treaty in late 1981. 
treaty represents the most comprehensive international 
legal instrument concerned with the role and status of 
women, and requires State parties, on ratification, to 
enter into a legally binding commitment to ensure the 
elimination of all forms of direct and indirect 
discrimination against women.
In 1983, the UN Convention was ratified by the Australian 
Government and partially incorporated within Australian 
domestic law the following year with the introduction of 
the Sex Discrimination Act .1984 (Cth). Of the various 
international treaties concerned with equal pay issues, 
it is the UN Convention which has played a unique role in 
the introduction and development of discrimination 
legislation within Australia's domestic legal system.
The UN Convention provides an important constitutional 
foundation for the enactment of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) by virtue of the Act's reliance on the 
external affairs power under Section 51 (xxix) of the 
Australian Constitution. The constitutional validity of 
Australia's legislative prohibitions against 
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment
2 A.C. Byrnes, Report on the Seventh Session of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, and the Fourth Meeting of State 
Parties To The Convention, Intemtional Woment's 
Rights Action Watch, Columbia University, New York, 
1988, pi
286
appears to depend in part on the provisions of Article 11 
of the UN Convention.
In addition to providing a clear constitutional 
foundation to the legislative framework of Australia's 
federal discrimination laws, the UN Convention continues 
to play a significant policy role in the development of 
women's rights within Australia.^ a broad outline of the 
provisions contained under the UN Convention will now be 
briefly presented.
The UN Convention^ is divided into a preamble and six 
parts. Part 1 defines discrimination and lists areas in 
which State Parties agree to adopt policies and measures 
to remove discrimination. Article 1 provides the 
definition of discrimination which is expressed to 
involve any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made 
on the basis of sex. The definition concentrates on the 
promotion of women's rights and the recognition of
3 Elizabeth Evatt J, "International Machinery On Human 
Rights”, Paper presented to the International Forum 
- "Future Directions by Women in Public Sector 
Administration" IASA Annual Conference, Brisbane, 4- 
12 July, 1988, p 25-33
4 See Appendix 1
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women's status within all areas of economic, political 
and social activity.^
Article 2 sets out the policy and legislative measures to 
be implemented by State parties to facilitate the removal 
of discrimination. Effective legal protection against 
discrimination through the establishment of competent 
tribunals and other public institutions is included 
amongst these measures. State parties are further 
obliged to ensure that public authorities and 
institutions refrain from engaging in any act or practice 
of discrimination. Such obligations arguably extend in 
the Australian context to the operation of Australia's 
State and federal wage fixing authorities in the 
determination of prescribed award wage rates.
Of particular relevance to the area of equal pay are the 
provisions contained in Part II of the UN Convention. It 
is here that Article 11 l.(d) requires:
1. State Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, 
in particular:
5 Commonwealth Secretariat, The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Womeni__The Reporting Process - A Manual forCommonwealth Jurisdiction, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London 1988, p 4
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(d) The right to equal remuneration, including 
benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work 
of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in 
the evaluation of the quality of work.^
THE REVIEW AND REPORTING -• FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
Part V of the UN Convention provides for the 
establishment of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which acts as the 
basic supervisory mechanism responsible for the 
monitoring of the Convention's implementation. CEDAW 
compromises twenty three independent experts nominated, 
and elected by State parties, and who serve in a private 
capacity, rather than as government representatives. The 
monitoring process involves the examination of reports 
submitted by State parties to the Committee and the 
reporting of the Committee's activities to the General
6 It would appear that the terms of Section 14 of the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) operate to 
incorporate the provisions of Article 11 within 
Australia's domestic law. See Chapter Nine for a 
more detailed discussion of the provisions of 
Section 14 of the federal Sex Discrimination Act
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Assembly of the United Nations through the Economic and 
Social Council.^
State parties are required to submit their reports on the 
measures adopted to give effect to the Convention's 
provisions within one year after becoming a party to the 
Convention and every four years thereafter.® In addition 
to analysing the reports submitted by State parties,
CEDAW members question government representatives who 
appear before the Committee prior to the preparation of 
its reports. The Committee issues a report of its 
activities on an annual basis. The Committee's reporting 
requirements provide an ongoing means for the review and 
evaluation by both government and non-government agencies 
of the Convention's progress. As will shortly be 
demonstrated these review and reporting processes have 
over recent years served a valuable role in analysing 
equal pay developments in Australia within a non partisan 
political context. As stressed in the guidelines issued 
by the Commonwealth Secretariat with reference to the 
Convention's implementation:
"Governments, women's national machineries and non­
governmental organisations have an important role in 
collecting information and presenting it so that it 
reflects the true situation within the country
7 See Article 21 of the UN Convention
8 Article 18 of the UN Convention
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concerned. In addition, Government Department's 
women's national machineries and non-governmental 
organisations can all use the reports to monitor the 
progress achieved to date, evaluate the obstacles 
which still remain and develop strategies to 
overcome them.
Under the terms of Article 21 of the UN Convention, the 
Committee's functions extend to making general 
recommendations based on its examination of reports and 
other information received from State parties.
Although CEDAW has no judicial power to pronounce a State 
party in violation of the UN Convention, or to enforce 
any form of remedy, it may offer suggestions to 
individual State parties and exert pressure through the 
public review of State parties' reports. ^  As Byrnes 
suggests:
"A positive appraisal in an international forum of a 
country's commitment and efforts can give impetus to 
further progress. An adverse assessment can 
embarrass a government at home and abroad, ideally
9 Commonwealth Secretariat, op .cit. p4
10 A.C. Byrnes, "The 'Other' Human Rights Treaty Body: 
The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women", The Yale Journal of 
International Law. Volume 14, Number 1, Winter 1989,
p 6
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providing it with some incentive to do more in the 
future. " ^
The Committee1s recommendations further provide 
constructive guidance to State parties seeking to meet 
their obligations under the Convention. This process is 
consistent with the Committee's role of promoting 
principles of non-discrimination within the broad areas 
referred to under the Convention's provisions.
In considering the implementation of equal pay 
principles, it is significant to note the recommendations 
presented by CEDAW at its Eighth Session meeting in 
February 1989. These recommendations were included in 
the Committee's April 1989 Report to the General Assembly 
of the United Nationswhere it was expressed that the 
Committee :
"Recommends to the State parties to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women that:
1. In order to fully implement the Convention of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, those
11 id
12 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. A/44/38, 14 April 1989
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State parties that have not yet ratified ILO 
Convention 100 should be encouraged to do so;
2. They should consider the study, development and 
adoption of job evaluation systems based on 
gender-neutral criteria that would facilitate the 
comparison of the value of those jobs of a 
different nature, in which women presently 
predominate, with those jobs in which men 
presently predominate, and they should include 
the results achieved in their reports to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women;
3. They should support, as far as practicable, the 
creation of implementation machinery and 
encourage the efforts of the parties to 
collective agreements, where they apply, to 
ensure the application of the principle of equal 
remuneration for work of equal value."^
It is conceivable that the above recommendations might 
operate in such a way as to encourage further policy 
development within Australia as a means of working 
towards greater progress in the area of equal pay. The 
recommendations suggested might even practically form the 
basis of submissions to Australia's federal wage fixing
13 ibid, p 82
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authorities in the course of industrial wage case 
proceedings.
AUSTRALIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE REPORTING PROCESSES 
ESTABLISHED BY CEDAW
In 1986, Australia's initial report to CEDAW was 
submitted in accordance with the requirements of Article 
18 of the UN Convention. ^  Australia's report, was 
considered by CEDAW at its 7th Session commencing in 
February 1988 together with a supplementary report 
describing further initiatives undertaken since 1986. ^  
The report covered a wide range of topics, including a 
statement regarding Australia's compliance with Article 
11. Although considerable progress was recorded in 
relation to the wage differentials between men and women 
workers over the previous decade, it was acknowledged 
that women in the paid workforce were not yet accorded 
full equality of opportunity and treatment with their 
male counterparts.1  ^ It was noted that as of 1987, 
women's average earnings were only 65% of men's, and in
14 See, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Office of the Status of Women, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women - Report of Australia, AGPS, Canberra 1986
15 See CEDAW, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
State. Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention. 
Initial Reports of State Parties - Australia. 
CEDAW/c/5/Add.40/Amend.1, United Nations January, 
1988
16 ibid, p 78
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the case of full time employees a 21% wage gap was 
evident. This situation was nonetheless stated as being 
considerably more favourable than that applicable to nine 
other comparable industrialised nations.
The overall assessment of Australia's report by CEDAW was 
extremely positive17 and the thoroughness and frankness 
of the submissions forwarded were viewed as clear 
evidence of Australia's commitment to realise equality 
between men and women. In relation to pay equity it was, 
however, noted that much remained to be done.1®
In keeping with the Committee's practice a series of 
questions were directed to Australia's representative 
regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the 
UN Convention. Among the matters raised, clarification 
was sought on the Australian Government’s position on the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value.1® In 
response to this query, the Committee was referred to ;the
17 A.C. Byrnes, International Legal Notes, "Australia 
and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women", 
The Australian Law Journal, Volume 62, June 1988, 
478; United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women on its Seventh Session. 
A/43/38, May 1988
18 United Nations, Economic and Social Council,
OPtCit»/ p 65
19 CEDAW, Summary Record of the 114th Meeting,
CEDAW/C/114/February 1988, p 13
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1986 Nurses Case decision^ and to the fact that wage 
increases for the nursing profession had been achieved, 
despite the rejection of the concept of comparable worth 
by Australia's leading wage fixing authority. The 
response provided, however, little analysis of the 
limitations placed on the processing of claims for equal 
pay for work of equal value, or of the obstacles to the 
full achievement of this principle within the context of 
the Australian industrial wage fixing system. A
THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AS A TOOL 
FOR THE EVALUATION OF PAY EQUITY MEASURES
An important feature of the UN Convention is its capacity 
to provide a model to evaluate and measure progress in 
relation to the development of the principles of equal 
treatment irrespective of sex.
In evaluating the implementation of Australia's 
obligations concerning the requirements set out under 
Article 11.1.(d) of the UN Convention with reference to 
equal pay, useful reference can be made to the guidelines 
issued by the Commonwealth Secretariat relevant to the 
reporting process administered by CEDAW. In relation to 
the application of the principle of equal remuneration ,
20 Private Hospitals' and Doctors' Nurses (A.C.T.)
Award (1986) 300 CAR 190
21 See CEDAW, Summary Record of the 118th Meeting, 
CEDAW/C/SR.118, March 1988, p 16
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for work of equal value these guidelines contain a range 
of questions for the purpose of determining the 
effectiveness of the implementation procedures adopted by 
State parties to the Convention. Particular questions 
suggested by the Commonwealth Secretariat include:
"1. Does the country have legal provisions
guaranteeing the right to equal pay for work of 
equal value? If so, how effective is their 
implementation? What obstacles impede their 
implementation?
2. If such provisions exist, how is quality of work 
evaluated? Does this evaluation lead to 
equality of treatment? If not, why not?
3. Are women and men afforded equal benefits as 
ancillary to work of equal value? If not, why 
not?"22
With respect to the implementation process the following 
objectives are listed:
"1. Ensure that all members of the labour force, 
domestic workers and agricultural workers are 
covered by anti-discrimination legislation.
22 Commonwealth Secretariat, op.cit. p 40-41
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2. If necessary, introduce legislative provisions 
to guarantee equal remuneration for work of 
equal value.
3. Where such legislation is in place, monitor its 
effectiveness.
4. Review the differential treatment with respect 
to pay, non-wage benefits and evaluation schemes 
for women workers, including those involved in 
part-time work.
5. Evaluate the effectiveness of current 
enforcement systems as to whether they are 
complaint-based. Examine who can bring the 
complaint; whether the procedure is free and 
well-publicised; and whether complaints can be 
taken on a representative or group basis. "^3
TOWARDS IMPROVED MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES
Applying the above tests and standards posed by the above 
guidelines prepared by the Commonwealth Secretariat, a 
number of clear issues arise in relation to the 
implementation and extent of the procedures adopted by 
Australia in the area of equal pay. First, there is the
23 I d
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apparent weakness in the impact, and coverage of 
Australia's discrimination laws with respect to workers 
and their wage conditions within the industrial wage 
fixing process.^ Obvious questions relating to the 
availability and accessibility of procedures to 
facilitate the review of complaints of alleged wage 
discrimination here arise. In particular, the 
effectiveness of current enforcement mechanisms to remedy 
discrimination in the payment of wage benefits, including 
non-award and overaward payments, might reasonably be 
identified as an area requiring further review. The 
inadequacy of the existing measures to monitor the 
evaluation of women's work in a manner consistent with 
the equal pay for equal work principle presents another 
key area for potential reform.
In relation to this latter issue, the 1989 
recommendations of CEDAW concerning the application of 
gender-neutral criteria in the evaluation of work value 
become especially relevant. The realisation of the 
objectives suggested by these recommendations clearly 
remain to be achieved within the Australian wage 
determination process. Such further action might, 
however, optimistically be expected to fall within the
24 For a detailed discussion of the limitations of
Australia's anti-discrimination legislation in the 
area of equal pay, see Chapter Ten, ante
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functions of the specialised Equal Pay Unit* 2-* established 
within the federal Government Department of Industrial 
Relations in late 1990. The protection of Australia's 
exemplary international reputation in relation to the 
removal of sex discrimination would appear, in the area 
of pay equity, to rely on a sustained commitment to the 
gender-neutral evaluation work value in accordance with 
the most recent CEDAW recommendations.
THE ILO EQUAL REMUNERATION CONVENTION (NO 100) AND 
RECOMMENDATION NO 90, 1951
Two other international instruments binding upon 
Australia involve a direct and specific focus on the 
achievement of greater pay equity. These are the 
International Labour Organisation's Equal Remuneration 
Convention (ILO 100)26 and its associated Recommendation 
(No 90).27 Both ILO 100 and Recommendation (No 9Q) were 
first adopted by the International Labour Organisation 
(the ILO) in 1951, in keeping with the ILO's founding 
objectives as contained within the original text of the
25 See P. Morris MHR, Minister for Industrial 
Relations, Media Release, 2 March 1990
2 6 Appendix 2
27 Appendix 3
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ILO Constitution.^ The Convention has historically been 
an important influence on the acceptance and 
implementation of equal pay principles within the 
Australian wage fixing system. ^
In 1974, ILO 1QQ was ratified by the Australian 
Government. It has yet, however, to be incorporated 
within Australia's domestic law through the enactment of 
national legislation. Australia's obligations under ILO 
1QQ do not accordingly give rise to private rights 
enforceable within the Australian legal system.^
The terms of ILO 100 are accompanied by Recommendation 
(No 90). In common with other ILO Recommendations, 
Recommendation (No 90) is not open to ratification. It
28 International Labour Conference, Equal Remuneration. 
General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendation. 
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1986, p 2
29 M. Gaudron and M. Bosworth, "Equal Pay?" in In Pursuit of Justice, Ed J Mackinolty and H Radi, Hale 
and Iremonger, 1976, p 163; see too the discussion 
of the 1968 and 1972 Equal Pay decisions in Chapter 
Three ante in which the relevance of the equal pay 
principles developed under international law is 
considered with reference to the determinations reached by the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission
30 See Simsek v McPhee & Anor (1982) 56 ALJR 277; 
Bradley v Commonwealth & Anor (1973) 128 CLR 557; Koawarta v Bjelke-Peterson & Ors (1982) 56 ALJR 625 
at p 648; Kiao v West (1985) 159 CLR 550; for a 
description of the limited effects of international 
human rights standards in circumstances where such 
standards have not been incorporated within the 
terms of local municipal law, see H. Burmester, 
"Impact of Treaties", Australian Law News, Vol 32, 
July, 1989, p 30
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serves nonetheless to embody detailed standards for the 
consideration of State parties, with a view to promoting 
the application of the principle of equal remuneration by 
national legislation, or otherwise.
By virtue of the terms of the ILO Constitution, several 
obligations exist in respect of ILQ 1QQ and its attached 
Recommendation (No 9 0 ) These obligations require the 
Australian Government:
"(a) to bring the Convention or Recommendation
before the federal authority or authorities 
within whose competence the matter lies, for 
the enactment of legislation or other action;
(b) to inform the ILO of the measures taken to 
bring the Convention or Recommendation before 
such authority or authorities and of the action 
taken by the authority or authorities;
(c) in the case of a Convention which the competent 
federal authority has consented to ratify, to 
communicate the formal ratification of the
31 Department of Industrial Relations, Review of 
Australian Law and Practice in Relation To 
Conventions Adopted By The International Labour 
Conference, AGPS, Canberra, 1985, p 4
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Convention to the ILO and to take any necessary 
action to give effect to the Convention.
In examining the necessary action to be taken with 
respect to ILQ I.Q.Q. and Recommendation (No 9Q) a clear 
understanding is needed of the provisions set out under 
both these international instruments. These provisions 
will now be outlined as a means of identifying 
Australia's international legal obligations in the area 
of equal pay. The following discussion might also serve 
to demonstrate the kinds of arguments which may require 
presentation, and further development in proceedings 
before Australia's industrial wage fixing authorities 
relevant to the negotiation of equal pay award wage 
increases.
THE PROVISIONS OF ILO 100 AND RECOMMENDATION 90
ILQ. 1QQ. and ReCQmmsndafcion.-XNQ-iflP- set out a range of 
measures to provide for, ensure, encourage and facilitate 
the application of the principle of equal remuneration 
for men and women for work of equal value.
To begin with, remuneration is very broadly defined in 
Article 1 of the Convention to include basic salaries and 
minimum wages, as well as "any additional emoluments 
whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in
32 ibid, p 5
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cash, or in kind." In the Australian context it is worth 
noting that this definition would clearly extend to cover 
overaward payments provided in the course of employment.
State parties are required under Article 2 of the 
Convention to apply the principle of equal remuneration 
by "means appropriate to the methods in operation for 
determining rates of remuneration." Any such application 
may take place by means of national laws, legally 
established machinery for wage determination, collective 
agreements, or a combination of these means.^ as a 
ratifying country, Australia is also required to allow 
for measures to promote the objective appraisal of jobs 
on the basis of the work to be performed in circumstances 
where such action will operate to give effect to the 
Convention's provisions. In the course of this process, 
State parties are required to co-operate with employers’ 
and workers' organisations involved in the wage 
negotiation process.
The terms of Recommendation (No 90) are more precise than 
those contained under ILO 100f and provide specific 
guidance on the form of appropriate action to be 
undertaken with reference to the ILO Convention. Where 
wage rates are subject to statutory regulation, it is 
recommended that State parties should ensure the
33 ILO 10Qf Article 2 sub paragraph 2
34 ILQ..1.QQ, Article 4
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application of equal pay for work of equal value after 
consultation with employer and employee groups, with 
particular regard to:
"(a) the establishment of minimum or other wage 
rates in industries and services where such 
rates are determined under public authority;
(b) industries and undertakings operated under 
public ownership or control; and
(c) where appropriate, work executed under the 
terms of public contacts."^5
ILO Recommendation (No 90) calls for the enactment of 
laws allowing for the general application of equal pay 
for work of equal value where appropriate in the light of 
methods in operation for the determination of wage 
rates.^ It is further recommended that State parties 
establish or encourage the use of objective job appraisal 
methods of work to be performed, whether by job analysis 
or other procedures.^
Other broad measures are referred to within 
Recommendation (No 90) such as the need to ensure that
35 ILO Recommendation (No 90). Paragraph 2
36 ILO Recommendation (No 90). Paragraph 3
37 ILO Recommendation (No 90). Paragraph 5
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employers and workers are fully informed as to any legal 
requirements to be met with regard to the application of 
the equal pay for work of equal value principle.
Reference is also made to the need for equal facilities 
for vocational training and placement. Recommendation 
(No 90) concludes by calling for every effort to be made 
to promote public understanding of the grounds on which 
it is considered that equal pay for work of equal value 
should be implemented.
THE 1985 GENERAL SURVEY BY THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON 
THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In accordance with the established practice of the ILO,^ 
State parties were requested in 1985 to report on the 
position of their law and practice with regard to the 
application of ILO 1QQ and Recommendation (No 90). This 
reporting requirement led in 1986 to the issue of a major 
report by the ILO's Committee of Experts on the 
Application^of Conventions and Recommendations.39 The 
1986 Report serves to clarify the obligations of State 
parties to the Convention, and establishes useful 
guidelines for those parties concerned with effective 
compliance under international law. It contains several 
comments and recommendations of directly applicable to 
current developments within the Australian wage fixing
38 See Article 19 of the ILO Constitution
39 International Labour Conference, op .cit.
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system. Some of the specific topics covered which are of 
relevance to the contemporary debate surrounding equal 
pay issues in Australia will now be briefly discussed.
JOB EVALUATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF EQUAL PAY FOR WORK 
OF EQUAL VALUE
It may be recalled that under ILQ 100, equal remuneration 
is to be established for "work of equal value". In 
choosing the "value" of the work as the point of 
comparison between male and female workers, it is 
important to appreciate that the ILO standards go beyond 
a reference to "the same", or "similar" work:
"The reference to "work of equal value" inevitably 
broadens the field of comparison since jobs of a 
different nature have to be compared in terms of 
equal value. To compare the value of different 
jobs, it is important that there exists methods and 
procedures of easy use and ready assess, capable of 
ensuring that the criterion of sex is not directly
or indirectly taken into account in the
. incomparison..
It is also important to recognise at this point that the 
Convention does not unconditionally require measures to 
be introduced for the objective assessment of jobs. Nor
40 ibid/ p 190
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is any positive indication provided as to how work value 
is to be determined. Despite this situation, it is the 
Committee of Experts1 view that :
"it follows from Article 3, paragraph 3 that some 
form of objective appraisal of jobs on the basis of 
the work to be performed is the only method set 
forth in the Convention for differentiating wages in 
conformity with the principle of equality.
A further requirement of the standards established under 
ILO 100 is that the reach of the comparison between jobs 
performed by men and women must be as wide as the wage 
policies and structures in place permit. The comparison 
must also take into account the degree to which wages 
fixed may be based on factors unrelated to sex. In any 
such assessment the Convention is intended to cover:
"not only open discrimination against either sex, 
but also cases where apparently objective criteria 
such as performance or job difficulty are explicitly
41 ibid, p 11
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or implicitly defined or applied with reference to 
the worker's sex.
In short, the Convention envisages the elimination of all 
forms of direct and indirect sex discrimination in the 
wage-fixing process.
When using job evaluation methods in the course of this 
process, the Committee has noted the particular 
difficulties which may be experienced in areas where men 
and women are segregated into different occupations, 
industries and jobs. It is suggested in these 
circumstances that:
"By adopting non-discriminatory evaluation criteria 
and applying them in a uniform manner, differences 
in wages resulting from traditional stereotypes with 
regard to the value of "women's work" are likely 
also to be reduced."
The above comments are particularly appropriate to 
Australia where levels of occupational segregation by 
gender are pronounced^ and where no clearly identifiable 
procedures exist for the systematic application of non-
42 ibid, p 12
43 For a discussion on the incidence of occupational 
segregation in the Australian workforce and its 
effect on the relative wage levels of male and 
female workers, see Chapter One, ante
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discriminatory evaluation criteria within the wage 
determination process.
The Committee's survey highlights the increasing 
importance of job evaluation as a means of giving effect 
to the terms of ILO 100:
"Because men and women tend to perform different 
jobs, a technique to measure the relative value of 
jobs with varying content is critical to eliminating
discrimination in the remuneration of men and
4.4.women.
Reference is made to a number of countries where the use 
of formal evaluation plans has been instituted to 
systematically examine and compare those jobs in which 
women predominate with jobs in which men predominate.^ 
Such procedures provide a recognised basis to identify 
and correct wage discrimination in the determination of 
pay rates. A noticeable absence within the Committee's 
discussion of these developments is any reference to the 
adoption of similar measures in Australia. The use of 
job evaluation methods and procedures as a means of 
identifying indirect sex discrimination in the 
determination of wage rates remains, it seems, to be 
appropriately accepted by Australian industrial wage
44 International Labour Conference, op .cit., p 106
45 ibid, p 109 ff
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fixing authorities as a legitimate tool to be 
systematically applied to ensure the removal of 
discriminatory wage practices.
THE SCOPE OF THE STATE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ILO 100 TO 
ENSURE THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL 
REMUNERATION
A ratifying State's obligation under ILO 1QQ to ensure 
the implementation of equal pay for work of equal value 
is limited to those areas where such action is consistent 
with the methods in operation for determining wage rates. 
This obligation will arise, in the Committee's view, 
where the State party is the employer, where the State 
party is in a position to intervene in the wage-fixing 
process, or where legislation bearing on equal treatment 
exists which is relevant to the setting of wage 
conditions.^  In the case of Australia, all three of 
these situations could be identified as relevant.
Although there is no general obligation to enact 
legislation under the Convention, the Committee points 
out that:
"legislative action by the State for the protection 
of equality may extend the government's competence 
to intervene in the field of wages and, hence, widen 
the scope for ensuring the application of the
46 ibid p 13
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principle under Article 2 paragraph 1 of the 
Convention."^7
In the case of Australia, the enactment of the federal 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) might arguably be 
interpreted as placing Australia within the above 
mentioned category. Assuming that Australia's recent 
federal discrimination and industrial legislation is 
intended to widen the scope for the application of the 
equal remuneration principle, some form of legislative 
amendment to national laws would appear necessary to 
enable these statutory provisions to effectively assist 
in removing indirect sex discrimination in the wages 
field.
EQUAL PAY PRINCIPLES NOT CONTINGENT ON ECONOMIC FACTORS
When considering the scope of ILQ 100. it is especially 
significant to note the Committee's firm view that 
governments must not seek to avoid their obligations 
under the Convention on the pretext that they are 
precluded from interfering in the wage fixing process by 
virtue of economic f a c t o r s . N o  compromise may be 
proposed, for example, that the implementation of the 
equal remuneration principle may only be pursued subject 
to suitable financial and economic conditions. Such an
47 Ibid/ P 14
48 ibid, P 15
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approach is unacceptable, in the Committee's assessment, 
having regard to the call for positive action required 
under the Convention's provisions through which the 
unqualified right to equal treatment irrespective of sex 
is guaranteed.^
Australia's appreciation of this position is hardly well 
reflected when considering the outcome and effect of the 
1986 Nurses Case Decision. 0^ As outlined earlier in 
Chapter Seven, this decision has throughout the 1980's 
had an overriding influence on the application of equal 
pay principles within the Australian industrial wage 
fixing system. Most notably it has operated over a 
sustained period to establish the preconditions for 
bringing equal pay claims in accordance with the 
anomalies and inequities provisions contained within 
national wage fixing guidelines. The restriction of 
equal pay awards to situation where no economic flow on 
effects may result is plainly difficult to justify given 
the positive requirement to implement the right to equal 
remuneration, irrespective of prevailing economic 
circumstances.
The slowly emerging shift away from the strict adherence 
to the requirements laid down in the 1986 Nurses Case
49 id
50 Private Hospitals ' . and Doctors ..Nurses (A.C-uZ..«.). Award (1986) 300 CAR 190
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decision^ brought most recently with the development of 
the structural efficiency principle might constructively 
be viewed as providing a greater potential scope for 
Australia's future compliance with its international 
treaty obligations in relation to equal pay issues. As 
to whether future developments within the Australian wage 
fixing system will effectively operate to ensure the 
positive application of equal pay principles in the newly 
emerging context of enterprise bargaining is, however, 
yet to be determined.
DISCRIMINATION IN INDUSTRIAL AWARDS AND COLLECTIVE WAGE 
AGREEMENTS
The elimination of discrimination in collective 
agreements is another area identified by the ILO 
Committee of Experts as requiring further action by State 
parties to ILO 100. The removal of discriminatory wage 
practices within industrial wage agreements is cited by 
the Committee as one of the most effective and practical 
ways of ensuring the achievement of the Convention's 
obligations.^ The need to focus on the terms and 
conditions established under collective wage agreements 
is particularly pertinent in the case of Australia where
51 See for example, the decision of the Industrial 
Relations Commission in Child Care Industry (ACT). 
Award 1985 and Child Care Industry (NT) Award 1986, 
Dec 1001/90 S Print J4316
52 International Labour Conference, op .cit.r p 193
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industrial award provisions frequently based on such 
agreements substantially determine the terms of 
remuneration applicable to the large majority of the 
Australian labour force. Given that consent award 
agreements between employer and employee groups continue 
to require the approval of State and federal industrial 
wage fixing authorities, the removal of discrimination in 
award wage conditions remains inextricably linked to the 
industrial award determination procedures established 
within the framework of industrial law. Although the 
problem of direct discrimination in respect of wages paid 
pursuant to industrial awards agreements has been 
substantially addressed over the past two decades through 
the operation of this regulatory framework, outstanding 
issues remain concerning indirect discrimination in the 
wage determination process. As the ILO Committee's 
Report confirms, less evident forms of indirect 
discrimination persist with regard to such matters as the 
choice of methods for determining remuneration, the 
criteria for the classification of jobs and the 
evaluation of the work value to be attached to specific 
occupations within the labour market.
The Committee noted with particular reference to 
Australia that overaward and bonus payments made to women 
employees outside the centralised wage regulation process 
were consistently less than those made to male employees.
53 ibid, p 179
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As at the time of the 1985 survey, the ACTU was reported 
to be engaged in the collection of data relating to these 
overaward wage differences. Reference was also made to 
the consultation taking place between the ACTU and the 
former federal Human Rights Commission in connection with 
the possible use of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
as a means of remedying problems of wage discrimination 
arising from overaward payments. As of 1991 this process 
of consultation is continuing. The provisions of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) remain to be tested in 
relation to both direct and indirect discrimination in 
the payment of overaward rates.^
TOWARDS GREATER EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE AWARENESS AND 
CONSULTATION
In reviewing the legal developments relevant to the 
application of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value within the various countries surveyed in 
1985, the following observations of the ILO Committee of
54 The need to address the issue of overaward payment
has been acknowledged as a key issue since the early 
introduction of the Sex•Discrimination Act 1984 
(Cth). See, P O'Neil, Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner, Address to Women in 
Trade Unions Network, Adelaide, February 1986 p 4; 
Some four years later, it is now likely that a 
national inquiry into overaward payments will be 
undertaken by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, see Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, Overaward Payments and the Sex 
Discrimination Act;__ Information Paper, 1991
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Experts strike a distinct and familiar chord with respect 
to the Australian experience:
"quite often, a relative scarcity of national 
standards for the general application of the 
principle corresponds to a situation where for years 
its implementation in practice is not considered to 
call for further action; once such action gets under 
way, however, and the further tools for implementing 
the principle are developed, the more the existence 
of problems in practice may be brought to the 
surface, thus initiating true progress.
These comments are no less applicable in Australia where 
the social and political impetus for legislative reform, 
or alternative measures to promote the implementation of 
equal pay principles appears to have largely subsided 
during the 1980's. While this situation might 
pragmatically indicate to some that no further measures 
are presently needed to facilitate greater pay equity for 
women, it would nonetheless be ill-judged to suggest that 
the equal pay debate in Australia has been finally
55 ibid, p 24
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concluded. As this Chapter has attempted to 
demonstrate the implementation of equal pay principles in 
conformity with international treaty law obligations has 
yet to be comprehensively achieved. A greater 
recognition of the need to comply with the standards and 
principles of equal treatment contained within 
international treaty agreement will it seems be required; 
however, before any effective progress in relation to the 
application of equal pay principles is likely to occur.^
Given the tri-partite nature of the Australian wage 
fixing system such compliance will necessarily demand a 
greater appreciation on the part of employers, employees, 
trade union organisations and wage fixing authorities 
alike of the need to ensure equal treatment irrespective 
of sex in the determination of wage rates. This 
development will in turn depend on an enhanced awareness 
of the productivity and efficiency benefits which will
56 It is interesting to note here the large number of 
submissions received by the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs relating to the Committee's reference on 
Equal Opportunity and Equal Status., for Australian Homan, directly related to issues affecting pay 
equity. See Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, Submissions Authorised..for 
Publication, Volumes 1-13, AGPS, Canberra, 1989-1991
57 This is an issue which will no doubt form part of 
the review relevant to the preparation of the second 
Australian report for CEDAW during the course of 
1991. See, "OSW's International Role", OSWQMEN,
June 1991, Number 9, Office of the Status of Women, 
Canberra, 1991, p 2
318
ultimately flow from the implementation of this 
fundamental right.
As outlined earlier in this Chapter, the obligations 
arising under the international Conventions ratified by 
the Australian Government in relation to the right to 
equal remuneration have no legally binding effect on 
private individuals until such time as domestic 
legislation is enacted to require compliance with the 
standards and provisions established under treaty 
agreement. Although it would appear that the provisions 
of Section 14 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
have attempted to implement the equal pay provisions of 
Article 11 of the UN Convention within Australian 
municipal law, it is clear that the operation of the 
other treaty instruments referred to in this Chapter have 
no legally binding effect within Australia's present 
legal system. The standards and objectives established 
under the terms of these international treaty agreements 
should ideally continue to play a constructive and 
positive role at a policy level in ensuring the removal 
of discriminatory treatment in the determination of wage
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C Qrates within the Australian wage fixing process. ° In 
the event that this is not possible further attention may- 
need to be given to the introduction of clearer national 
legislation under which the right to equal pay for work 
of equal value is assured.
58 For a detailed discussion of the ways in which the 
principles established under international treaty 
agreements may lead through the process of gradual 
policy development to the introduction of practical 
measures to implement the principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value see E C Landau, The Rights of 
Working Women in the European Community.- Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels, 1985 pp 15-20
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CHAPTER TWELVE
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF INDUSTRIAL LAW 
AND DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF WOMENS WAGES
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has been directed to examining the processes 
by which women's wage rates have been regulated within 
the Australian wage fixing system, and the ways in which 
discrimination laws may influence this system through 
the review of unfavourable treatment on the basis of 
sex. Two separate areas of legal study have been 
undertaken. The first of these relates to the area of 
industrial law which predominantly controls the wage 
levels fixed for the majority of Australian women 
workers. Second, is the area of discrimination law 
under which a range of legal provisions have been 
introduced to remedy sex discrimination in the terms and 
conditions of employment. A significant feature to 
emerge is the lack of any obvious or developed 
connection between the two legal areas in relation to 
the practical implementation of equal pay principles.
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The resolution of sex discrimination issues within the
Australian wage fixing process has traditionally been 
the preserve of the industrial law jurisdiction. The 
length of this tradition has been an important factor 
contributing to the largely exclusive development of 
industrial law with regard to the regulation of female 
wage rates. The limited interrelationship between the 
two areas of industrial law and discrimination law has 
been further reinforced by the existing statutory 
framework provided under Australia's discrimination 
laws. These laws operate to preserve the authority of 
Australia's industrial wage tribunals to regulate all 
aspects of award wage conditions. The removal of 
discrimination from federal industrial award wage 
provisions accordingly depends to a substantial degree 
on the exercise of the statutory powers of the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth^.
The Industrial Relations Act significantly provides that 
the Industrial Relations Commission must take account of 
the principles embodied within the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (CthQ in the performance of its functions. The 
provisions of the Industrial Relations Act do not, 
however, explicitly require the Commission to ensure the 
implementation of equal pay principles or the removal of 
discriminatory wage practices. While equal pay award 
wage claims may continue to be brought under the terms
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1 the establishment ofof the 1972 Equal Pay Case , 
equal pay claims remains contingent on the collective 
bargaining strength of trade union organisations in 
areas affecting women's employment. The initiation of 
such claims also relies substantially on the willingness 
of trade union organisations to protect and promote the 
special interests of women trade union members.
The key role of Australia's industrial arbitration 
system in ensuring the removal of discrimination from 
award wage provisions strongly suggests that any new 
measures for the progressive application of equal pay 
principles must primarily focus on legal and 
institutional reform within the industrial wage fixing 
process. In examining the kinds of changes necessary to 
effect this reform several critical issues can be 
identified. The first of these relates to the need to 
develop suitable wage fixing methods which directly 
address the implementation of the principle of equal pay 
for work of equal value, irrespective of sex.
The implementation of equal pay principles through the 
pursuit of equal pay award wage claims has been very 
largely influenced by the operation of prevailing 
national wage fixing principles. The changing impact of
1 National Wage Case and Equal Pay Cases (1972) 147CAR 172
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these principles has meant that no clearly identifiable 
procedures have been consistently applied to facilitate 
the identification and review of alleged sex 
discrimination within the Australian wage fixing system. 
More effective procedures are required which allow for 
the adjustment of relative wage levels on a gender 
neutral basis having regard to the effort, skills and 
responsibility attached to work performed within 
specific job classifications. This must involve a 
change in the traditional emphasis placed on the need to 
establish "net additions" to work value as a fundamental 
prerequisite to the determination of work value award 
wage increases.
The practical and conceptual difficulties of devising 
suitable principles for the assessment of work value 
within wage structures has formed the subject of 
longstanding and widespread interest. Outstanding 
issues persist with regard to the need to develop gender 
neutral criteria in the conduct of comparative work 
value assessments between job classifications. These 
issues are highlighted in cases where dissimilar work 
content exists, but where similar work value is claimed.
The positive identification and treatment of gender bias
/
in such cases arguably requires a more flexible use of 
comparative work value assessments and a greater focus 
on the need for gender-neutral job evaluation 
procedures.
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The 1990 decision of the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission in the Childcare Worker's Case 2 indicates a 
recent shift in approach to the comparative assessment 
of differing job classifications involving dissimilar 
work content. Whether this precedent will eventually 
lead to the broader application of non-discriminatory 
job evaluation methods in the review of work value 
between predominantly male and female occupations 
remains to be seen. More systematic, objective and 
strategically directed procedures for the identification 
and assessment of discriminatory wage setting practices 
will be necessary, however, before any major improvement 
to the wage position of Australian women workers is 
likely to occur. These measures will be central to 
ensuring Australia's continuing compliance with its 
international treaty obligations relevant to equal 
remuneration for women workers and the removal of sex 
discrimination in all its forms.
On a more immediate and practical level, non- 
discriminatory wage fixing methods will need to be 
devised through the ongoing development of the 
structural efficiency principle and the introduction of 
enterprise wage bargaining. The manner in which 
discrimination law principles will be taken into account
2 Child Care Worker's Case. Industrial Relations Commission, September 1990, S Print J4316
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by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the 
context of these national wage fixing developments is at 
this stage unclear. The establishment of effective 
methods for the review of sex discrimination in the 
course of productivity based enterprise wage bargaining 
clearly represents a major challenge for the Australian 
wage fixing system of the 1990's.
More particularly close scrutiny will be necessary of 
the exercise of federal statutory powers involving the 
ratification of enterprise wage bargaining agreements 
under Sections 112 and 115 of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1988 (Cth). Given the relatively weak collective 
bargaining strength of women workers a careful analysis 
of enterprise bargaining developments will, over time, 
be vital to ensuring that the relative wage position of 
Australian women workers does not regress. A stronger 
commitment by trade union organisations to ensuring the 
implementation of equal pay principles will be equally 
critical to the maintenance and improvement of existing 
male/female wage relativities. This latter development 
will in turn be relevant to sustaining current levels of 
trade union membership amongst women within the paid 
labour market.
In developing appropriate wage fixing methods to deal 
more effectively with the incidence of wage 
discrimination, a primary issue emerges in assessing the
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role which prevailing market forces should play in 
determining work value. It is hardly feasible, for 
example to envisage the design of work value assessments 
in which the influence of market forces is entirely 
excluded. Similarly, it would appear over simplistic to 
allow free market forces to wholly determine wage levels 
in circumstances where discrimination in the payment of 
wage rates is in issue. While obvious conceptual 
complexities arise in maintaining a balance between 
these alternative perspectives, it is important that the 
difficulties posed should not restrict the creation of 
viable measures for the treatment of sex discrimination 
in the determination of wage rates. This is especially 
so having regard to the Australian experience in the 
industrial wage area where a familiarity has developed 
over many years with the assessment of work value across 
award classifications and the flexible adjustment of 
appropriate award wage relativities.
The extent to which market forces should be permitted to 
determine work value is integrally connected to the 
fundamental issue of whether the right to equal 
treatment irrespective of sex should remain subordinate 
to economic considerations. In considering this issue 
it is important to appreciate that neither the 
methodological approach of orthodox economic analysis, 
nor the assumptions upon which it is based are immutably
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value free or gender neutral in effect. 3 Legal 
principle would moreover suggest that the perceived 
economic effects of equal pay award wage adjustments 
should not form the basis for denying the substantive 
right to equal treatment irrespective of sex in the 
terms and conditions of employment. The restricted 
application of equal pay principles within the 
Australian wage fixing system throughout the 1980's to 
cases involving no economic flow on effects arguably 
reflects an inadequate recognition of this basic legal 
right.
The limited recognition of the right to equal treatment 
irrespective of sex within the industrial wage fixing 
system highlights the need to develop a broader 
awareness of the principles embodied within Australia's 
sex discrimination laws. This process must necessarily 
involve an increased understanding of the subleties and 
pervasiveness of gender bias in the determination of 
wage conditions. Such attitudinal change would arguably 
be enhanced by a wider appreciation of the cost, 
efficiency and human resource benefits to be obtained 
from the removal of discriminatory wage practices. The 
negative cost effects resulting from discrimination in 
the wage determination process should, for example, be
3 M Waring, Counting for Nothing, What Men Value and 
What Women are Worth. Allen & Unwin Port Nicholsen Press, 1990, p 14 ff
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taken into account in the productivity and cost 
assessments undertaken within the industrial wage 
negotiation process.
A particular emphasis has been placed in this thesis on 
examining the operation of Australia's sex 
discrimination legislation and its effect on gender wage 
discrimination within the Australian labour market. As 
outlined in Chapters Nine and Ten the direct application 
of this legislation is effectively restricted to the 
area of overaward and non award wage payments as a 
result of exemptions provided to employers acting in 
accordance with industrial wage orders. Even in 
relation to overaward and non award wage payments, 
however, it has yet to be demonstrated whether the 
statutory provisions contained under Australia's sex 
discrimination laws legally extend to accommodate the 
review of alleged discrimination in the determination of 
wage conditions. Considerable uncertainty remains 
regarding the capacity of Australia's sex discrimination 
laws to legally remedy such issues as the undervaluation 
of work predominantly performed by women. The 
uncertainty of achieving any satisfactory outcome 
through the use of existing legal procedures has 
provided little incentive for individuals or trade union 
groups seeking the review of alleged sex discrimination 
in the payment of wage rates. In contrast to other 
major industrialised countries, no identifiable legal
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jurisprudence relating to the identification and 
treatment of wage discrimination has yet emerged in 
Australia.
The lack of legal authority in relation to the issue of 
wage discrimination might be attributed to several 
factors. The first and most important of these factors 
relates to the unique Australian approach to the 
implementation of equal pay principles through the 
operation of the quasi-legislative orders of industrial 
wage tribunals. This approach has characteristically 
involved the use of flexible and non-legalistic 
procedures for the removal of discrimination from award 
wage provisions. Legal solutions have as a result 
rarely been sought or applied in securing wage outcomes 
in accordance with equal pay principles.
It is important to recall at this point that the 
industrial conciliation and arbitration process has 
historically secured wide wage reforms for Australian 
women workers through the use of collective wage 
bargaining means within a centralised wage fixing 
system. The success of the conciliation and arbitration 
process in achieving improved wage benefits for women 
workers has arguably promoted the use of non legal 
remedies as the preferred means for ensuring the 
application of equal pay principles. The achievements 
towards greater pay equity for Australian women have
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consequently been largely determined by the application 
of industrial wage procedures as distinct from the 
pursuit of statutory legal rights and the development of 
legal precedent.
The success of the Australian conciliation and 
arbitration system in delivering pay equity for women 
becomes especially apparent when comparing the size of 
the gender wage gap in Australia with other comparable 
industrialised countries. It is interesting to note, 
for example, that the wage gap between men and women 
workers within the paid labour market is significantly 
lower in Australia than the United States, Japan, Great 
Britain, Canada and New Zealand. 4 This is despite the 
existence of various legislative schemes in several of 
these overseas jurisdictions under which legal 
mechanisms have been introduced to specifically deal 
with issues of sex discrimination in the determination 
of wage rates. Such legislative schemes have 
traditionally involved the use of formal complaint based 
models with a narrow emphasis on individual legal rights 
and remedies. It is possible that the perceived 
inadequacies of these models have also partially 
detracted from the development of legal case law and
4 K MacDermott, Pay Equity, A Survey of Seven OECD 
Countries, Information Paper No. 5, Department of 
Employment, Education and Training, Women's Bureau 
AGPS, Canberra, 1987, p 67)
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authority within Australia concerned with the phenomenon 
of wage discrimination. This perception may have 
wrongly led to the assumption that legal principle has 
no useful role to play in implementing the right to non- 
discriminatory treatment in the payment of wage rates.
It is equally possible however, that the lack of legal 
development in relation to the topic of wage 
discrimination can be attributed to the restricted 
operation of the existing statutory provisions contained 
under Australia's sex discrimination legislation. Even 
where this legislation might arguably be applied in the 
case of overaward and non award wage payments, the use 
of the legal process appears to have been largely 
inhibited by the difficulties attached to characterising 
and establishing complaints of wage discrimination 
within the legislative definitions and provisions under 
Australia's sex discrimination laws.
The adequacy of existing statutory protections against 
sex discrimination in the payment of overaward wage 
rates raises particularly contentious issues in the 
context of recent developments towards a more 
decentralised wage fixing system. It is worth noting 
that increasing levels of male and female earnings are 
comprised of overaward wage payments made outside the 
centralised industrial wage fixing process. An 
immensely difficult task lies ahead in monitoring the 
level of over award payments made to men and women within
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a progressively deregulated wage market. The gathering 
of sufficiently accurate and comprehensive data on these 
gender wage differences will, nonetheless, be 
fundamental to determining the incidence and extent of 
sex discrimination within the Australian wage fixing 
system. Whether any legal rights and remedies exist to 
protect women against discrimination in the payment of 
overaward wage rates made outside the industrial wage 
fixing system is yet to be legally determined.
In conclusion, it is important to recall that the wage 
gap between men and women workers in Australia has 
failed to significantly improve over a period of almost 
fifteen years. Full time women workers in Australia 
continue to receive only 84.5% of the average weekly 
ordinary time earnings of men while women's average 
weekly wages fall to a level of 66.5% of male 
earnings. 5 It is extremely probable that these wage 
differences reflect a residual level of sex 
discrimination in the payment of wage rates. It is also 
highly likely that sex discrimination in the payment of 
wage rates will remain a continuing feature of the 
Australian wage fixing system leading into the 1990's. 
The growing participation of women workers within the 
Australian labour market would suggest that a greater
5 ABS Catalogue 6301.0, May 1991
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understanding will gradually be demanded of the complex 
issues surrounding the incidence of sex discrimination 
in the payment of wage rates. A wider knowledge of the 
principles contained within Australia's sex 
discrimination legislation should ultimately assist in 
establishing a clearer relationship between 
discrimination law and industrial law in relation to the 
regulation of women's wages.
The resolution of such key issues as the undervaluation 
of women's work will ultimately depend, however, on the 
impetus of institutional and legal reform in response to 
community and legislative demands. This will primarily 
be a matter for Australian women and the combined 
influence of women's interest groups in securing social, 
institutional and political change relevant to the 
removal of sex discrimination in all its forms.
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Sex Discrimination No. 4,1984
SCHEDULE Section 4
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women.
Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the inadmissibility 
of d iscrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and 
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, inclaiding distinction based on sex.
Noting that the Slates Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights have the obligation 
to ensure the equal right of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political 
righ is.
Considering the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and the specialised agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women.
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations adopted by the United Nations and the specialised agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women.
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive discrimination against 
women continues to exist.
Recalling that discrimination agdinst women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of humanity.
Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the least access t^food, health, education, 
training and opportunities for employment and other needs,
Convinced that the establishment of the new international economic order based on equity and justiice will contribute significantly towards the promotion of equality between men and women,
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, of all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colomialism. neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and interference in the inlerrnal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of men and women.
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace ¿nd security, relaxation of international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective' of their social and economic systems, 
general and complete disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament understrict and effective 
international control, the affirmation of the principles of justice, equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the realisation of the right of peoples under alien and colonial 
domination and foreign occupation to self-determination and independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, will promote social progress and development and as a consequence will contribute to the attainment of full equality between men and women.
Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the 
cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields,
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the development of society, so far not fully recognised, the social significance of maternity and the role of 
both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a 
sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole,
A ware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the fami ly is needed to achieve full equality between men and women.
Determined to implement the principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women and, for that purpose, to adopt the measures required for the elimination of such discrimination in all its forms and manifestations.
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SCHED ULE—continued
Have agreed on Ihc following:
PART 1
Article 1
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination against women" shall mean 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Article 2 ?
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and. to this 
end, undertake:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or 
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and 
other appropriate means, the practical realisation of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, 
prohibiting ail discrimination a^ inst women;
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure 
through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of 
women against any act of discrimination;
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure 
that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;
(c) To lake all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organisation or enterprise;
(0 To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women:
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.
Article 3
Slates Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural 
fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement 
of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.
Article 4
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality 
between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, 
but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these 
measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been 
achieved.
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the 
present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.
Article 5
Slates Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for 
men and women:
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social 
function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the 
children is the primordial consideration in ail cases.
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SCHEDULE—continued
Article 6
Slates Parties shall lake all appropriate measures, including legislation, lo suppress all forms of 
traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.
PART II
Article 7
Stat es Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
polilica l and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with 
men, th«e right:
(a) To vole in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly 
elected bodies;
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and 
to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;
(c) To participate in non-governmental organisations and associations concerned with the public
and political life of the country. u
Article 8
Staites Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and 
withou t any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international level 
and to participate in the work of international organisations.
^ Article 9
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their 
nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality 
by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her 
stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their
children. .
PART III 
Article 10
Sta tes Parlies shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
order t*o ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and in particular to ensure, on a 
basis off equality of men and women:
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for the 
achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of ail categories in rural as well as in 
urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technicalrprofessional and 
higher technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training;
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the 
same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality;
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in 
all forms of education by encouraging coeducation, and other types of education which will 
help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes 
and the adaption of teaching methods;
(d) i The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants;
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education, including adult 
and functional literacy programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest 
possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women;
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organisation of programmes for girls 
and women who have left school prematurely;
(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education;
(h) i Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being of
families, including information and advice on family planning.
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Article 11
1. Slates Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in 
particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same 
criteria for selection in matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security 
and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and 
retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work 
of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in c^scs of retirement, unemployment, sickness, 
invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the 
safeguarding of the function of reproduction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination agaiast women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to 
ensure their effective right to work. States Plrties shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of 
maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of 
former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to 
combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in 
particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care 
facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be 
harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically in 
the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as 
necessary.
Article 12
1. Slates Parties shall take ail appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health 
care services, including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. States Parties shall ensure to 
women appropriate services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, 
granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.
Article 13
Stales Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the 
same rights, in particular
(a) The right to family benefits;
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit;
(c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life.
Article 14
1. Stales Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural women and the 
significant roles which rural women play in the economic survival of their families, including their 
work in the non-monctized sectors of the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure 
the application of the provisions of this Convention to women in rural areas.
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2. State? Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in 
rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and 
benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right:
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning at all levels;
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counselling and 
services in family planning;
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes;
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including that relating 
to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and extension 
services, in order to increase their technical proficiency;
(e) To organise self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to economic 
opportunities through employment or self-employment;
( f) To participate in all-community activities;
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology 
and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes;
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity 
and water supply, transport and communications.
PART IV
Article 15
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men 
and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights 
to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in ail stages of procedure 
in courts and tribunals.
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a legal 
effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void.
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to 
the movement of persons and the freedom to chose their residence and domicile.
Article 16
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in
all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality 
of men and women: A1
(a ) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and 
full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters 
relating to their children: in ail cases the interests of the children shall be paramount:
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children 
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights:
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and 
adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legislation: 
in ail cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a 
. profession and an occupation:
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, 
administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a 
valuable consideration.
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, 
including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration 
of marriages in an official registry compulsory.
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PART v 
Article 17
1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the present 
Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at the time of entry into force of the 
Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the Convention by the thirty-fifth 
Slate Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the 
Convention. The experts shall be elected by States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in 
their personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the 
representation of the different forms of civilisation as well as the principal legal systems.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated 
by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals.
3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force of the present 
Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their nominations 
within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus 
nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the Slates 
Parties.
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of States Parties convened 
by the Secretary-General at United Natiqns Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the 
States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees 
who obtain the largest number of votes arid an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of 
States Parties present and voting.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. However, the terms of 
nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after 
the first election the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the 
Committee.
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee shall be held in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this article, following the thirty-fifth ratification or 
accession. The terms of two of the additional members elected on this occasion shall expire at the end 
of two years, the names of these two members having been chosen by lot by the Chairman of the 
Committee.
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the Stale Party whose expert has ceased to function as a 
member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its nationals, subject to the 
approval of the Committee.
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly, receive 
emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the Assembly may decide, 
having regard to the importance of the Committee’s responsibilities.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for 
the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the present Convention.
Article 18
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for 
consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures 
which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and on the progress 
made in this respect:
(a) Within one year after the entry into force for the Slate concerned; and
(b) Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever the Committee so requests.
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations 
under the present Convention.
Article 19
1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years.
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Article 20
H. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more than two weeks annually in order 
to consider the reports submitted in accordance with Article 18 of the present Convention.
2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters or at 
any other convenient place as determined by the Committee.
Article 21
I. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, report annually to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and general 
recommendations based on the examination of reports and information received from the Stales 
Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be included in the report of the 
Cormmitlce together with comments, if any, from Stales Parties.
2. The Secretary-General shall transmit the reports of the Committee to the Commission on the 
Sta tus of Women for its information.
Article 22
The specialised agencies shall be entitled- to be represented at the consideration of the 
im plementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of their activities. 
Thie Committee may invite the specialised agencies to submit reports on the implementation of the 
Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities.
PART VI
Article 23
Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achievement 
of equality between men and women which may be contained:
(a) In the legislation of a State Party: or
(b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that Slate.
Article 24
States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level aimed at achieving 
the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Convention.
Article 25
1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all Stales.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of the present 
Convention.
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited 
w/ith the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. The present Convention shall be open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by 
tlhe deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 26
1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any State Party 
by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any. to be taken in 
respect of such a request.
Article 27
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit with 
Uhe Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the 
(twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
•day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 28
l . The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all Slates the text of 
reservations made by Slates at the time of ratification or accession.
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2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be 
permitted.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform all States thereof. Such notification 
shall take efTect on the date on which it is received.
Article 29
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be 
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are 
unable to agree on the organisation of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to 
the International Court of Justice by-request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each Slate Party may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession
thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound-^by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States 
Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to any State Party which has made such a 
reservation. ^
3. Any Stale Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article
may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. -
Article 30
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which 
are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed the present Convention.
APPENDIX 2
TEXT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE 
EQUAL REMUNERATION CONVENTION, 1951 (No. 100) 
AND RECOMMENDATION, 1951 (No. 90)
Convention No. 100
Article 1
For the purpose of this Convention -
-
(a ) the term "remuneration" includes the ordinary, basic or minimum 
wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable 
directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the 
employer to the worker and arising out of the worker's employment;
(b) the tern}, "equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of 
equal value" refers to rates of remuneration established without 
discrimination based on sex.
Article 2
1. Each Member shall, by means appropriate to the methods in 
operation for determining rates of remuneration, promote and, in so far 
as is consistent with such methods, ensure the application to all 
workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers 
for work of equal value.
2. The principle may be applied by means of -
(a) national laws or regulations;
(b) legally established or recognised machinery for wage determination;
(c) collective agreements between employers and workers; or
(d) a combination of these various means.
Article 3
1. Where such action will assist in giving effect to the 
provisions of this Convention measures shall be taken to promote 
objective appraisal of jobs on the basis of the work to be performed.
2. The methods to be followed in this appraisal may be decided 
upon by the authorities responsible for the determination of rates of 
remuneration, or, where such rates are determined by collective agree­
ments, by the parties thereto.
3. Differential rates between workers which correspond, without 
regard to sex, to differences, as determined by such objective 
appraisal, in the work to be performed shall not be considered as 
being contrary to the principle of equal remuneration for men and women 
workers for work of equal value.
Article 4
Each Member shall co-operate as appropriate with the employers' 
and workers' organisations concerned for the purpose of giving effect 
to the provisions of this Convention.
APPENDIX 3
Recommendation No. 90
1. Appropriate action should be taken, after consultation with 
the workers1 organisations concerned or, where such organisations do 
not exist, with the workers concerned -
(a) to ensure the application of the principle of equal remuneration 
for men and women workers for work of equal value to all 
employees of central government departments or agencies; and
(b) to encourage the application of the principle to employees of 
state, provincial or local government departments or agencies, 
where these have jurisdiction over rates of remuneration.
2. Appropriate action should be taken, after consultation with 
the employers' and workers' organisations concerned, to ensure, as 
rapidly as practicable, the application of the principle of equal 
remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value in all 
occupations, other than those mentioned in Paragraph 1, in which rate 
of remuneration are subject to statutory regulation or public control 
particularly as regards -
(a) the establishment of minimum or other wage rates in industries 
and services where such rates are determined under public 
authority;
(b) industries and undertakings operated under public ownership or 
control ; and
(c) where appropriate, work executed under the terms of public 
contracts.
3. (1) Where appropriate in the light of the methods in opera­
tion for the determination of rates of remuneration, provision should 
be made by legal enactment for/.the general application of the 
principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of 
equal value.
(2) The competent public authority should take all necessary and 
appropriate measuresVto ensure that employers and workers are fully 
informed as to such legal requirements and, where appropriate, advised 
on their application.
4. When, after consultation with the organisations of workers 
and employers concerned, where such exist, it is not deemed feasible 
to implement immediately the principle of equal remuneration for men 
and women Workers for work of equal value, in respect of employment 
covered by Paragraph 1, 2 or 3, appropriate provision should be made
or caused to be made, as soon as possible, for its progressive applica­
tion, by such measures as -
(a) decreasing the differentials between rates of remuneration for 
men and rates of remuneration for women for work of equal value;
(b) where a system of increments is in force, providing equal 
increments for men and women workers performing work of equal 
value.
5. Where appropriate for the purpose of facilitating the deter­
mination of rates or remuneration in accordance with the principle of 
equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value, 
each Member should, in agreement with the employers' and workers' 
organisations concerned, establish or encourage the establishment of 
methods for objective appraisal of the work to be performed, whether 
by job analysis or by other procedures, with a view to providing a 
classification of jobs without regard to sex; such methods should be 
applied in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the 
Convention.
6. In order to facilitate the application of the principle of 
equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value, 
appropriate action should be taken, where necessary, to raise the 
productive efficiency of women workers by such measures as -
(a) ensuring that workers of both sexes have equal or equivalent 
facilities for vocational guidance or employment counselling, for 
vocational training and for placement;
(b) taking appropriate measures to encourage women to use facilities 
for vocational guidance or employment counselling, for vocational 
training and for placement;
(c) providing welfare and social services which meet the needs of 
women workers, particularly those w'ith family responsibilities, 
and financing such services from social security or industrial 
welfare funds financed by payments made in respect of workers 
without regard to sex; and
(d) promoting equality of men and women workers as regards access to 
occupations and posts without prejudice to the provisions of 
international regulations and of national laws and regulations 
concerning the protection of the health and welfare of .women.
7. Every effort should be made to promote public understanding 
of the grounds on which it is considered that the principle of equal 
remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value should 
be implemented.
8. Such investigations as may be desirable to promote the appli­
cation of the principle should be undertaken.
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APPENDIX
EMENDATIONS TO THE THESIS
Table of Statutes 
Insert:
Industrial Conciliation Act 1972 (SA)
Industrial Relations Act 1979 (Vic)
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SA)
Equal Opportunity Act 1977 (Vic)
Table of Cases 
Insert:
National Wage Case (1974) 157 CAR 293
Replace Ex Parte H V McKay with Ex Parte Harvester v Mckay
Replace Koowarte v Bielke Peterson with Koowarta v Bielke Peterson
Page 10 line 1 insert:
Section 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution provides a specific head of 
legislative power which allows the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with 
respect to the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes extending beyond 
the limits of any one State . A strong emphasis on conciliation and arbitration is 
further reflected within the regulatory framework adopted by State Governments 
in Australia. The legislative structures developed in Australia by both State and 
federal Governments have led to an industrial arbitration system where wage 
claims are negotiated on a collective basis. These negotiations are predominantly 
undertaken by trade union organisations seeking wage benefits on behalf of 
groups or classes of employees falling within particular award categories.
The differences in approach to the definition and implementation of equal pay 
principles has led to important differences in the way in which work value has 
traditionally been determined in Australia and the United States. In the United 
States work value is customarily assessed having regard to the "worth" of the 
work undertaken to the employer. In Australia the value of work has been held to 
refer to worth in terms of award wage or salary fixation. These differences in 
approach in part reflect the different institutional systems used to implement equal
pay principles in Australia and the United States. In Australia the focus on 
conciliation and arbitration through industrial wage bargaining is to be contrasted 
with the judicial approach adopted in the U.S. with its bias towards legal 
remedies aimed to enforce individual and representative rights and freedoms..
Page 11 line 20 insert
This is not to say, however, that a difference in earnings between men and women 
would alone be sufficient to legally establish a complaint of wage discrimination. 
An evidentiary inference is, nonetheless, capable of arising in certain 
circumstances where wage differences exist. This is implicitly recognised by the 
CEDAW Committee: Footnote See p295.
It is also consistent with the approach adopted in the Danfoss case: Footnote 
(1989) IRLR 532. In this case the European Court held that under the EEC Equal 
Pay Directive, the burden of proof is on an employer to show that a pay practice is 
not discriminatory where a female worker establishes, by comparison with a 
relatively large number of employees, that the average pay of female workers is 
lower than that of male workers.
pl2-13
Footnote 23 insert:
The need to take into account all factors relating to differences in pay is critical to 
the identification of discrimination in the payment or determination of wage rates. 
This is so irrespective of whether worth of a job means worth to the employer or 
whether it is more broadly determined in terms of award wage fixation.
pl4 footnote 27 line 2
Replace 1984 with 1988
p 34 line 1
Replace with" Commission in the 1988 National Wage Case and the decision by 
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the 1989 National Wage Case 
decision. "
p38 line 9 insert:
Equal pay principles were first implemented in Australia in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's as a result of several test case proceedings brought within the 
industrial law jurisdiction.
p40 line 12 insert:
In 1918 the decision of Waterside Worker's Federation of Australia vJW  
Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434 established that the Commonwealth Parliament 
could only confer judicial power on Courts established under Chapter III of the 
Constitution.
In the Wheat case (1915) 20 CLR 54 similar views were expressed by the High 
Court regarding the need to ensure a distinct separation between the executive and 
the judicial arms of government. Here it was held that any powers of adjudication 
exercised by bodies other than courts must be confined to executive and 
administrative functions.
p40 line 17 insert:
The High Court's decision in Boilermaker's was upheld on appeal to the Privy 
Council: R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermaker's Society o f Australia (1956) 94 CLR 
254.
p42 line 5 insert:
In 1936 the High Court held in R v Burgess; Ex Parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 
that the Commonwealth Parliament had the power under Section 51(xxix) to do 
anything reasonably incidental to carrying out external treaty obligations. More 
recently an expansive view of the foreign affairs power was adopted by the High 
Court in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 and Koowarta v Bjelke 
-Peterson (1982) 153 CLR 168.
p44 line 6 insert:
"a similar emphasis has been placed on the benefits of conciliation and arbitration 
as a means of resolving industrial disputes."
Footnote: Legislative changes in Queensland, South Australia and New South 
Wales have occurred since the cut off point of March 1991 identified at the 
introduction of the thesis.
Page 46 line 16 insert
In establishing that work provides the same rate of profit to an employer it was 
held by McNaughton J that:
Footnote 7: Amend to read Section 15A Public Service Act 1984 (Vic)
Page 53 line 4
Insert "federal" before "industrial tribunal" 
line 6
Replace "Where a federal award is breached penalties may be imposed by Courts" 
line 9 insert
An industrial award does not, however, confer rights on persons who are not 
parties to it.
Page 54
Footnote: A more detailed account of recent developments in relation to 
collecting wage bargaining is set out in Chapters 2-8.
Page 55 line 2
delete the word "only" 
line 5 insert:
While it is possible for parties other than those nominated under Section 99 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) to notify an industrial dispute, the likelihood 
of this occurring is remote.
Page 56 line 11 insert:
"It is not possible for a federal industrial wage tribunal to determine an equal pay 
claim unless "
Footnote: See, for example, Federated Municipal and Shire Commonwealth 
Employee's Union o f Australia Case.
Page 57 Footnote 31 insert:
Does this wage disparity accurately reflect gender neutral differences in terms of 
effort, skill and responsibility in the workplace? See Handels v Danfoss [1989] 
IRLR 533.
Page 58 line 6 insert:
The family day care decision involving the Federated Municipal and Shire 
Commonwealth Employee's Union of Australia was handed down on 5 April, 
1991.
The Commission decided that the general finding of a dispute in relation to the 
Councils sponsoring family day care schemes in Victoria and Tasmania could not 
be allowed to stand. The Commission determined that any dispute between the
Union and the Councils sponsoring these schemes did not extend beyond Victoria. 
Accordingly there was no industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988.
In the concluded view of Justice Boulton, Justice Munro and Commissioner 
Donaldson:
"the nature of the relationship between the care providers and Councils is not, 
except in limited cases to which we have referred, one of employment."
The limited cases referred to by the Commission involved an isolated number of 
Melbourne City Councils. The number of workers employed by these Councils 
represented a small percentage of the 15, 000 family day care workers engaged to 
perform child care services . As a result of the decision the vast majority of 
women workers within the family day care scheme were denied access to the 
industrial arbitration process governed by the AIRC.
Page 59
Replace Ex Parte H V McKay with Ex Parte Harvester v Mckav
Page 64 line 20 replace:
"Commission" with the word "Court"
Page 105
Footnote: Laura Bennett, "Equal Pay and Comparable Worth and the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission", Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 
30, 1988.
Page 152 line 15:
Delete "and"
Page 154 line 9 insert:
More particularly the number of women participating within the Australian labour 
market increased from 49.1 % in 1987 to 52 % in 1990. Footnote: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Catalogue 6203 (1984,1987, 1990). This increase 
predominantly reflects however, a growth in the participation of part time women 
workers as distinct from full time employees.
Page 185 line 8:
Replace criteria with criterion 
Page 185 line 22:
Replace compliment with complement 
Page 196 line 6
Replace Section with Sector
Page 211 p 12 delete:
"Commission"
Page 218 insert:
Footnote: formal adjudication procedures are discussed at pp241-2 
Page 222 insert:
Caridi v Steiger illustrates the way in which Section 31 of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972 (SA) served to prevent an application to 
the South Australian Industrial Commission in circumstances where the applicants 
had already lodged a complaint under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984. The case 
upheld the power of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission to 
determine the complaint. As noted at p223 it illustrates the tendency of the Courts 
to interpret the terms of discrimination legislation as operating consistently with 
industrial law.
Similarly, the case of R v Sex Discrimination Board;exparte Cope relates to 
allegations of wrongful dismissal. It chiefly endorses Wardley, and illustrates the 
way in which industrial law and discrimination can coexist: see p 222. It involves 
a piece of State legislation which has since been superseded. It is not directly 
concerned with the issue of wage discrimination, or the regulation of women's 
wage rates.
Page 228 insert:
The broad terms of Section 14 might reasonably be interpreted with reference to 
the provisions of Article 11 of the Convention attached to the Act. To this extent 
the terms of Article 11 are relevant to the development of Australian domestic 
law.
Section 3 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 states that one of the objects of the 
Act is to give effect to certain provisions of the Convention. Article 11 is one 
such provision.
Sub-Section 9 (10) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 provides that:
"If the Convention is in force in relation to Australia, the prescribed provisions 
of Part II and the provisions of Division 3 of Part II have effect in relation to 
discrimination against women to the extent that the provisions give effect to the 
Convention."
Circumstances can arise where none of the provisions of Section 9 can be relied 
upon to legally support a claim of sex discrimination in employment other than 
Sub-Section 9(10), (e.g a complaint of sex discrimination in Tasmania involving 
employment in an unincorporated small business). The constitutional validity of 
Section 14 relies in such cases on the operation of the external affairs power under 
s 51(xxix) of the Constitution.
Page 245ff
Footnote: The Waters decision was handed down in December 1991, 
immediately following the submission of this thesis for examination. It has not 
therefore been considered. Banovic is referred to at pp 250-251. Seep 251 
where the issue of whether a requirement or condition will arise is demonstrated 
to be clearly open to legal argument. This point is reinforced at p255 where the 
possibility is noted that Section 5(2) might not be legally interpreted in such a way 
as to support a claim of indirect discrimination in the determination of wage rates.
Page 252 line 19 replace:
S5(l)(a) with S5(2)(a)
Page 255 replace line 4
"In determining whether the Sex Discrimination Act might be applied to remedy 
complaints of indirect discrimination in the payment of wage rates different fact 
circumstances will need to be taken into account in each case. Numbers in a 
workplace, in occupational groups, in industries or sectors could be relevant to 
determining the base populations necessary to substantiate any particular claim of 
wage discrimination. Mere numbers in relation to sexual imbalance may not 
satisfy however the regulatory requirements relevant to the comparison of 
proportions under Section 5 (2)(a) of the Act.
Whether a requirement is discriminatory will further depend upon the legal 
determination of the issue of 'reasonableness'"
Page 266
On another view Section 41A of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act might be 
interpreted as relating to wage determinations made only in respect of 
Commonwealth government employment.
Bibliography insert:
L. Bennett, "Legal Intervention and the Female Workforce: The Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court 1907-1921" (1984) 12 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 23
Replace McGarry with McCarry
Replace Ronald with Ronalds (first reference)
